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A B S T R A C T
Evolutionary anthropology seeks answers to the eternal philosophical question: how
have we come to be? Studies in evolutionary anthropology attempt to explain the
evolution of uniquely human behaviours by investigating the mechanisms that drive
different trajectories. In this thesis dynamic mathematical models are built to investig-
ate the tradeoffs defining divergent evolutionary pathways of strategic choice. This is
done by comparing evolutionary equilibria at great ape-like and hunter-gatherer-like
life histories.
One investigation considers the evolution of pair bonding in humans. Mate guard-
ing that pays off in increased likelihood of obtaining paternities outperforms strategies
of paternal care at hunter-gatherer-like male-biased sex ratios while multiple mating is
the evolutionary equilibrium at chimpanzee-like female-biased sex ratios. This demon-
strates the promise of mate guarding as a pathway to social monogamy and links male
reproductive strategies to the grandmother hypothesis through sex ratio dependence.
Competition and care as male reproductive strategies are then investigated more
generally in an ordinary differential equation model. Equilibria depend on life history
and benefit parameters.
An integro-difference equation model that explores the effect of non-parental imit-
ation on the coevolution of low fertility at high socio-economic status is also given,
applying Darwinian selection to a contemporary case of cultural evolution.
This thesis shows that competitive strategies often pay off at human-like paramet-
ers despite the possibility of increased offspring survivorship through care. However,
coexistence or persistence of a non-competitive strategy may also occur under specific
parameters.
Uncovering drivers of the evolution of different male reproductive strategies is im-
portant for guiding further research and shedding light on why we are so different
from other great apes.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
1
introduction 2
The application of mathematical modelling to the investigation of social behaviours
has been an increasingly growing field of curiosity in recent decades (e.g. Chan et al.,
2016; Jennions and Fromhage, 2017; Kokko, 2008; Laland, 1993; Schacht and Bell, 2016).
The techniques and models developed within mathematical modelling have the power
to illuminate and inform hypotheses regarding interactions and behaviours between
populations. For example, between cells, insects, or individuals investing in competing
behavioural strategies. Our own daily interactions with society and the world around
us may lead us to think that attempting to simplify or quantify human behaviour
is too complex, as choices and strategies appear to exist outside of straightforward al-
gorithms. How can one possibly attempt to express human interaction by using simply
a few variables? This is what I venture to do in this thesis. Drawing from various dis-
ciplines and fields of research, I use mathematical modelling to shed light on some of
the mysteries of human behaviour and evolution.
Creating mathematical models that allow for the investigation of mechanisms of
individual behaviour is a useful tool in obtaining evidence to either support or neg-
ate existing hypotheses. Such modelling techniques are able to marry interdisciplinary
information and develop quantitative analysis that can inform the problem at hand.
Gatenby and Maini (2003, p.76) emphasise the indispensability of "[developing] mech-
anistic models that provide real insights into critical parameters that control system
dynamics". This marriage between mathematical modelling and behavioural interac-
tions is the intersection in which this thesis sits.
Questions within evolutionary anthropology and cultural evolution are investig-
ated through the lens of dynamical systems. I develop models of human behavioural
strategies with an emphasis on the male side of the story of human life history, and in
doing so seek to uncover some of the mechanisms that drive the evolution of uniquely
human, counter-intuitive behaviours and traits. What are the selection pressures lead-
ing to monogamy in humans? Why do males tend towards competition over caring
behaviours? Can we learn more about the mechanisms that drive modern societies to
low fertilities?
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1.1 human life history and mathematical modelling
The eternal philosophical question, "Where do we come from?" is pervasive in human
experience and informs and inspires evolutionary anthropological research. The stud-
ies in this thesis seek answers to this question and consider the selection pressures
and mechanisms by which we as humans have come to be unique in the ways that we
interact with and manipulate the world around us. Some of these differences include
large brains, long postmenopausal life spans, and long interbirth intervals.
Persistence of different behaviours is often dependent on the tradeoff between effort
invested in reproduction and effort invested in somatic maintenance. Life history the-
ory explores these tradeoffs by considering determinants relating to specifics of growth,
fertility and mortality. For example, costs of increasing the success of reproduction may
trade off with a reduction in energy spent on physical or somatic maintenance and im-
munity. Energy is redirected or diverted, following pathways that increase fitness. It is
the balance of these tradeoffs that establishes evolutionarily stable strategies.
It is the combination of selection pressures influencing mortality and fer-
tility that will favour a particular life history strategy, and models reveal
that small changes in these selection pressures can have large effects on the
optimal life history. (Mace, 2000, p.8)
Exploring these tradeoffs and finding the tipping point between the costs and bene-
fits of competing strategies can help us understand the selection pressures that drive
changes to behaviour and, in particular, that so sets us apart from our closest cousins,
the great apes. Is it possible to quantify and compare these tradeoffs in order to track
changes in evolutionary trajectories? Investigations of this are based on the theory of
natural selection, originally established by Darwin (1871). This work has shaped stud-
ies of humanity ever since.
Studies of modern hunter-gatherers and other small-scale societies are crucial in un-
derstanding human evolution and the selection pressures of ancestral humans. While
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few hunter-gatherer or foraging communities exist in the modern world, there has
been much ethnographic and demographic interest in these people groups. Through-
out anthropological literature, ethnographic data is available for many of these people
groups, as well as the great apes (e.g. Hawkes et al., 1991, 2001; Hill et al., 2001, 2007;
Hill and Hurtado, 1996; Howell, 1979; Blurton Jones, 2016; Muller and Wrangham,
2014). Ethnographic and archaeological research of populations such as these provide
a guide to thinking about human behaviour within an environment representative of
human ancestral lifestyles, in particular considering the trajectory of human behaviour
had modern healthcare and contraception not intervened (von Rueden et al., 2014).
Marlowe (2005) further highlights the importance of this information in evolutionary
anthropology and evolutionary biology, stating that "the ethnographic record of for-
agers provides the only direct observations of human behaviour in the absence of
agriculture, and as such is invaluable for testing hypotheses about human behavioural
evolution" (Marlowe, 2005, p.1).
In exploring human life history, there has been much interest in the mechanisms of
female postmenopausal life span, mate guarding and pair bonding, and large-game
hunting. These behaviours, observed in hunter-gatherers, are uniquely human and
at first glance counter-intuitive. Natural selection might assume the persistence of
strategies that produce more surviving offspring. However, this is often not the case.
Selfish behaviours, or behaviours that reduce the fitness of the population as a whole,
can persist by mechanisms of maladaptive competition and costly signalling (as mod-
elled by Grafen, 1990a,b, for example), winning over strategies that seem more benefi-
cial to the group. Such mechanisms are sometimes difficult to prove by exposition.
The interdisciplinary partnership of anthropology and mathematics has been instru-
mental in the exploration of hypotheses surrounding these behaviours by quantifying
and analysing the long-term equilibrium evolutionary benefits of these behaviours (e.g.
Grafen and Ridley, 1983; Grafen, 1990b,a; Hawkes et al., 1995; Kim et al., 2012, 2014;
Kokko and Jennions, 2003, 2008; Schacht and Bell, 2016). However while a wide range
of models exist for the investigation of questions in evolutionary anthropology, much
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of this research is founded in ideas of game theory, and specifically, optimal foraging
theory or fitness maximisation (Charnov, 1976; Hill et al., 1987; Smith, 1972; Pyke et al.,
1977), or statistical analysis of empirical data. Dynamical systems modelling of behavi-
oural strategies is lacking, and generally under appreciated by the mathematical world.
In this thesis, I follow the instructive work of Hawkes et al. (1995) to investigate the
evolution of male reproductive strategies. These studies are given in Chapters 2 and
3, where I explore the possibility of mate guarding as an avenue to pair bonding in
humans. Hawkes et al. (1995) investigated the tradeoffs between three strategies (mate
guarding, care and multiple mating), and showed persistence of mate guarding in a
wide range of situations. However, pair bonding is rare in mammals. This begs the
question, what drives the evolution of pair bonding in some populations, but not oth-
ers?
One suggestion follows from Coxworth et al. (2015), who note the shift in adult
sex ratio that emerges as postmenopausal longevity evolved in humans. As ecological
changes created a fitness opportunity for subsidies provided by ‘grandmothers’, the
increase in longevity caused a shift in adult sex ratios from female-biased ape-like sex
ratios to male-biased hunter-gatherer-like sex ratios. This is the result of males remain-
ing fertile until old age, but the female age of menopause staying around 45 despite the
increased longevity. These male-biased sex ratios cause an increase in male competition
as female mates per male become scarce. Thus, the payoffs to male reproductive invest-
ment necessarily shift as sex ratios change. This is the premise of research conducted
in Chapters 2 and 3. I investigate the effect of changing sex ratios on the evolution of
male reproductive strategies, and align these discoveries with demographic studies of
chimpanzees and hunter-gatherers.
In the first model in Chapter 2, I critique a model from the literature (Schacht and
Bell, 2016) and develop an ordinary differential equation model to investigate the effect
of sex ratios on male reproductive strategies. I show that the winning strategy is highly
dependent on the sex ratio. In Chapter 3, I continue this investigation by making expli-
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cit assumptions that were implicit in previous models. I develop a difference equation
model in order to accurately model the male’s dilemma, where increased production
raises the payoff for theft (Hawkes et al., 1995; Tullock, 1974). By explicitly studying
inefficiencies in guarding and emphasising that paternities should be necessarily un-
certain regardless of the number of pairs formed, I investigate the dependence of male
reproductive strategies on both the adult sex ratio and the efficiency of guarding.
In these models, mate guarding trades off with alternative strategies of care and mul-
tiple mating, but care is an insufficient explanation for the evolution of pair bonding,
as it fails to outcompete guarding at male-biased sex ratios. At these hunter-gatherer-
like sex ratios, the scarcity of females relative to males creates a selection pressure for
traits that increase one’s competitive standing for paternities amongst peers. It is com-
petition that outperforms care in this investigation of pair bonding.
In Chapter 4, I then consider a general model of the male mating strategies of com-
petition and care, where competition pays off in increased likelihood of obtaining pa-
ternities and care pays off in differential offspring survival. This addresses the question
of sex-role divergence, and explores why males tend towards competition over caring
strategies. The investigation follows from the Fisher condition (Fisher, 1930), which
highlights the importance of gametic differences on strategic investment. Since male
gametes are small but more numerous compared to females’ large but fewer gametes,
males are able to bear the cost of producing more gametes that go wasted in compet-
ition. I develop a model of this interaction between the costs of care and competition
and apply this model to the problem of large-game hunting.
Ethnographic studies of the Hadza people in Tanzania highlight the uniqueness of
human large-game hunting, where investment in large-game hunting does not return
direct offspring survival benefits (Hawkes, 1991; Hawkes et al., 1991; Hawkes, 1993;
Hawkes et al., 2001; O’Connell et al., 1988). While the classical hunting hypothesis (Lan-
caster and Lancaster, 1983; Washburn and Lancaster, 1968) would propose that this
strategy evolves out of paternal care, where the successful capture of game results in
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the direct provisioning of offspring, this optimistic hypothesis fails to align with ethno-
graphic research. There is no observed correlation between the success of hunters and
the differential provisioning of their offspring. Instead, the show-off hypothesis pro-
poses that this behaviour is a costly signal and investment increases one’s likelihood
of obtaining paternities as others defer to better hunters (Hawkes, 1991; Hawkes et al.,
1991; Hawkes, 1993). This is supported by the observation that successful hunters are
deemed better mates and subsequently obtain more paternities (Hawkes et al., 2001).
Investment in one’s deferential competitive standing amongst peers is key to under-
standing this tradeoff. When do selection pressures drive the evolution of competition
and increased likelihood of paternities over provisioning and increased offspring sur-
vivorship?
1.2 cultural evolution
Techniques and concepts from evolutionary anthropology and evolutionary biology are
often employed in questions regarding the cultural evolution of behaviours in contem-
porary society (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Mace, 2000; Mesoudi et al., 2007; Mesoudi,
2011; Richerson and Boyd, 1984). Using Darwinian evolution theory, mechanisms that
drive the evolution of culture can be explored. In Chapter 5, a novel dynamic mathem-
atical model of the cultural evolution of low fertility at high socio-economic status is
explored. Natural selection might imply the evolution of high fertility when individu-
als have access to greater wealth. However, improvements in socio-economic status are
instead negatively correlated with fertility (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; Bryant, 2007; Livi-
Bacci, 1986). Due to this evolution, more than half of the global population now live
in countries with below replacement fertilities. This can be thought of as demographic
transition, as fertilities decreased with the shift from pre- to post-industrial societies
(e.g. Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Bryant, 2007; Kaplan, 1996;
Livi-Bacci, 1986; Mace, 1996). However, for the scope of this investigation, I explore
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the transversal dimension of this evolution, investigating the within population hetero-
geneity that emerges with high socio-economic status individuals evolving to lower
fertilities than their lower socio-economic status counterparts.
Investigating drivers of the evolution of low fertility is important in understanding
population dynamics and comparing societies. Understanding the mechanisms of this
shift may assist in managing ageing populations and drastically decreasing fertility
levels. An integro-difference equation model is developed and sensitivity analysis per-
formed to determine regions within which low fertility evolves at high socio-economic
status, while allowing for strategic choice within the framework of cultural evolution
where imitation from non-parents is informed by Darwinian evolution. In doing this
I seek answers to the question: what are the mechanisms that drive the effects of mal-
adaptive competition and lead those of higher socio-economic status to invest in lower
fertilities? I investigate the effects of wealth distribution and social learning.
Throughout these studies, competitive strategies evolve despite the subsequent sacri-
fice in overall population fitness. In this thesis I will demonstrate the utility of mathem-
atical modelling — and dynamical systems modelling in particular — in investigating
these reproductive tradeoffs and in exploring possible evolutionary trajectories.
2
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Although we humans share many features with other members of the primate or-
der, especially with the closest living members of our hominid family — members
of genus Pan including chimpanzees — there are substantial differences between our
lineage and that of other primates. These differences include larger brains, long post-
menopausal life spans, shorter interbirth intervals, intergenerational care of offspring,
and the habit of pair bonding. In this chapter, I consider this pair-bonding habit and
explore the effects of changing sex ratios on the evolution of this observed social mono-
gamy.
Persistent bonds between mating pairs are common in birds, but social monogamy
is rare in mammals where females are committed to internal gestation and lactation.
Those female commitments influence opportunities for fathering. Males may gain more
paternities by outcompeting other males for multiple mates rather than remaining with
one. Yet, unlike most mammals, including our closest primate cousins, humans regu-
larly form pair bonds. The stability of these relationships varies widely both among
and within human communities, but adults usually form pair bonds across the wide
array of subsistence and social systems observed both historically and ethnographic-
ally.
To explain the origins of human pair bonding, evolutionary anthropologists use
many lines of evidence. Two of them are especially influential: first, the archaeolo-
gical record of human lineage that begins more than two million years ago with stone
tools and the bones of large animals; and second, among living people who depend
on wild foods, men usually hunt while women usually gather. This sexual division of
labour is addressed in more detail Chapter 4. Our human species, let alone the homo
genus, evolved before the origins of agriculture about 10-12 thousand years ago. So
hunter-gatherers are especially useful windows into the ancient problems and solu-
tions that contributed to the evolution of our lineage as was noted in the Introduction
of this thesis. The earliest archaeology and foraging specialisations by sex seem con-
sistent with the hunting hypothesis, which proposes that human pair bonding evolved
when ancestral populations began to rely on hunting and ancestral females paired
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with hunters who in turn provisioned their offspring. This long favoured hypothesis
assumes that pair bonding arises from benefits for paternal investment in the survival
of children (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1983; Washburn and Lancaster, 1968). However,
others suggest that this reliance on paternal provisioning is insufficient, instead propos-
ing that alternative mechanisms resulted in an evolutionary push towards pair bonds
(Hawkes et al., 1995; Lukas and Clutton-Brock, 2013; Marlowe, 2000; Marlowe and
Berbesque, 2012).
The benefit of this paternal provisioning made nuclear families units of common
economic and reproductive interest, resulting in the shorter interbirth intervals and
higher survival of long-dependent juveniles that is characteristic of humans (Kaplan
et al., 2000; Lancaster and Lancaster, 1983; Washburn and Lancaster, 1968). However,
paternal provisioning and pair bonding are absent in the non-human members of the
great ape radiation, indicating that an alternate male strategy of multiple mating, with
males competing for paternities of the offspring of all available females, is the likely
ancestral condition of human lineage. When most males are seeking multiple mates,
caring for dependent juveniles must not only trade off against the possibility of gain-
ing more paternities elsewhere, but also risk supplying fitness benefits to competitors
who secure the paternities of those dependants. This points to possible benefits for a
third strategy. In addition to seeking multiple mates or devoting care to dependants, a
male might invest his time and effort in guarding a mate to prevent competitors from
gaining extra-pair paternities. Guarding is the action of protecting one’s mate from
successful mating with a competing male.
From this perspective, males are faced with a form of "the social dilemma" where
increased production — in this case care that increases the survival of dependants
— raises the payoff for theft (Hawkes et al., 1995; Tullock, 1974). If those who mate
with multiple females without paying the cost of paternal investment can appropriate
the fitness benefits supplied by carers, caring strategies could not spread. This male’s
dilemma (Hawkes et al., 1995) points to a benefit for males who allocate effort to guard-
ing their females in order to raise their own probability of paternity. Mate guarding
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increases the probability that the paternity of offspring born to a guarded female be-
longs to the guarding male rather than a multiple mater. With the male’s dilemma in
mind, mate guarding may be an especially important form of male competition and a
possible avenue to pair bonding.
This simplification of payoffs identifies three mutually exclusive ways for males to
earn reproductive benefits. Net gains from effort devoted to seeking additional mates,
increasing dependant survival, or increasing paternity certainty are dependent on the
strategies of the competing males.
Recent work increasingly challenges conventional arguments of paternal provision-
ing as the pathway for the evolution of pair bonds in humans. This includes quantitat-
ive observations of modern hunter-gatherers in which the daily failure risk of hunters,
coupled with wide distribution of bonanzas when they are successful, challenges the
view that hunting is paternal effort. The meat of big animals is not controlled by
the successful hunter but treated as a common good with shares claimed widely and
mostly consumed by those outside of his own nuclear family (Hawkes, 1993; Hawkes
et al., 2014; Wood and Marlowe, 2013). This wide sharing of resources is investigated in
Chapter 4. Moreover, comparative analyses of the social systems of non-human mam-
mals find that when paternal care does occur, it is a consequence rather than a cause
of pair bonding or social monogamy (de Waal and Gavrilets, 2013; Lukas and Clutton-
Brock, 2013).
The possibility that mate guarding has been an avenue to pair bonding deserves par-
ticular attention for the evolution of human lineage because humans are distinguished
from the great apes by remarkable longevity which includes a long post-fertile life
stage in women (Alberts et al., 2013; Croft et al., 2015; Levitis et al., 2013). One hypo-
thesis about the evolution of human life history proposes that the long postmenopausal
life span evident in humans was driven by grandmothering (Hawkes et al., 1998). Kim
and colleagues’ (Kim et al., 2012, 2014) two-sex agent-based model of this hypothesis
results in a male-biased shift in sex ratio in the fertile ages as grandmothering pro-
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pels longevity past the end of female fertility, while males remain fertile to old age
(Coxworth et al., 2015). When the number of competitors rises relative to the availab-
ility and eligibility of fertile females, males gain fitness advantages by altering their
strategies in response to the increase in competition (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1992;
Harts and Kokko, 2013; Marlowe and Berbesque, 2012). Because most organisms are
fertile throughout adulthood, the sex ratio in the fertile ages is generally labelled the
adult sex ratio (ASR). Coxworth et al. (2015) use the model developed by Kim et al.
(2014) to track the evolution of changing ASRs with the evolution of a human-like
grandmothering life history and propose that it was the human male-biased ASR that
propelled the evolution of our pair-bonding habit.
A model of three male mating strategies (dependant care, multiple mating, and mate
guarding) is developed in this chapter and the response of payoffs to changes in the
sex ratio in the fertile ages, the ASR, are analysed. These strategies have been modelled
in the literature in varying combinations and to varying degrees of success (Fromhage
et al., 2007; Grafen and Ridley, 1983; Gross, 2005; Kokko and Jennions, 2003; Kokko and
Rankin, 2006; Kokko, 2008; Kokko and Jennions, 2008; Marlowe and Berbesque, 2012;
Winkler, 1987).
I begin the investigation of these male reproductive strategies by detailing the re-
cursion model developed by Schacht and Bell (2016) and critiquing some of the as-
sumptions of their model. Following the lead of, but departing from, this recursion
model developed by Schacht and Bell (2016), I develop an ordinary differential equa-
tion (ODE) model, adjust the method of obtaining the ASR and introduce parameters
that allow for guarding inefficiency. Where Schacht and Bell (2016) adjust the ASR by
assuming that guarding is perfect and eternal, permanently removing guarded females
and their guards from the population and thus changing the ASR, the ODE model in
this chapter parametrises the ASR and analyses its effect on long-term equilibrium
strategies using bifurcation analysis. This one-sex model does not explicitly model the
female population, instead parametrising female availability by the sex ratio. This dif-
fers from how Gavrilets (2012) addressed the male’s dilemma by focusing on female
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faithfulness and preference for carers. However, this focus on female preference ignores
empirical evidence that hunter-gatherer males do not prioritise paternal provisioning.
The introduction of parameters of guarding inefficiency also allow for the investigation
of the effect of theft on guarding when paternity is slightly uncertain.
2.1 outline of recursion model by Schacht and Bell (2016)
The following section outlines the recursion model developed by Schacht and Bell
(2016) in further mathematical detail than originally presented and proposes changes
to the model which are then developed in Section 2.2. The model tracks the evolution
of three male strategies as they respond to changes in the sex ratio. These strategies are
defined as paternal care to dependants (PC), mate guarding (MG) and multiple mating
(MM), and have respective frequencies p, q, and 1− p− q. Male mating success is fre-
quency dependent on Mt/Ft, the ratio of all fertile non-guarding males to unguarded
females at time t, which is defined on discrete fixed intervals. These intervals give one
time step as the time taken from conception to independence, or sexual maturity. The
fitness of each male strategy shifts in response to changes in this sex ratio as this indic-
ates partner availability. Evolutionary dynamics of strategy frequencies are simulated
by calculating equilibrium fitnesses of each strategy as the sex ratio changes. Figure 2.1
is a schematic chart of the recursive algorithm outlined in Schacht and Bell (2016).
2.1.1 Adult sex ratio dynamics
In Schacht and Bell (2016) the adult sex ratio, Mt/Ft, described does not strictly fol-
low the standard definition of the ASR, which includes all fertile adults regardless
of a female’s present fertility status. Within their model, the adult sex ratio shifts as
per-partner availability changes with the establishment of pair bonds. Adult sex ra-
tio dynamics are defined as proportional to the change in the frequency of guarding
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Figure 2.1: Schematic diagram of each time step within the recursion model developed
by Schacht and Bell (2016).
males. Due to the assumption of perfectly successful mate guarding in the model, fe-
males who are guarded by guarding males and the males guarding them are removed
from the mating pool. The sex ratio changes in response to this bond formation, as
the overall number of eligible, unpaired mating males and females changes. This in
turn affects the strategic choices of the remaining males. This construction reflects a
sex ratio more akin to the definition of the operational sex ratio (OSR) — for example,
as defined by Emlen and Oring (1977) and Mitani et al. (1996) — which convention-
ally includes only those eligible for conception, or the mating sex ratio. For example,
in mammals, the OSR does not include females who are unable to conceive due to
pregnancy or lactation. A review of the different definitions of the sex ratio is given by
Ancona et al. (2017).
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This inconsistency in definition of the sex ratio modelled makes it difficult to com-
pare results with documented values obtained from demographic studies (Coxworth
et al., 2015). Correct definitions of the sex ratio are key to understanding populations
and strategic choice, as was emphasised in Kokko and Jennions (2008).
In the recursion model in Schacht and Bell (2016), sex ratio dynamics are modelled
separately for female-biased and male-biased populations. One time step represents
the time taken for conception and upbringing to independence of one child; at each
time step it is assumed that each female has one child, who then becomes a fertile
adult. There is a steady flux of fertile adults.
For male-biased mating sex ratios, a greater number of males are competing for
female mating opportunities. At any given time t, when Mt > Ft,
Ft+1 = Ft(1− qt), (2.1)
Mt+1 =Mt − qtFt, (2.2)
qt+1 =
qtMt − qtFt
Mt − qtFt
. (2.3)
In this male-biased scenario, newly guarded females are removed from the eligible fe-
male population with probability qt, the fraction of guarding males, at each time step.
This assumes that all guarding males will necessarily find a female, and all females are
guarded with perfect efficiency. The number of new females guarded by males at time
t is qtFt.
Since only social monogamy is considered, this same number qtFt of male guards
are similarly removed from male eligibility. While general convention would not re-
move these males and females from the ASR and a female would not be removed from
the OSR until she is pregnant, the complete removal of guarding males and the females
they guard dictates the changes in the sex ratio in the mating pool, or the mating sex
ratio.
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The numerator in the proportion of guarding qt+1 given by Equation (2.3), repres-
ents the change in the population of guarding males or the remaining guarders, that
is, the number of guarding males minus the number of guarding males with newly
guarded females. Further, since qt represents the proportion of guarding males out of
the whole population Mt at a given time t, the denominator of Equation (2.3) repres-
ents the total number of males of any strategy still searching for mates.
For female-biased populations, Mt 6 Ft, where there is an excess of female partners
available, it is assumed that males gain no benefit from mate guarding. This zero bene-
fit causes the frequency of mate guarding, q, to automatically shift to zero. Protecting a
mate from cuckoldry does not ensure an individual any more paternities than search-
ing for a new mate through paternal care or multiple mating. Thus the frequency of
guarding males, q, is 0. In other words, guarding males make no significant impact on
the population and mutants are immediately taken over by paternal carers and mul-
tiple maters. Consequently, the population is constant and dependent only on initial
conditions as no guarded pairs are removed from eligibility.
Ft+1 = F0 − q0M0, (2.4)
Mt+1 =M0(1− q0), (2.5)
qt+1 = 0. (2.6)
This formulation and the assumptions regarding the availability of guarded females
may be a useful simplification, but it fails to capture the essence of the mate-guarding
social dilemma. Males may choose strategies that increase their reproductive output
and quality, but this increases the payoff for paternity theft. This is a male form of ‘the
social dilemma’ (Hawkes et al., 1995) in which those contributing to increased offspring
production benefit free-riders who take the benefit without paying the cost.
By removing guarding males and the females they guard from the population as
described above, guarding is assumed to be perfectly effective. Guarding males are not
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subject to cuckoldry by multiple-mating males and their presence has no effect on the
remaining males or their strategic choices. The mating males take only paternity oppor-
tunities from unguarded females, that is, only reducing the paternities of caring and
other mating males. This complete removal of guarded pairs from the available mating
pool restricts individuals from affecting or being affected by competition. With this
perfectly effective guarding, there is no opportunity for paternity takeover by a mating
male, and the question arises as to who the guarding males are guarding against.
From this perspective, the recursive set up in Schacht and Bell (2016) is a special
case of perfect mate guarding where guarded females are equivalent to pregnant and
lactating female mammals in conventional definitions of the OSR, yet the sex ratio ana-
lysed is of the form of the ASR. Guarded females are removed from eligibility. Further,
paternities of females being guarded are impossible to obtain even if they are not yet
pregnant and guarding males are themselves entirely immune to other paternity op-
portunities.
In the next section, fitnesses of each strategy are summarised and explained, further
developments are suggested and more extensive analysis of equilibrium population
frequencies is performed.
2.1.2 Paternal-care strategy
At each time step, caring males pair with females with a probability dependent on the
availability of unguarded females, yt. Caring males provide survival benefits to their
mate’s offspring with magnitude c and all males survive from one time step to the next
with probability u, regardless of strategy. While paired with females, caring males are
subject to paternity theft by multiple maters. This theft, referred to as cuckoldry in
Schacht and Bell (2016), occurs at a given time t with probability ht. The form of this
probability is obtained by considering the limit of a transition probability matrix as
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time progresses to infinity. It describes how a caring male divides his time between
searching for available mates and caring for the offspring of his current mate, both his
own and those of multiple-mating males who have stolen paternities from him. This
transition between possible states is visualised in Figure 2.2.
Searching for a mate CuckoldryCare
Probability of 
cuckoldry
Probability of !nding a 
female and conceiving 
with her
Figure 2.2: Paternally caring males transition between three states: searching for a
mate, caring for their own offspring, or caring for the offspring of a MM
male who has cuckolded him. The rates at which PC males transition
between these states is determined by the transition matrix given in (2.7).
The following transition matrix represents this Markov process, wherein the term
indexed by (i, j) in the transition matrix (2.7), represents the proportion of time a caring
male who is in state i ∈ [Mate, Care, Cuckolded] indicated by the rows, spends his time
on activity j ∈ [Mate, Care, Cuckolded] indicated by the columns. The transition matrix
is given by

Mate Care Cuckolded
Mate (1− b)[(1− k)(1− (a(1− p ′)b) + k] b (1− b)(1− k)a(1− p ′)b
Care (1−α) α 0
Cuckolded (1−α) 0 α
.
(2.7)
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Here, b is the probability of a female producing offspring; k is the probability of
protection from cuckoldry; a is the probability of finding a female; p ′ is the propor-
tion of caring males out of all non-guarding males; and α is the proportion of time
a caring male spends caring for either his own child or the child of a multiple mater
who has cuckolded him. These and other parameters used are summarised in Table 2.1.
The term (Mate, Mate) gives the probability that an individual who has found a
mate is continuing to mate with that female partner. To remain in this mating state, this
female must not already be pregnant, either by the carer himself or another multiple-
mating male. The term is given by the following probability
(1− b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of F
not falling
pregnant with PC
× [
Prob. of
theft due to
no protection︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− k) × (1− (a(1− p ′)b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. that
F not pregnant
by MM male
+
Protection
of F
from theft︷︸︸︷
k
]
.
The probability that a caring male obtains the paternity of his mate’s offspring and
subsequently cares for that child is the probability of successful conception with that
female. This is the intrinsic female probability of conception, b, in the term (Mate, Care)
in the transition matrix (2.7).
The term (Mate, Cuckolded) represents the time spent caring for the offspring of a
multiple-mating male who has cuckolded him. The probability that the paternity of
offspring is that of a multiple mater is the probability that the female has not fallen
pregnant with the carer, multiplied by the probability that a multiple mater is able
to find that female and win that paternity, i.e., get her pregnant. This is given by the
following expression
(1− b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of F
not falling
pregnant with PC
×
Prob. of
theft due to
no protection︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− k) × a︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
MM male
finding F
×
Frequency
of
MM males︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− p ′)× b︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
conception with
MM male
.
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Caring males who are currently caring for their own offspring, that is, they have
not been cuckolded, divide their time between mating and care, at probabilities (1−α)
and α respectively. This is denoted in the second row of the transition matrix. Similarly,
in the third row, males who are caring for the offspring of mating males from times
when they were cuckolded spend their time mating and caring for these offspring at
probabilities (1−α) and α respectively.
Using these expressions, the probability that a male will be cuckolded is found. As-
suming that a caring male will continue to search for a mate until his mate is pregnant,
and that following this successful conception he will care for that offspring regardless
of its paternity, the probability of being cuckolded is obtained by taking the infinite
power of the transition matrix (2.7). Schacht and Bell (2016) make the simplifying as-
sumption that α = 1, and thus obtain the probability of cuckoldry, or paternity theft
ht =
(1− b)(1− k)at(1− p
′)
1+ (1− b)(1− k)at(1− p ′)
. (2.8)
As an alternative explanation to the transition matrix provided in Schacht and Bell
(2016), consider that at each time step there is a set of females who have not yet con-
ceived, FNP. Within one time step, they are able to conceive with caring males with
probability x, and mating males with probability y. If they do not conceive, the female
remains in the ‘not pregnant’ set, FNP. This continues until each female is pregnant,
and the males are assigned paternities. Thus, the probability of a caring male obtain-
ing paternities and then spending his time caring for his own offspring is x/(x+ y),
and of a multiple-mating male obtaining the paternity and the caring male caring for
these offspring is y/(x+ y).
Thus, if x is the probability of conception with unpaired females and if pairing with
a caring male ensures paternity certainty, then x = b. If y is the probability of cuck-
oldry at any one instance, y is given by the term (Mate, Cuckolded) in transition matrix
(2.7), i.e., y = (1− b)(1− k)a(1− p′)b. Combining these and rearranging gives ht, the
probability of cuckoldry, as given by Equation (2.8).
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Further, the probability of a male of any strategy finding an available female is yt.
This is frequency dependent on the availability of females if the population is male-
biased, or equivalent to 1 if the population is female-biased. Hence,
yt = min
[
Ft
Mt
, 1
]
. (2.9)
Combining these terms gives the overall fitness of the caring strategy. This is given
by the following deterministic equation for the lifetime fitness of a caring male:
wp = u
0︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
male survival
to t=0
y0︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
finding female
at t = 0
(1+ c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit
from
care
(1− h0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of not
being cuckolded
at t=0
+ u1︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
male survival
to t=1
y1︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
finding female
at t=1
(1+ c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit
from
care
(1− h1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of not
being cuckolded
at t=1
+ . . .
= (1+ c)
∞∑
t=0
utyt(1− ht). (2.10)
2.1.3 Multiple-mating strategy
Multiple-mating males are able to mate with multiple females, and have the added
benefit of also being able to steal paternities from caring males. These added paternity
benefits from stealing are given by gt, the expected number of theft events per multiple
mater.
The fitness benefit, zt, of mating with multiple available, unpaired females is given
by the total number of these unpaired females shared amongst all multiple-mating
males. This is given by
zt =
Ft − ytMt(pt + qt)
Mt(1− pt − qt)
. (2.11)
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The expected number of paternities stolen from carers by multiple-mating males,
gt, can be calculated by first finding the maximum possible number of paternities
a multiple mater can gain through theft, ft, and adjusting this by the probability of
successful cuckoldry, ht. The maximum possible number of paternities, ft, is obtained
by calculating the number of females paired with caring males available to be taken,
ytptMt, and sharing those paternity opportunities between all multiple-mating males,
Mt(1− pt − qt). Thus,
ft =
ytptMt
Mt(1− pt − qt)
. (2.12)
Adjusting for the actual probability of theft, ht, then gives
gt = ftht. (2.13)
The overall fitness of multiple-mating males is given by the deterministic lifetime
fitness expression:
wm = u
0︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
male survival
to t=0
[
z0︸︷︷︸
Fitness benefit
from shared
paternity at t=0
+ g0︸︷︷︸
Expected no.
of cuckold
events
(1+ c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit
from
care
]
=
∞∑
t=0
ut[zt + gt(1+ c)]. (2.14)
2.1.4 Mate-guarding strategy
The fitness of mate guarding is solely dependent on the probability of finding a female,
defined above as yt, and the probability of subsequently guarding this female through-
out the guarder’s lifetime. This assumption models lifelong mate guarding and once
guarded pairs are formed, both the male and female are removed from eligibility, as
described in Section 2.1.1. This models eternal and perfect guarding.
2.1 outline of recursion model by schacht and bell (2016) 24
The fitness of guarding males is given by
wg = u
0︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
male survival
to t=0
y0︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
finding F
at t = 0
+ u1︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
male survival
to t=1
y0︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
finding F
at t = 0
+ . . .
+ u1︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
male survival
to t=1
(1− y0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of
not finding F
at t = 0
y1︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
finding F
at t = 1
+
u2︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
male survival
to t=2
(1− y0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of
not finding F
at t = 0
y1︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
finding F
at t = 1
+ . . .
+ u2︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
male survival
to t=2
(1− y0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of
not finding F
at t = 0
(1− y1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of
not finding F
at t = 1
y2︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
finding F
at t = 2
+ . . . .
This geometric series simplifies to
wg = u
0 1
1− u
+ u1
1
1− u
y1(1− y0) + u
2 1
1− u
y2(1− y1)(1− y0) + . . .
= u0
1
1− u
+
∞∑
t=1
ut
1
1− u
yt
t−1∏
j=0
(1− yj). (2.15)
A summary of the parameters used is provided in Table 2.1.
2.1.5 Results
Following from the work of Schacht and Bell (2016), the model is recoded and sim-
ulated in MATLAB for efficiency. The model is simulated for a larger range of ASRs
(M/F) than previously investigated to examine the dynamics of the system when fe-
males are extremely scarce. However, these values are still within the range of realistic
ASR values of human hunter-gatherers, as given in Table 2.2.
Simulations are given in Figure 2.3 showing equilibrium strategy frequencies at chan-
ging ASRs. It can be seen that for all values of paternal-care benefit, c, and theft, k, mate
guarding is the evolutionary equilibrium when females are extremely scarce. That is, as
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Parameter Interpretation Value
at Probability of a female encountering
another caring or mating male
min[Ft/Mt, 1]
b Probability of conception per ‘mating
bout’ for unguarded females
Between 0 and 1
k Level of prevention from theft Between 0 and 1
p ′ Frequency of caring males out of
non-guarding males
p/(1− q)
u Probability of male survival Between 0 and 1
c Added survival benefit to offspring of
caring males
Between 0 and 1
yt Probability of finding a female min[Ft/Mt, 1]
ht Probability of cuckoldry Equation (2.8)
zt Fitness benefit gained from shared
paternity for mating
Equation (2.11)
ft Maximum paternities a multiple mater
can gain through cuckoldry
Equation (2.12)
gt Expected number of cuckoldry events
per time t
ftht
Table 2.1: Summary of terms used to calculate the fitness of each strategy. The first
section of the table corresponds to parameters relating to cuckoldry.
the sex ratio approaches 2 where fertile females are half as scarce as fertile males, mate
guarding prevails even when the benefit of care is maximised, c = 1. Even for para-
meter combinations where paternal care outcompetes other strategies for a wide range
of ASRs, mate guarding will eventually prevail when the sex ratio is large enough. This
is evident in Figure 2.3(c) and (d). The switch behaviour points to the existence of a
bifurcation that is dependent on sex ratio. This bifurcation is further considered in the
development and analysis of an analogous ODE model presented in Section 2.2.
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Population ASRM/F
5 chimpanzee population averages 0.47
Kanyawara chimpanzees 0.70
!Kung 1.46
Ache 1.87
Hiwi 1.62
Hadza 1.60
Table 2.2: ASR values taken from specific assumptions about fertile ages (Coxworth
et al., 2015), and mortality profiles calculated for specific empirical popula-
tions. The first population is taken from a synthetic mortality schedule based
on 5 different chimpanzee populations (Hill et al., 2001). The second is a lar-
ger data set of one of these chimpanzee populations (Muller and Wrangham,
2014). The following populations are human hunter-gatherer populations as
reported by Blurton Jones (2016); Hill and Hurtado (1996); Hill et al. (2007)
and Howell (1979).
Sex Ratio (males/females)
St
ra
te
gy
 Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Lo
w
 ca
re
, c
 =
 0
.1
Hi
gh
 ca
re
, c
 =
 
1
High theft, k = 0.1 No theft, k = 1
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PC
MM
MG
Figure 2.3: Effect of mating sex ratio on the frequency of strategies (PC, MM, and
MG) at equilibrium given different parameters of care and cuckoldry. Initial
conditions are p0 = q0 = 0.005, and parameters of probability of birth and
probability of death are b = 0.5 and u = 0.9.
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2.1.5.1 Overall dynamics as parameters change
If care increases offspring survival by less than 50%, i.e., c < 0.5, the frequency of
strategies at equilibrium follows the equilibrium behaviour shown in Figure 2.3(a).
Mate guarding begins to increase in the population as soon as there is a scarcity of
females until guarding fully takes over other strategies, as was shown in Schacht and
Bell (2016). For greater benefit of care, higher c, there is a region of strategy coexistence
where the proportion of caring males increases, coexisting with multiple maters until
the sex ratio is balanced and multiple mating is removed. Following this, as the ASR
continues to increase, care persists until a threshold ASR value is reached and mate
guarding once again takes over.
Differing values of protection from theft by caring males, k, determines the rate at
which paternal care increases in frequency. Higher values of protection result in high
frequencies of caring males for a greater range of ASR. This can be seen by comparing
panel (c) with panel (d) in Figure 2.3. For example for c = 1, if k = 0.1 shown in Figure
2.3(c) caring males are in majority for 0.85 < ASR < 1.43, while if k = 1 shown in Fig-
ure 2.3(d), caring males are at a high frequency for a larger range, 0.65 < ASR < 1.80.
Further, the region in which multiple mating outcompetes other strategies changes
as the likelihood of theft, k, changes, as given by Schacht and Bell (2016). Multiple
mating wins at low sex ratios where it is difficult to find a female to guard, and shared
paternities from multiple mating are more easily obtained than forming guarding or
caring pairs.
2.1.5.2 Coexistence of strategies
By performing analyses on a wide range of values of care, c, and theft, k, a set of para-
meters within which mixed strategies occur emerges. In Figure 2.4(a) where c = 0.6
and k = 0.01, between sex ratios of 0.9 and 1.2, multiple-mating males prevail over
caring and guarding strategies, but there is potential for paternal care to exist sim-
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ultaneously. However, as the ASR increases to become more male biased, guarding
overwhelms other strategies.
When the benefit of care, c, increases, caring males persist as the winning strategy
for an increasingly wider range of ASRs. In Figure 2.4(b), paternal care reaches a max-
imum equilibrium frequency of 0.95 until a switch in strategies occurs at a sex ratio of
approximately 1.3. Mate guarding once again overtakes care and multiple mating as
the prevailing reproductive strategy when sex ratios are sufficiently male-biased.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of sex ratio on the frequency of strategies (caring, multiple mating
and guarding) at equilibrium for two different combinations of c and k,
demonstrating the coexistence of strategies. For (a) this occurs between an
ASR of 0.9 and 1.2; for (b) this occurs between an ASR of 0.6 and 1.4. Other
parameter values are defined as p0 = q0 = 0.005, b = 0.5 and u = 0.9.
2.1.5.3 Regions of different equilibria
To extend the results presented in Schacht and Bell (2016), a sensitivity analysis is per-
formed to investigate equilibrium frequencies of mate guarding and paternal care as
c and k change across all possible values. By simulating the model at two different,
realistic sex ratios it is possible to find regions in the c-k parameter space where each
strategy takes over. Of particular interest are sex ratios close to 1, where there is po-
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Figure 2.5: Equilibrium values of male strategies given two different initial sex ratios.
Panels (a) and (b) present regions of mate-guarding density, q, as a function
of parameters c and k. Panels (c) and (d) present regions of paternal-care
density, p, as functions of c and k. Blue represents zero density of the cor-
responding strategy, and yellow represents a high density of the strategy.
Specific density colours are given in the colour bars on the right of each
plot. Sex ratio is 0.9 in panels (a) and (c), and 1.1 in panels (b) and (d).
tential for coexistence, and a boundary exists between equilibrium steady states. For
this reason, in Figure 2.5, a slightly female-biased population (sex ratio of 0.9) and a
slightly male-biased population (sex ratio of 1.1) are simulated and compared.
It is evident that a bifurcation exists in the c-k parameter space, across which the
steady state switches between strategies. This is particularly evident in Figure 2.5(b).
For ASR = 1.1, mate guarding takes over the population for k < −2.125c+ 0.26. This
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is obtained by fitting a line to the boundary in Figure 2.5(b) across which mate guard-
ing prevails, i.e., q = 1. Density of the paternal-care strategy can also be observed in
Figure 2.5(c) and 2.5(d). This shows coexistence with multiple mating where a range
of colours can be seen.
Sensitivity analysis is also performed at chimpanzee-like and hunter-gatherer-like
sex ratios given in Table 2.2. Results are compared for a sex ratio of 0.70, as is the
documented mating sex ratio for Kanyawara chimpanzee population, with that of the
Hadza, 1.60. However, a switch in the winning strategy only occurs when theft is un-
likely and there is a large benefit to care, i.e., high k and high c. This can be seen at the
Hadza hunter-gatherer ASR in Figure 2.6(b) and 2.6(d).
Thus, it can be seen that at male-biased hunter-gatherer-like ASRs, there is a large
region of mate guarding seen in yellow in Figure 2.6(b). This can be compared to the
Kanyawara chimpanzee, female-biased simulation where there is no mate guarding
in Figure 2.6(a). Results from the agent-based model developed by Kim et al. (2014)
showed that the male-biased sex ratio of hunter-gatherers emerged as a result of the
grandmother hypothesis; there was a transition from female-biased to male-biased sex
ratios as life histories evolved from a chimpanzee-like equilibrium to a hunter-gatherer-
like equilibrium. This provides links between grandmothering and the evolution of
male reproductive strategies. As the increase in longevity and postmenopausal female
life span results in increasingly male-biased sex ratios, these male-biased sex ratios in
turn drive changes in male reproductive strategies.
In the next section, this model is recast into an ODE model and analytic and numer-
ical bifurcations are investigated further. In this way, it is possible to more accurately
determine the dependence of long-term strategic equilibria on the sex ratio.
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Figure 2.6: Equilibrium values of male strategies given two different initial sex ratios
informed by documented demographic sex ratios. Panels (a) and (b) present
regions of mate-guarding density, q, as a function of parameters c and k.
Panels (c) and (d) present regions of paternal-care density, p, as functions
of c and k. Blue represents zero density of the corresponding strategy, and
yellow represents a high density of the strategy. Specific density colours are
given in the colour bars on the right of each plot.
2.2 ordinary differential equation model
In this section an ODE model is developed, following the instrumental work of Hawkes
et al. (1995) and Schacht and Bell (2016). Working in this continuous ODE framework
allows for the investigation of long-term equilibrium strategies through bifurcation
analysis. Of particular interest are parameters defining sex ratio and parameters of
guarding efficiency.
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The sensitivity of the model to assumptions regarding the effectiveness of guard-
ing and the magnitude of the effect of male care on dependant survival is investigated.
Where Schacht and Bell (2016) considered only perfectly effective guarding, I introduce
a parameter that varies guarding efficiency. This allows some paternities of guarded
females to be stolen by multiple-mating males. Schacht and Bell (2016) assumed that
guarded females are completely removed from the eligible population and used their
disappearance from eligibility to alter the sex ratio. As noted above, this models a form
of the mating sex ratio, rather than the ASR. In the ODE model, both guarding males
and guarded females are included in the ASR to remain consistent with the general
usage of the ASR.
I further add the additional relaxing assumption of pair-bond breakup. Schacht and
Bell (2016) assumed that guarding males remained paired until they left the popula-
tion by death and females were assumed immortal and guarded until the end of the
guarder’s life. While a modelling convenience, it allows guarders a larger benefit than
is likely to occur in real life. Instead, a constant proportion of pairs in this system
are allowed to break up, moving guarding males back to the searching category and
guarded females back to eligibility.
Four male compartments are defined with rates of growth dependent on their strategies
and constant rate of death that is independent of strategic choice. These compartments
are defined as caring males, P; multiple-mating males, M; and searching and guarding
males, S and G respectively. The searching male population captures the behaviour of
males adopting a guarding strategy but who are yet to find a female to guard due
to female scarcity. The ODE model is defined for two cases. Where ρ is the ASR para-
meter, the model is defined separately for female-biased, ρ 6 1, and male-biased, ρ > 1.
For female-biased populations, there is an excess of females available for conception
relative to males. Therefore, a male need not spend time searching for a female — he
is sure to find one immediately. Thus, searching and guarding compartments are col-
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lapsed into one compartment: guarding males, G. Pair-bond breakup does not need
to be modelled as guarders will find a new mate quickly after breakup with his prior
mate. The three-compartment ODE system for female-biased populations is represen-
ted as
dP
dt
= b(1− Mˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Logistic
growth
(1+ c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Care
benefit
kP︸︷︷︸
Paternities
won by PC
P︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
PC finding
unpaired F
− µP︸︷︷︸
Death
of PC
,
dM
dt
= b(1− Mˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Logistic
growth
ΩM︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
MM finding
unpaired F
+ b(1− Mˆ)(1+ c)(1− kP)P︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gained paternities
from theft of
mates of PC
+ b(1− Mˆ)(1− kG)G︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gained paternities
from theft from
MG pairs
− µP︸︷︷︸
Death
of MM
,
dG
dt
= b(1− Mˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Logistic
growth
kGG︸︷︷︸
Paternities
won
by MG
− µG︸︷︷︸
Death
of MG
.
(2.16)
The constant b is the intrinsic rate of birth; c is the benefit to offspring survival from
caring males; Mˆ = (P+M+G) is the total population of males relative to the carrying
capacity; ki is the rate of conception with males from strategy i, with (1− ki) being
the rate of theft of paternities from those strategies by multiple maters; and Ω(t) is the
number of available females per multiple-mating male at a given time. For simplicity
I denote Ω(t) as simply Ω. The logistic growth rate employed here allows long-term
behaviour to approach a finite equilibrium.
Multiple-mating males are characterised by investment in mating with all available
females including the mates of caring males and, to a lesser extent, the mates of guard-
ing males. By mating in this way, multiple maters are able to steal paternities from
other males. Theft of paternities is simplified by explicitly assuming that females who
fail to conceive with their mates will necessarily produce offspring with multiple ma-
ters. The proportion of paternities obtained by a caring male is defined as kP and
therefore, the corresponding proportion of paternities taken by multiple-mating males
as (1− kP). High values of kP correspond to low rates of extra pair paternity, and vice
versa.
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Similarly, guarding inefficiency is introduced by allowing multiple-mating males
some chance at paternities of the offspring of guarded females. Following the same
logic as above, the rate of conception within guarded pairs is defined as kG and the
rate of paternities gained by multiple maters as (1 − kG). Guarded females are less
available to multiple-mating males than other females because guards are devoted to
guarding their mates from paternity theft. Thus, multiple maters obtain paternities
from the mates of carers more readily than from guarders. Therefore, it is necessary to
impose the restriction kG > kP.
The number of unpaired females multiple maters are able to find and with whom
they will produce offspring is defined as Ω, i.e.,
Ω =
Unguarded females
Non-guarding males
=
Mˆ
ρ −G
Mˆ−G
, (2.17)
where ρ is the sex ratio parameter defined as males over females, and Mˆ is the popu-
lation of males as given previously, or Mˆ = (P +M+ S+G) in the male-biased case.
Defining ρ in this way gives Mˆ/ρ as the total number of females in the population.
For a male-biased population, ρ > 1, guarding males who are searching for a mate
but unable to find one due to female scarcity do not produce offspring at that time.
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These males are modelled by the searching compartment S. The four-compartment
ODE system for male-biased populations is represented by
dP
dt
= b(1− Mˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Logistic
growth
(1+ c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Care
benefit
kP︸︷︷︸
Paternities
won by PC
ΩP︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
PC finding
unpaired F
− µP︸︷︷︸
Death
of PC
,
dM
dt
= b(1− Mˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Logistic
growth
ΩM︸︷︷︸
Prob. of
MM finding
unpaired F
+ b(1− Mˆ)(1+ c)(1− kP)ΩP︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gained paternities
from theft of
mates of PC
+ b(1− Mˆ)(1− kG)G︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gained paternities
from theft from
MG pairs
− µM︸︷︷︸
Death
of MM
,
dS
dt
= b(1− Mˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Logistic
growth
kGG︸︷︷︸
Paternities
won
by MG
− µS︸︷︷︸
Death of
searching males
− φS︸︷︷︸
Rate of finding
available F
to guard
+ βG︸︷︷︸
Pair-bond
breakup
,
dG
dt
= φS︸︷︷︸
Rate of finding
available F
to guard
− µG︸︷︷︸
Death of
guarding males
− βG︸︷︷︸
Pair-bond
breakup
,
(2.18)
where parameters are defined as above; β is the rate of pair-bond breakup; Mˆ =
(P +M+ S+G) is the total population of males relative to the carrying capacity; and
φ is the rate at which searching males find an available female and transition to the
guarding population.
In this male-biased system, Ω < 1 and can therefore be interpreted as the probability
of finding a female. Thus, the rate of transition from searching to guarding, φ, can be
found by assuming a Poisson processs and using the convention that the transition
probability is found by
Probability = 1− exp(−Rate×∆t).
Therefore, the rate of transition from searching to guarding is given by
φ = − ln(1−Ω), (2.19)
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where it is assumed that the time step ∆t = 1. As the population moves from male
biased to female biased, i.e., as Ω approaches 1, φ approaches infinity and searching
males instantaneously find mates and become guarding males. As a result, there are
no searching males and the compartments S and G in the male system given by the
last two equations in (2.18) reduce to the equation for G in the system (2.16). Therefore,
these two systems are consistent at equal sex ratio.
A summary of the parameters used in the ODE system is given in Table 2.3.
Parameter Interpretation Value
b Birth rate 1
β Rate of pair-bond breakup 0.05
c Benefit to children of the mates of caring
males
0.8
kP Rate of conception with caring males 0.7
kG Rate of conception in guarded pairs 0.9
Ω Number of females available in
female-biased system, or probability of
finding an available female in one time
step ∆t
Equation (2.17)
φ Rate of finding a female Equation (2.19)
µ Death rate 0.05
ρ Sex ratio (Mˆ/F) Female biased: 0.7,
Male biased: 1.4
Table 2.3: Summary of parameters within the ODE system of male strategies. The third
column provides values of parameters used for simulations of stability and
equilibrium.
2.2.1 Results
The model is simulated to determine long-term equilibria given a variety of parameter
sets, starting with the simple case where there is no theft from guarded pairs and
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no pair-bond breakup, kG = 1, β = 0. This models perfectly efficient guarding, as is
assumed by Schacht and Bell (2016). Then, I introduce imperfect guarding by setting
kG < 1 and β > 0. Bifurcation analyses are performed on the system using AUTO07 to
identify the specific effect of ASR and guarding efficiency kG on the system. AUTO07
is a software for the continuation of solutions of ODE systems under given initial con-
ditions.
These results are then interpreted and compared with ASRs from ethnographic stud-
ies of hunter-gatherer and chimpanzee populations (Blurton Jones, 2016; Hill and Hur-
tado, 1996; Hill et al., 2001, 2007; Howell, 1979; Muller and Wrangham, 2014) as calcu-
lated by Coxworth et al. (2015).
First, the effect of care, c, and probability of theft from carers, kP, is investigated
for the case where guarding is perfect, before considering the case where guarding
is imperfect. Figure 2.7 shows the equilibrium behaviour of the system at different
ASRs when guarding is perfectly effective. As the system moves from female- to male-
biased sex ratios, a switch between long-term equilibrium strategies occurs. In gen-
eral, in female-biased populations multiple mating wins over competing strategies,
and guarding wins in very male-biased populations. However, in Figure 2.7(b) and (d)
where theft from paternal carers is not allowed, kP = 1, there is a region within which
care can persist within the population, represented by blue. If any theft is introduced,
the guarding strategy outcompetes multiple mating and care for all male-biased ASRs,
seen in the left hand side panels (a) and (c) with kP = 0.1. The larger the survival bene-
fit of care, c, the greater the ASR region within which care outperforms other strategies.
The region of care persistence pushes in to the female-biased region where otherwise
multiple mating would prevail. This can be seen by comparing panel (b) with panel (d).
Introducing guarding inefficiencies then allows a selective benefit for the coexistence
of multiple mating and guarding even when populations are very male-biased. This
can be seen in Figure 2.8, where some paternities are available to multiple maters,
kG = 0.9, and pair bonds are allowed to breakup, β = 0.1. Using the same parameters
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Figure 2.7: Equilibrium frequencies of each strategy given specific adult sex ratio, ρ,
at high and low care, c = 1 and c = 0.1, and high and low proportion of
theft from caring males, kP = 0.1 and kP = 1. Other parameters used for
simulation are: kG = 1, β = 0, µ = 0.05. This models perfect guarding.
Panels (a) and (c) demonstrate high proportions of theft. In these cases,
multiple mating wins at female-biased sex ratios, and guarding takes over
at male-biased ones. Panels (b) and (d) show a region of sex ratios where
care takes over the population. The size of the region within which care
wins increases as the survival benefit of care increases. At very male-biased
sex ratios, guarding still takes over the population, and at very female-
biased sex ratios, multiple mating still wins.
of care, c and kP, as in Figure 2.7, the equilibrium behaviour of the caring population
remains qualitatively similar. However, where there is no theft from carers, kP = 1,
and the benefit of care is at a maximum, c = 1, the region of care persistence is much
larger, stretching into a region of male-biased sex ratios, where ASR= 1.4. However,
I point out that in this case theft from carers is less likely than theft from guarders
kP > kG, subsequently failing to capture the male’s dilemma. This highlights the im-
portance of guarding behaviours as limiting theft from carers smuggles in a form of
guarding where carers can be certain of paternities. As the sex ratio increases to very
male-biased, guarding coexists with a small proportion of multiple mating.
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Figure 2.8: Equilibrium frequencies of each strategy given specific adult sex ratio, ρ,
at high and low care, c = 1 and c = 0.1, and high and low proportion of
theft from caring males, kP = 0.1 and kP = 1. Other parameters used for
simulation are: kG = 0.9, β = 0.1, µ = 0.05, modelling imperfect guard-
ing. Panels (a) and (c) demonstrate high proportions of theft. In these cases,
multiple mating wins at female-biased sex ratios, and guarding and mul-
tiple mating coexist at male-biased sex ratios. Panels (b) and (d) show a
region of sex ratios where care takes over the population, with guarding
and multiple mating coexisting when populations are male-biased, though
guarding still outperforms multiple mating.
Long-term equilibrium strategies are then compared at the ASRs calculated for chim-
panzee and human populations in Table 2.2. In cases of limited care benefit (panels
(a) and (b) in Figure 2.7 and 2.8), multiple mating wins at all female-biased sex ra-
tios, meaning that for chimpanzee-like ASRs, multiple mating outperforms competing
strategies. At male-biased sex ratios, when the benefit of care is low, guarding outper-
forms other strategies at all ASRs in human hunter-gatherer populations as given in
Table 2.2, e.g. at the Hadza ASR of 1.60 (as calculated by Coxworth et al. (2015) from
life tables in Blurton Jones (2016)). However, Figure 2.8 shows the possibility of coex-
istence with multiple maters at these male-biased ASRs, pointing to scope for cheaters
to remain in the population.
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However, when there is limited or no theft from carers, i.e., larger kP, care can take
over the population at some female-biased sex ratios and some male-biased sex ratios
when c = 1. For example, at an ASR similar to that of the Kanyawara chimpanzees
(0.70) care takes over the population when care benefit is high. Though this region of
care encompasses a large range of ASRs, such a situation where kP > kG is an inaccur-
ate representation of the payoffs to guarding. The region of care persistence highlights
the sensitivity of the model to variation in parameters of care and theft.
Mate guarding outperforms other strategies at all very male-biased populations even
in the extreme case when care corresponds to juvenile immortality, i.e., c = 1. Further,
the guarding strategy can coexist with multiple mating when guarding is not perfectly
efficient. Assuming that all human populations have ASRs greater than 1.4, guarding
males perform better than other strategies. However, if a population is only slightly
male-biased, it is possible for care to win.
2.2.2 Sensitivity analysis
To investigate long-term equilibria in further detail and for cases that include theft
from guarded pairs, sensitivity analysis is performed by finding bifurcations in the sex
ratio, ρ.
Bifurcation diagrams for the male-biased and female-biased systems are presented.
Constant parameters of death and birth are assumed: intrinsic rate of birth per female,
b, is assumed to be 1 year−1, where time in the model is given in years; and death rate,
µ, is chosen as constant, and equivalent to 0.05 per year. Parameters used are summar-
ised in Table 2.3.
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2.2.2.1 Female-biased population
In the three-compartment female-biased system given by Equation (2.16), analytic
steady states can be found. I also provide examples of numerical solutions for given
parameter sets. Two steady states exist for this system, corresponding to the over-
whelming persistence of multiple mating, and the coexistence of both care and mul-
tiple mating. Guarding vanishes in both steady states. The steady states for (P,M,G)
are given by
SS multiple mating
(
0,
b− µρ
b
, 0
)
, (2.20)
SS coexistence
(
(kP(1+ c)ρ− 1)(bkP(1+ c) − µ)
bkP(1+ c)(ρ+ cρ− 1)
,
(1− kP)(bkP(1+ c) − µ)
bkP(1+ c− 1/ρ)
, 0
)
.
(2.21)
Mate guarding does not take over the population when the sex ratio is female-biased.
The proportion of theft allowed for guarding males, kG, does not factor in to the steady
states in these female-biased systems as guarding does not persist in any form.
The steady state where care and guarding go extinct and multiple mating persists
(SS multiple mating) is stable under the conditions
kP(1+ c) <
1
ρ
and µ <
1
ρ
b.
Given that µ < 1 and ρ < 1 for female-biased sex ratios, and with the estimate that
b = 1, the second condition is upheld in all cases of this female-biased system. Thus,
provided that the first condition holds, multiple mating outperforms all other strategies
and care goes extinct.
For care to persist in the population with multiple mating, i.e., the steady state given
by Equation (2.21) to be stable, the following three conditions must hold
kP(1+ c) > 1, µ < ρkP(1+ c), and µ < bkP(1+ c).
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(a) Caring males, P (b) Multiple maters, M
ρ
(c) Guarding males, G
Figure 2.9: Bifurcations of the female-biased ODE system (Equation (2.16)), where sex
ratio is less than 1, i.e. ρ < 1. Dashed lines correspond to unstable steady
states, and solid lines to stable steady states. Steady states are given in red,
green and black, corresponding to equivalent steady states across panels
(a), (b) and (c). The green steady state corresponds to Equation (2.20), and
red and black to Equation (2.21). The red dashed, unstable steady state
is negative in the caring strategy and is therefore biologically unrealistic.
Other parameters are low care, c = 0.8, and low theft, kP = 0.7.
One-parameter bifurcations in the sex ratio, ρ, given high care, c = 0.8, and low theft,
kP = 0.7, are given in Figure 2.9. At very low sex ratios, the zero-care steady state is
stable, meaning that all care dies out, and multiple mating takes over. This corresponds
to the steady state given by Equation (2.20), and the black steady state in Figure 2.9.
However, for ρ > 0.79, the stable steady state switches to Equation (2.21), where care
and multiple mating coexist. This is given by the green steady state of Figure 2.9.
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An example steady state obtained through numerical analysis given the parameter
estimates in Table 2.3, and where ρ = 0.7, can be calculated using the analytic expres-
sions of the steady states presented above. The steady states in the form (P,M,G), the
corresponding eigenvalues, and the subsequent stability of each solution given these
parameter values are

Steady-State Solution with (P,M,G) Eigenvalues Stability
(0, 0.9650, 0) (0.0067,−0.0151,−1.3786) Unstable
(0.4995, 0.4697, 0) (−1.5700,−0.0191,−0.0059) Stable
.
2.2.2.2 Male-biased population
Due to the transfer term, φ, between searching and guarding, analytic steady-state solu-
tions cannot be easily obtained for male-biased populations. The effect of the sex ratio
ρ on the steady-state solutions is investigated numerically. The number and nature of
the steady states is also determined by the proportion of paternities of guarded fe-
males that are stolen by multiple-mating males, kG. One-parameter bifurcations in kG
are given in Figure 2.10, and in ρ in Figure 2.11. This analysis of kG is also evident in
comparing Figure 2.7 with Figure 2.8.
The bifurcation in Figure 2.10, for ρ = 1.2 and other parameters as given in Table
2.3, shows that care is never stable, and multiple mating is unstable at high guarding
efficiency (high kG). When guarding is highly efficient (high kG), only the guarding
strategy persists, labelled A. However, once guarding inefficiency is introduced and
the paternities of guarders can be stolen by multiple maters, i.e., kG is anything other
than 1, coexistence of multiple mating and guarding results, as is evident in the red
steady state in Figure 2.10 and labelled as B.
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(a) Caring males, P (b) Multiple maters, M
(c) Searching males, S (d) Guarding males, G
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Figure 2.10: Bifurcation diagrams of the ODE system as guarding efficiency, kG,
changes. Dashed lines correspond to unstable steady states, and solid lines
to stable steady states. Steady states are given in red, green and black,
corresponding to equivalent steady states. A corresponds to guarding
takeover, and B to coexistence of multiple mating and guarding strategies.
Further, bifurcation analysis on the effect of the sex ratio ρ is given in Figure 2.11.
When the sex ratio is close to equal, the caring steady state can still be stable. This is
shown in red and labelled A in the figure. At these low male-biased sex ratios, guarding
is eliminated. Instead multiple mating coexists with care. This steady state continues
until ρ > 1.47 (for the given parameters of care and theft used for Figure 2.11). At
this point, the red steady state becomes unstable, and the solution instead approaches
the stable steady state corresponding to guarding persistence with a small proportion
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of multiple maters coexisting, labelled B and shown in black. There is a small region
of bistability for multiple maters and carers (between ρ ∈ [1.2, 1.47]) where the stable
steady-state is dependent on the initial conditions of these populations. The green
steady state here corresponds to negative values for searching and guarding and are
therefore unrealistic solutions, labelled C.
(a) Caring males, P (b) Multiple maters, M
A
C
B
ρ
A
B
C
ρ
A
B
C
ρ
A
B
C
ρ
(c) Searching males, S (d) Guarding males, G
Figure 2.11: Bifurcation diagrams of the ODE system as the sex ratio, ρ, changes.
Dashed lines correspond to unstable steady states, and solid lines to stable
steady states. Steady states are given in red, green and black, correspond-
ing to equivalent steady states. The steady state labelled A corresponds
to care persistence at low male-biased sex ratios; B corresponds to guard-
ing persistence with a small proportion of multiple maters coexisting; C
corresponds to a negative solution and is therefore disregarded.
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As in the female-biased case, I present an example steady state obtained through
numerical simulation. I use parameter values given in Table 2.3 for a male-biased sex
ratio ρ = 1.4. While analytic solutions for male-biased populations cannot be determ-
ined, numerical simulations show the existence of one equilibrium point at a large P
value of 0.74, and another stable state corresponding to extinction of the paternal-care
strategy. Three numerical solutions of the three steady states are given below.

Steady-State Solution with (P,M,S,G) Eigenvalues Stability
(0, 0, 0.2947, 0.6320) (−0.0379,−0.0425,−0.5815,−1.2577) Stable
(0.4877, 0.1416, 0.017, 0.3007) (0.0094,−0.0191,−0.8570,−1.0410) Unstable
(0.7416, 0.2153, 0, 0) (−0.0082,−0.1914,−1.1091,−1.3487) Stable
.
2.3 discussion
The ODE model presented allows for further investigation of the sensitivity of male
mating strategies to the sex ratio in the fertile ages. Along with other studies of both
human and non-human species (Coxworth et al., 2015; Fromhage et al., 2005, 2007; Mar-
lowe, 2000; Marlowe and Berbesque, 2012; Schacht and Bell, 2016), the model provides
further evidence for the proposal that pair bonding becomes advantageous to males as
populations shift towards male-biased ASRs. The ODE model has shown that where
there is an excess of available females, multiple mating and/or paternal care take over
the population. Care performs better than multiple mating when theft of paternities
from carers is low (high kP). This may be a result of implicitly assuming that care in-
corporates guarding and its benefits. Alternatively, when available females are scarce,
searching and guarding take over the male population, though, depending on the ef-
fectiveness of guarding, multiple maters can coexist with guarders.
Dependant care, and the risk of paternity theft, poses a form of the social dilemma
as proposed by Tullock (1974). If effort devoted to care cannot be devoted to deterring
other males from stealing this paternity, then paternity is not certain. Allowing a pro-
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portion of paternities, kP, to be certainly that of a carer, is a form of guarding. Care
only triumphs in a range of ASRs close to 1, and when kP is anything other than 0,
further emphasising the importance of guarding strategies.
Across sexual reproducers, male gametes are smaller and more abundant, but the
number of possible conceptions can be no more than the number of female gametes,
which are larger and fewer in number (the Fisher Condition, Fisher, 1930). This de-
fining difference between the sexes, anisogamy, is enough to make traits that increase
success at mating competition evolve more easily in males than in females (Lehtonen
et al., 2016). Further differences between the sexes that evolved in our mammalian
lineage, including internal gestation and lactation in females, add to the differential
benefits to males for multiple mating.
The human habit of pair bonding is among the striking contrasts between us and
most other mammals including our closest living relatives in genus Pan (Chapais, 2009).
The origins of this pair-bonding habit have long been attributed to fitness benefits from
paternal care (e.g. Lancaster and Lancaster, 1983), but explanations that attribute the
origins of pairing to such benefits are increasingly found to be unsatisfactory (e.g. Lu-
kas and Clutton-Brock, 2013). Attention to mate guarding instead (e.g. Hawkes et al.,
1995), especially to the important effects of mating sex ratios on the relative success of
alternative male strategies (e.g. Blurton Jones et al., 2000; Coxworth et al., 2015; Schacht
et al., 2014; Schacht and Bell, 2016), appears an especially promising approach.
Initial contributions to understanding how male strategies vary with competitive
context considered searching versus guarding (Grafen and Ridley, 1983; Parker and
Stuart, 1976). Many subsequent models then ignore mate guarding as a strategic choice
and focus only on the alternative strategies of multiple mating or paternal care (Gross,
2005; Kokko and Jennions, 2003; Kokko and Rankin, 2006; Kokko, 2008; Winkler, 1987).
Schacht and Bell (2016) propose that a male bias in mating sex ratios favoured mate
guarding as the pathway by which human pair bonding evolved. Following from work
on the grandmother hypothesis in Kim et al. (2014), Coxworth et al. (2015, p.11810)
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focused on this shift to male-biased mating sex ratios that accompanied the evol-
ution of our grandmothering life history, and emphasised the importance of "this
mate-guarding hypothesis [as] an alternative to long favoured arguments that pair-
ing evolved in our lineage as a consequence of the benefits of cooperative parenting".
The ODE model developed here provides further evidence of this promise, hence
demonstrating the effectiveness of mate guarding as a pathway to pair bonding in situ-
ations where multiple maters can easily claim paternities from the mates of their caring
counterparts, and to a lesser extent, a fraction of paternities from guarded females. It
also shows the potential for multiple maters to survive on the paternities of offspring
from guarded pairs when guarding is not perfectly effective. When guarders cannot
ensure the paternities of their mates with complete certainty, a small proportion of
multiple maters can coexist with guarders. This supports the results of Schacht and
Bell (2016) and adds the insight that guarding efficiency is important in determining
winning strategies.
The magnitude of the change in sex ratio entailed in the evolution of human life his-
tory as proposed in the grandmother hypothesis (Coxworth et al., 2015) is more than
sufficient to allow mate guarding to take over populations, provided that guarding is
close to fully efficient.
Developing this analogous ODE allows for a more thorough analysis of parameter
regions within which each distinctive strategy persists. In particular, this allows for the
investigation of the effect of sex ratio on steady states. As the sex ratio increases from
a female-biased ape-like ASR, the benefits of mate guarding increase. The chance of
obtaining a paternity through non-guarding strategies decreases with growing scarcity
of fertile females.
The critical region of ρ where a transcritical bifurcation exists is around the sex ra-
tio of modern day hunter-gatherers and is therefore especially significant. Thus, the
results of our ODE model are consistent with the hypothesis that pair bonding is a
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consequence of mate guarding given that it increases a male’s probability of paternity
in the presence of a particularly male-biased sex ratio. However, it has also shown that
multiple maters can survive in the population. An alternative model of these male re-
productive strategies is developed and analysed in Chapter 3.
3
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3.1 introduction
As noted in Chapter 2, male mating strategies have been modelled within the literat-
ure (Fromhage et al., 2007; Grafen and Ridley, 1983; Gross, 2005; Kokko and Jennions,
2003; Kokko and Rankin, 2006; Kokko, 2008; Kokko and Jennions, 2008; Marlowe and
Berbesque, 2012; Winkler, 1987). This chapter presents a difference equation model of
the three strategies considered in Chapter 2: multiple mating, paternal care and mate
guarding. By employing a difference equation model, I develop a system in which the
assumptions are more aligned with anthropological and ethnographic observations
and hypotheses. I re-examine the assumptions implicit in the ODE and recursion mod-
els (Loo et al., 2017b; Schacht and Bell, 2016) and explicitly define events that can occur
in each mating period to further investigate the effect of adult sex ratio and guarding
effectiveness on male mating strategies.
Definitions of both pair bonding and social monogamy vary throughout the literat-
ure (Komers and Brotherton, 1997; Lukas and Clutton-Brock, 2013). Some researchers
restrict the category of pairing species to cases where pairs or families are not embed-
ded in larger social groups. For simplicity, this chapter presents a model that ignores
these issues and considers pairs existing within larger populations. Even with these
simplifications that reduce the strength of guarding, it is shown that guarding still out-
competes other male strategies when sex ratios are sufficiently male-biased.
Variation in the success of male mating strategies depends on the number of com-
petitors (Parker, 1974; Parker and Stuart, 1976). Evolutionary biologists have focused
their attention on the importance of the sex ratio in the fertile ages which are conven-
tionally labelled as the adult sex ratio (ASR) since most animals are fertile throughout
adulthood (Coxworth et al., 2015; Kokko and Jennions, 2008; Marlowe and Berbesque,
2012; Schacht and Borgerhoff Mulder, 2015; Schacht and Bell, 2016). But such lifelong
fertility is not the case for human females whose fertility ends at about the same age
that fertility ends in other great ape females. However, other great ape females display
geriatric impairments while they are still fertile and usually die before reaching meno-
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pause (Thompson et al., 2007). In contrast, as outlined in Chapter 2, women can remain
healthy and productive well beyond their fertile years even in the higher mortality re-
gimes experienced by hunter-gatherers (Blurton Jones et al., 2002; Hawkes, 2003).
I again highlight the links between sex ratio and male reproductive strategies, in-
formed by changes that emerged out of investigations of postmenopausal longevity.
The grandmother hypothesis (Hawkes et al., 1998; Hawkes, 2003) proposes that post-
menopausal longevity evolved in human lineage when habitats in ancient Africa be-
came more open and ancestral populations did not follow receding forests. Savanna
foods offered high return rates, but not to youngsters who were too small to handle
these foods effectively. This could have resulted in higher costs to mothers, but as
older females whose own fertility was declining continued to acquire and process these
foods, their subsidies allowed mothers to produce more offspring sooner. According
to the hypothesis, grandmothers that were ageing more slowly could subsidise more.
Consequently, they left more descendants and longevity increased in subsequent gen-
erations. As longevity increased in both sexes, the physiology of sperm production
carried fertility to older ages in males.
Simulations of a mathematical model of the grandmother hypothesis (Kim et al.,
2012, 2014) track sex ratios in the fertile ages (ASR) as grandmothering subsidies drive
model populations from a great ape-like life history to a human-like one (Coxworth
et al., 2015). Across the transition, ASRs shift from female to male-biased. This is con-
sistent with the notion (Coxworth et al., 2015, p.11806) that "our distinctive life his-
tory. . . supplies previously unrecognised support for a mate-guarding hypothesis for
the evolution of human pair bonds."
In this chapter, a difference equation model is developed to (i) investigate how the
ASR affects the long-term equilibrium male strategy, and, (ii) explore the sensitivity
of the resulting equilibrium to assumptions about the effectiveness of guarding and
the magnitude of the effect of male care on dependant survival. Following and adding
to the assumptions found in Schacht and Bell (2016) and the model in Chapter 2, a
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discrete difference equation model is developed to explore the effects of mate guard-
ing, the benefits of male care for dependant survival, extra-pair paternity and partner
availability on the evolution of three male strategies where offspring are assumed to
fully inherit the strategy of their father. Assumptions of frequency-dependent mating
success follow those of Schacht and Bell (2016) and the strategies under consideration
are similar to those investigated in Hawkes et al. (1995).
However, by employing a difference equation model, I break apart implicit assump-
tions made in previous models (Hawkes et al., 1995; Schacht and Bell, 2016) in order to
add parameters of guarding efficiencies. While these such parameters were included
in Chapter 2, this difference equation model construction allows for clear, logical ex-
planations of the assumptions. Assumptions are made explicit. Whereas Schacht and
Bell (2016) only considered perfectly effective guarding, the model presented in this
chapter has limits on guarding effectiveness that lead to less than perfect paternity
certainty to investigate the importance of this issue in a world that is likely to include
some extra-pair paternities. This is essential as the size and number of male gametes
necessitate a degree of paternity uncertainty.
Since the aim of this chapter is to explore the relative payoffs of these strategies
under different sex ratios in the fertile ages, the simplifying assumption of mutual ex-
clusivity of strategies is employed. This is to ensure that effort devoted to competing
for new mates cannot also be devoted to guarding a current one, nor can effort de-
voted to guarding a current mate be devoted to caring for her offspring. This follows
from Tullock’s first argument about the social dilemma (Tullock, 1974, p.9). Noting that
"theft is the oldest labour saving device," Tullock invites readers to ". . . consider a soci-
ety in which theft is completely unrestricted, i.e., no resources of any sort are devoted
to preventing theft. . . under these circumstances, it is almost always true that the most
highly profitable "investment" of resources is to take something from your neighbour".
In addition to assuming mutual exclusion, the possibility of strategy switching is ig-
nored to investigate the relative pay-offs of static, pure strategies depending on the
ASR. The steps of the model are outlined below.
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3.2 model
A difference equation model is employed to explore the effects of pair bonding, mate
stealing, and partner availability on male reproductive strategies. In particular, I ex-
plore the effect of guarding efficiency on equilibrium behaviours. The compartments
of different male strategies follow that of Chapter 2 and are dependant care, P; mul-
tiple mating, M; and mate guarding, separated into two compartments — those who
are actively searching for a female to guard, S, and those who are currently guarding
a female, G. This allows the tracking of the number of guarded pairs and the number
of actively searching males, who directly compete with multiple maters and caring
males for paternities. Searching males, S, do not produce offspring at a given time,
while guarding males, G, either produce offspring with their pairs or transition back
to searching if pairs break up. The population of available unguarded females is de-
noted by F and, since only social monogamy is modelled, G also represents the number
of guarded females.
The full difference equation system is given by
P(t+∆t) = (1− µA,m)P(t) +
b
2
(1− µC,m)
1−c(1− µA,f)BP(X)(1− kP),
M(t+∆t) = (1− µA,m)M(t) +
b
2
(1− µC,m)(1− µA,f) [BM(X) +BS(X)kG]
+
b
2
(1− µC,m)
1−c(1− µA,f)BP(X)kP,
S(t+∆t) = (1− µA,m) [S(t) +βG(t) −BS(X)] + µA,f(1− µA,m) [G(t) −βG(t) +BS(X)]
+
b
2
(1− µC,m)(1− µA,f) [G(t) −βG(t) +BS(X)] ,
G(t+∆t) = (1− µA,m)(1− µA,f) [G(t) −βG(t) +BS(X)] ,
F(t+∆t) = (1− µA,f) [F(t) +βG(t) −BS(X)] + µA,m(1− µA,f) [G(t) −βG(t) +BS(X)]
+
b
2
{(1− µC,f)(1− µA,f) [G(t) −βG(t) +BS(X) +BM(X)]
+(1− µC,f)
1−c(1− µA,f)BP(X)
}
,
where Ba(X) represents the birth function of each searching strategy a = P,S,M and
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X = (P,M,S,G, F) is the vector of all population groups. The constant b is the birth rate
per year and is a measure of female fecundity. The care benefit to survival, c, applies to
the offspring of carers. The proportion of paternities stolen from strategies P and G by
multiple maters are given by kP and kG respectively. The probability of death, µi,j, is
defined separately for age class i = A,C adults or children, of sex j = m, f males or fe-
males. This allows for sex-specific removal rates to drive biases in sex ratio. Pair-bond
breakup is also allowed at a constant proportion β. These parameters are summarised
in Table 3.1.
Parameter Interpretation Value
rA Adult mortality rate 0.02
rC Immature mortality rate 0.03
σ Removal rate ratio Between 0 and 2
µA,f Probability of female adult
mortality/removal
(1− exp [−rAσ∆t])
µA,m Probability of male adult
mortality/removal
(1− exp [−rA∆t])
µC Probability of immature mortality (1− exp [−rC∆t])
b Birth rate 1
c Extent of care benefit to survival Between 0 and 1
β Proportion of random pair-bond
breakup
Between 0 and 1
P Availability of cared offspring to
theft
Between 0 and 1
kP Proportion of cared paternities
stolen
PM
1+PM
G Ineffectiveness of guarding against
extra-pair paternities
G 6 P and between 0 and 1
kG Proportion of guarded paternities
stolen
G
1+GM
∆t Time-step 10
Table 3.1: Summary of parameters used within the difference equation model, their
interpretation and baseline values, or corresponding equations.
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Within the difference equation system, a series of events occur at each time step, ∆t.
Let Xn be the population size of a given compartment X at a certain time t = n∆t. To
determine the dynamics at each time step, let Xn,i be the population size of X at each
sub-step i = 1, 2, 3, 4 during ∆t where each sub-step is ordered sequentially as shown
below:
1. Breaking pair bonds,
2. Mating events,
3. Death,
4. Offspring become adults.
In order to transition from t = n∆t to t = (n+ 1)∆t, sub-steps occur in order with
the final sub-step, i = 4, corresponding to the next time step t = (n+ 1)∆t. I note that
the order of the system is the most sensible order of events. Proceeding through the
system in an alternate order defines a different model to the system above, resulting in
perturbations in the results. However, the qualitative effect of ASR remains unchanged.
The difference equations for each sub-step are described in detail as follows.
3.2.1 Pair-bond breakup
I assume that a constant proportion of pair-bond breakup occurs at sub-step i = 1. As
a result of this breakup, guarding males return to the searching compartment and fe-
males return to eligibility. Multiple-mating and caring populations remain unchanged.
Thus,
Pn,1 = Pn,
Mn,1 =Mn,
Sn,1 = Sn +βGn,
Gn,1 = Gn −βGn,
Fn,1 = Fn +βGn.
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Breakup occurs due to random effects parametrised by the constant β. This can be
interpreted in terms of a male deciding to search for a different female, or a female
choosing to leave. However, following from Hawkes et al. (1995) I emphasise the inter-
pretation of male-male competition, such that pairs may break up when males defer to
their higher status counterparts.
3.2.2 Mating
At each sub-step i = 2 males search for potential mates. Guarding males not in a
pair search for a female to guard, while multiple-mating males and paternal carers
search for females continually. The number of females found by a male of strategy a is
defined by a birth function Ba(X) and X = (P,M,S,G, F) is the population vector. This
is defined separately for male-biased and female-biased populations.
Firstly, for female-biased populations, I assume that caring and guarding males have
priority over multiple-mating males in securing mates. Since only social monogamy
is considered, once carers and guarders have successfully paired with females, the
remaining females are then assigned to multiple maters. The birth functions in the
female-biased case are then given by
BP(X) = P,
BS(X) = S,
BM(X) = F− P− S.
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Birth function, Ba(X) Value when female-biased Value when male-biased
BP(X) P F PMˆ
BS(X) S F SMˆ
BM(X) F− P− S FMMˆ
Table 3.2: Birth function used, constructed with different frequency-dependent patern-
ity payoffs, where Mˆ = P+S+M is the total population of actively searching
males.
In male-biased populations, where females are scarce, paternities are assigned propor-
tionally to each of the searching male strategies, P, M and S. This is given by
BP(X) = F
P
Mˆ
,
BS(X) = F
S
Mˆ
,
BM(X) = F
M
Mˆ
.
These approximations of the birth function are summarised in Table 3.2.
During this mating sub-step, searching and guarding adult populations are adjusted
based on the number of new pairs formed in this time step. When searching males find
a female with whom to pair, they move to the guarding population and the female is
removed from the eligible female population Fn,1. Thus, the recursion for adults in this
sub-step is
Pn,2 = Pn,1,
Mn,2 =Mn,1,
Sn,2 = Sn,1 −BS(X),
Gn,2 = Gn,1 +BS(X),
Fn,2 = Fn,1 −BS(X).
During this mating sub-step, dependants are then born to each strategy. These off-
spring populations are defined by Cjn,2, where j = P,M,G is the strategy of the father,
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taking the simplifying assumption of patrilineal inheritance. Offspring are born based
on Ba(X), the number of females found by males of the given strategy a, and the avail-
ability of paternities to being stolen by multiple maters. A proportion ka of paternities
are stolen by multiple maters from males of strategy a. Thus, the offspring of carers is
given by
CPn,2 = bBP(Xn,1)(1− kP),
where b is the probability that a female gives birth in this time step and kP is the pro-
portion of paternities stolen from paternal carers by multiple maters.
The paternities belonging to guarders is similarly given by
CGn,2 = bGn,2(1− kG),
where kG is the proportion of paternities stolen from guarders due to imperfect guard-
ing.
The offspring of multiple maters are broken down into CM,Pn,2 and C
M,G/M
n,2 , which de-
note paternities stolen from carers and thus subject to the benefit of care, and offspring
born to unpaired multiple maters or stolen from guarding pairs and thus receiving no
care benefit, respectively. The offspring born to multiple maters are given by
CM,Pn,2 = bBP(Xn,1)kP,
C
M,G/M
n,2 = bBM(Xn,1) + bGn,2kG,
where b, kP and kG are defined as above.
In order to determine the proportion ka of paternities stolen from males of given
strategy a, I define a ∈ [0, 1] as the relative availability of females to being taken by
multiple maters over their partners from strategy a. The paternities of the offspring
of a given female are fully susceptible to theft when a = 1, meaning multiple maters
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have the same chance of mating with a particular female as her partner, and completely
unavailable when a = 0. Thus, the proportion of paternities ka stolen from males of
strategy a is given by
ka =
aM
1+ aM
. (3.1)
This is a simplification of the cuckoldry term used in Schacht and Bell (2016) that was
described in detail in Chapter 2, Equation (2.8).
An alternative interpretation of the availability of the paternities of guarded females
to being stolen by multiple maters, G, is that it indicates guarding efficiency. If G is
high, this corresponds to low guarding efficiency, and therefore, larger proportions of
paternity theft. The term (1− G), therefore, can be interpreted as guarding effective-
ness.
3.2.3 Death (or removal)
Death occurs at sub-step i = 3. Paternal-caring and multiple-mating populations are
updated by
Pn,3 = (1− µA,m)Pn,2,
Mn,3 = (1− µA,m)Mn,2,
where the constant µA,m corresponds to the adult male probability of death, and thus,
survival is given by (1− µA,m).
In the case of searching and guarding males, in addition to considering individual
survival, it is also necessary to consider what happens if one’s mate dies. If the female
mate of a guarder dies, the male returns to searching for a new mate and, similarly, if
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the guarder dies, his mate returns to eligibility. Searching, guarding and eligible female
populations are therefore updated by
Sn,3 = (1− µA,m)Sn,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surviving
searchers
+ µA,f︸︷︷︸
Guarded
female
dies
(1− µA,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Guarding
male
survives
Gn,2,
Gn,3 = (1− µA,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Guarding
male
survives
(1− µA,f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Guarded
female
survives
Gn,2,
Fn,3 = (1− µA,f)Fn,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Eligible
female
survives
+(1− µA,f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Guarded
female
survives
µA,m︸ ︷︷ ︸
Guarding
male
dies
Gn,2.
For the searching population, the first term corresponds to the surviving fraction of
searching males, and the second term to surviving guarding males whose females have
died and who therefore return to the searching compartment. For the guarding popu-
lation, the survival of both the guarding male and the guarded female are accounted
for. Further, for the female population, the first term calculates the surviving fraction
of eligible and unpaired females, and the second term reintroduces surviving females
whose guards have died.
The terms defining the probability of death µi,j for age class i = A,C, adults or
children, and of sex j = m, f, male or female, are obtained by assuming an exponential
distribution based on mortality rates rA for adults and rC for offspring.
To obtain variable sex ratios other than equal, I vary the removal rate of adult females.
This removal rate could be a result of higher or lower mortality than males, or females
reaching the end of fertility. The difference between µA,m and µA,f determines the
extent of bias in the equilibrium adult sex ratio. The probabilities of removal in time
step ∆t are given by
µA,m = 1− exp [−rA∆t] ,
µA,f = 1− exp [−rAσ∆t] ,
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where σ is the removal rate ratio. The adult male probability of removal or death,
µA,m is given as constant, and the female removal is adjusted by the ratio σ. With
these sex-specific mortalities, the ASR at equilibrium can take values other than 1. Fig-
ure 3.1 shows the dependence of the ASR at equilibrium on the removal rate ratio, σ.
For σ = 1, the equilibrium ASR is balanced at 1/2, and as σ increases or decreases,
the ASR shifts from male-biased to female-biased, respectively. As σ approaches 0, the
female population increases to infinity. At this strength of female-bias, the benefit of
multiple mating far outweighs other strategies. Due to the overwhelming excess of fe-
males and the assumption that multiple maters will be able to mate with all available
females, the population is maintained at an ASR around 0.35. Thus, as can be seen in
Figure 3.1, as σ approaches 0, the equilibrium ASR does not similarly go to 0.
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Figure 3.1: The effect of the removal rate ratio σ on the ASR at equilibrium.
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Juveniles are subject to offspring mortality rates and their survival is further depend-
ent on the survival of their mother. If a dependant’s mother dies, the dependant also
dies. Juvenile populations are given by
CGn,3 = (1− µC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Offspring
survives
(1− µA,f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mother
survives
CGn,2,
CPn,3 = (1− µPC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Offspring
survives
with care
benefit
(1− µA,f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mother
survives
CPn,2,
CMn,3 = (1− µC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Offspring
survives
(1− µA,f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mother
survives
C
M,G/M
n,2 + (1− µPC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Offspring
survives
with care
benefit
(1− µA,f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mother
survives
CM,Pn,2 .
The term (1− µA,f) is the survival fraction of adult females, ensuring that dependants
only survive provided their mother survives. The constant µC is the baseline probabil-
ity of death of offspring, which applies to the offspring of guarding pairs and multiple
maters, who do not receive any care benefit. The constant µPC defines the probability
of death of the dependants of carers. This term adjusts baseline mortality µC by a para-
meter of care benefit, c ∈ [0, 1]. Here, I define c such that c = 0 corresponds to equal
survival of the offspring of caring males with the offspring of guarding and multiple-
mating males, and c = 1 to the juvenile immortality of the dependants of carers. The
benefit of care is restricted to the juvenile years. Investment in paternal care alters the
removal rate rC by a factor of (1 − c). The survival probability of those who obtain
survival benefits from care can be described in terms of µC by the following:
Survival probability with care benefit = 1− µPC
= 1− (1− exp [−rPC∆t])
= exp [−rc(1− c)∆t]
= (exp [−rc∆t])
1−c
= (1− µC)
1−c.
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3.2.4 Offspring become eligible
This sub-step corresponds to children maturing to become eligible adults. Half of each
child compartment surviving at sub-step i = 3 move to adult male compartments, and
the other half become adult females to ensure equal sex ratio at birth, since juvenile
mortality is not sex-specific. Full strategy inheritance is assumed, which means that
offspring follow the strategy of their paternal fathers. The difference equations are
Pn+1 = Pn,3 +
1
2
CPn,3,
Mn+1 =Mn,3 +
1
2
(
CM,Pn,3 +C
M,G/M
n,3
)
,
Sn+1 = Sn,3 +
1
2
CGn,3,
Gn+1 = Gn,3,
Fn+1 = Fn,3 +
1
2
(
CPn,3 +C
M,P
n,3 +C
M,G/M
n,3 +C
G
n,3
)
,
which become the population values of the next time step.
Differences between this model, the recursion model presented in Schacht and Bell
(2016) and the ODE described in Chapter 2 are outlined in Table 3.3.
3.2.5 Parameter estimates
Simulations are run with a time step of 10 years, ∆t = 10 years, in order to capture
an average of one offspring per female per time step. This takes into account weaning
time and child dependency and allows offspring to mature sexually before entering
eligibility. This time step follows the implicit choice of time step given in Schacht and
Bell (2016), where females produce one offspring per time step, unless cared for, where
they can produce up to (1+ c) offspring. A continuous model will remove problems
that arise from this lengthy time step, but requires a more complicated age structure
that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Further, birth rate, b, is defined as 1 offspring
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per time step. Mortality rates are chosen as adult mortality rate, rA = 0.02, which is
adjusted by sex to impose variations in ASR, and immature mortality rate, rC = 0.03,
which is adjusted by care.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the processes in the model described above, and Table 3.1 lists
the parameters used. Dynamics are simulated in MATLAB and the resulting frequen-
cies of equilibrium strategies for populations compared. An extensive numerical sens-
itivity analysis is presented in Appendix B, however I summarise these results in the
following sections.
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Figure 3.2: Flow chart outlining the steps of the difference equation model described
in Section 3.2.
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Parameter Assumption
Schacht and Bell
(2016) recursion
model
Chapter 2 ODE
model
Difference equation
model
Care, c Care increases the
birth rate of females,
resulting in a greater
number of surviving
offspring. Females
can have one to two
surviving offspring
per time step.
Care benefits juvenile
survival. Females
have a maximum of b
offspring per time
step and survival is
dependent on her
mate’s strategy.
Care benefits juvenile
survival. Females
have a maximum of b
offspring per time
step and survival is
dependent on her
mate’s strategy.
Theft of
paternities
from caring
males, k,
kP or P
Cuckoldry, k, of the
paternities of only
paternally caring
males by
multiple-mating
males.
kP is the rate of
conception with
caring males; (1− kP)
is the proportion of
the offspring of
carers sired by
multiple maters.
P defines relative
female availability of
paternities to theft by
multiple maters, with
kP defining the
proportion of the
offspring of carers
sired by multiple
maters.
Theft of
paternities
from
guarding
males, G
or kG
No theft. Guarding
provides eternal
pairs, and paternity
certainty.
kG is the rate of
conception with
guarding males;
(1− kG) is the
proportion of the
offspring of guarders
sired by multiple
maters. kG > kP
G defines relative
female availability of
paternities to theft by
multiple maters, with
kG defining the
proportion of the
offspring of carers
sired by multiple
maters. G < P.
Pair-bond
breakup, β
Pairs remain together
until death.
Guarding pairs break
up at a constant rate.
Guarding pairs break
up at a constant rate.
Survival Offspring survival
not explicitly
modelled. Adult
mortality equal for
males and females, u.
Offspring survival
adjusted by care. All
other baseline
mortalities equal.
Offspring survival
adjusted by care.
Male and female
removal adjusted by
sex ratio.
Table 3.3: Table summarising and comparing assumptions and parameters used within
the recursion developed by Schacht and Bell (2016), the ODE model in
Chapter 2 and the difference equation model developed here.
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3.3 effect of changing asr on the frequency of male strategies
As noted in Section 3.1, a shift in ASRs from female- to male-biased accompanies the
transition from a great ape-like life history to a human-like one. Thus, it is of special
interest to consider the effect of ASRs within this range on male reproductive strategies.
In particular, I investigate equilibrium behaviours at great ape-like and human-like sex
ratios, taking these values from Coxworth et al. (2015). In this way, I again consider the
links between male reproductive strategies and the grandmother hypothesis.
Population ASRM/(M+ F) ASRM/F
5 chimpanzee population averages 0.32 0.47
Kanyawara chimpanzees 0.41 0.70
!Kung 0.59 1.46
Ache 0.65 1.87
Hiwi 0.62 1.62
Hadza 0.62 1.60
Table 3.4: ASR values taken from specific assumptions about fertile ages (Coxworth
et al., 2015), and mortality profiles calculated for specific empirical popula-
tions (see the text for further specifics). The first population is taken from
a synthetic mortality schedule based on 5 different chimpanzee populations
(Hill et al., 2001). The second is a later, larger (although still very small)
data set from one of these chimpanzee populations (Muller and Wrangham,
2014). Fertile ages include all males older than 15 years, and females between
10 and 45 years. The following populations are human hunter-gatherers as
reported by (Blurton Jones, 2016; Hill and Hurtado, 1996; Hill et al., 2007;
Howell, 1979). Fertile ages include males 20 to 65, and females from 20 to
40. These estimates of the ASR differ from others reported (e.g. Kramer et al.,
2017; Schacht et al., 2014); see Discussion. For the chimpanzee estimates, fer-
tile ages "included males older than 15 years and females between ages 10
and 45 years" (Coxworth et al. (2015, p.11808), citing Thompson et al. (2007)
here).
Here, in Table 3.4, ASRs are given as the proportion of males in the total fertile
population as suggested by Ancona et al. (2017) (a ratio calculated by Coxworth et al.
(2015), and appearing in the second column of their Tables 1 and 2), and in the third
column as the more widely used ratio of fertile males to fertile females, M/F. They
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(Coxworth et al., 2015, p. 11808) used life tables from the sources cited and, assuming
stationary populations, calculated the ASR by modelling age structure using "probabil-
ity of survival to each age in the published life tables, summing the calculated number
of survivors for males and females to each of the fertile ages, then dividing the sum for
each sex by their combined total to get the fraction of fertile adults by sex." For chim-
panzees they assumed (Coxworth et al., 2015, p.11808) that fertile ages "included males
older than 15 years and females between ages 10 and 45 years" (citing ref Thompson
et al., 2007, here). For non-humans, ASR calculation can be met with some challenges
(Ancona et al., 2017), but is relatively straightforward as all adult males and females
can be counted as eligible for conception. For humans, fertile ages "included men from
20 and 65 years based on reported age ranges of fertilities from the ethnographers and
those reported by Tuljapurkar et al. " (citing ref Tuljapurkar et al., 2007, here). "Women
from 20 to 40 years are included based on average ages of first and last birth" (citing
ref Robson et al., 2006, here). Issues around calculating human ASRs and alternative
estimates are considered in the Discussion in this chapter.
Figure 3.3 displays the long-term equilibrium strategies of the model at a range of
ASRs including representative ASRs given in Table 3.4. The four panels in Figure 3.3
show that at a chimpanzee-like female-biased ASR of 0.41 or less, multiple mating
takes over the population. In fact, this is the case for all female-biased sex ratios (ASR
< 0.5). Based on the frequency-dependent birth function (see Table 3.2) the benefit of
gaining the extra paternities at such a female-biased ASR, once guarding and caring
males have obtained their mates, is large enough to push the long-term equilibrium
strategy to favour multiple-mating males.
Now consider a human-like male-biased ASR of 0.62, following ethnographically
based estimates of the ASR of the Hadza in particular, as given in Table 3.4. In panels
(a) and (b) of Figure 3.3, the guarding strategy is favoured, while in panel (c) and (d),
the case of high pair-bond break and inefficient guarding, caring persists in the popu-
lation. While this points to paternal care outperforming mate guarding, I note that this
only occurs where pair-bond break is high, and the availability of caring is close to that
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Figure 3.3: Simulations showing changes to the equilibrium strategic frequency given
changes to the sex ratio, for different parameter sets, in particular showing
the qualitative effect of changes in guarding efficiency, G, and pair-bond
breakup, β. Other parameters used are c = 0.2 (a care benefit raising juven-
ile survival by 20%) and P = 0.2.
of the availability of guarding. In Figure 3.3, the paternities of carers are only slightly
available to theft, P = 0.2. At more male-biased ASRs, guarding still outperforms
other strategies. Changes to the value of the guarding efficiency parameter define re-
gions within which different equilibrium stable strategies can result. This is explored
in Section 3.4. Overall, mate guarding takes over the population at very male-biased
ASRs.
3.4 effect of likelihood of extra-pair paternities
Investigating the changing frequency of strategies as parameters change reveals the
sensitivity of the system to changes in the efficiency of guarding, G. If G is per-
turbed above 0, the ASR at which the population switches from multiple mating to
guarding increases. This puts the ASR at which the switch occurs between 0.5 and
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0.62, a range that is especially relevant when considering issues of human evolution
since it includes the ASRs of human hunter-gatherer populations as shown in Table
3.4. If guarding is highly inefficient (G close to 1) then it is possible for a population
with a human-like ASR (less than 0.62) to be overtaken by multiple maters.
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Figure 3.4: Effect of changing guarding inefficiency, G, on the ASR at which the dom-
inant strategy switches from multiple mating to guarding, i.e., when guard-
ing begins to take over the population. When G is just greater than zero,
so that guarding is slightly less than perfectly effective, the ASR required
for guarding to take over from multiple mating rises immediately from 0.5
to 0.57 and the takeover threshold ASR for guarding increases, becoming
more male biased with decreasing effectiveness of guarding. Other paramet-
ers used are β = 0.8, c = 0.2 and P = 1. When G = 1, all guarded females’
offspring are susceptible to extra-pair paternities by multiple-mating males,
and the sex ratio at which guarding begins to take over is 0.62.
Figure 3.4 shows the effect of guarding inefficiency, G, on the ASR at which guard-
ing takes over the population when care, c, is low, stealing from cared mates, P, is
high, and pair-bond break, β, is high. When the paternities of the offspring of guarded
females are unavailable to multiple maters, G = 0, guarders begin to take over the
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population at an equal ASR, i.e., fertile M/(M+ F) = 0.5. When G is anything other
than 0, such that guarding is anything less than perfectly effective, the ASR at which
guarding takes over competing strategies is pushed to ASR > 0.57. As G continues
to increase and guarding becomes less effective, the ASR at which guarding takes over
continues to increase. As the paternities of the offspring of guarded females become
more available to multiple maters, multiple maters are able to subsidise their relat-
ively lower chance of finding available females with their ability to steal from guarders.
Thus, multiple maters can outperform other strategies at some male-biased sex ratios
given that guarding is inefficient. When G = 1 the point of switch is at ASR = 0.62.
In the hunter-gatherer sample presented in Table 3.4 ASRs range between 0.58 and
0.65. This is the region where winning strategies depends strongly on the efficiency of
guarding. Therefore, it is possible for multiple mating to persist in populations with
human-like mating sex ratios as long as guarding is not perfectly effective. This shift
in the point at which mate guarding takes over shows the importance of guarding effi-
ciency in determining the winning strategy.
3.5 effect of benefits to care
A care benefit of c = 0.2 is assumed in Figure 3.3 where carers do not succeed against
multiple maters or guarders. Simulations show that care only persists in the population
where multiple maters get no extra-pair paternities from the offspring of the mates of
carers, i.e., P = 0, and at near equal sex ratios. This can be seen in Figure 3.5(a) and
(b). When multiple maters are unable to steal paternities from carers, the strategy of
care outperforms other strategies at a range of ASRs. The larger the survival benefit
of care (comparing panels (b) with (a) in Figure 3.5), the greater the range of ASR val-
ues at which care overcomes both multiple mating and guarding. However, once the
male’s dilemma is recognised and extra-pair paternities can occur, this region of care
disappears. This is evident in panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3.5. Note that if no theft of
paternity from carers can occur, caring effort effectively includes perfectly comprehens-
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ive guarding. Otherwise, extra-pair paternity of the offspring of carers’ mates should
be at least possible. When there is any chance of theft, even if care results in immortal
offspring, caring does not persist in the population.
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Figure 3.5: The effect of care on the equilibrium strategies given different ASRs. When
there is no benefit to multiple mating, that is, when P = 0 and G = 0
in panels (a) and (b), the strategy of care can overcome other strategies, for
a small range of ASRs. Once extra-pair paternity is possible, this region
where care survives disappears, and even if offspring are immortal, c = 1,
multiple mating wins at female-biased ASRs and guarding wins at male-
biased ASRs. Parameters used are low pair-bond breakup, β = 0.2; and no
paternities lost by guarders, G = 0. This models fully efficient guarding,
as assumed by Schacht and Bell (2016).
3.6 discussion
Various mathematical models have shown paternal care to be an insufficient basis for
the evolution of pair bonding (Loo et al., 2017b; Schacht and Bell, 2016). Regardless
of the magnitude of care benefit for dependant survival (even to the point of near-
immortality, as shown in Figure 3.5), as long as paternity is less than certain, male care
is not a sufficient explanation for the evolution of social monogamy or pair bonding as
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a male mating strategy. While there are parameter sets within which care is the long-
term equilibrium strategy, this occurs only when carers have certain paternity. Certain
paternity further implies that guarding is required for the evolution of pair bonding.
Moreover, guarding is only favoured when ASRs are male biased, which highlights the
importance of likely links between the male-biased ASRs that accompanied the evolu-
tion of our grandmothering life history on one hand and the evolution of pair bonding
in our lineage on the other (Coxworth et al., 2015). The results of the model concur
with Schacht and Bell (2016) who used alternative assumptions and a different model-
ling approach. By breaking down the model assumptions implicit in Schacht and Bell
(2016) I was able to further emphasise that care does not evolve under realistic hunter-
gatherer-like parameters and also demonstrate the importance of guarding efficiency
on the evolution of male reproductive strategies.
Comparing these results to those of Schacht and Bell (2016) shows that the ineffi-
ciency parameter produces similar results to reducing the probability of male survival
from one period to the next, their u, described in Chapter 2. However, while the effect
is similar, the interpretation is not. If a male does not survive, he will not produce off-
spring. This is different from a male being cuckolded, or failing to produce offspring
at that time step. Further, the parameter u (in Schacht and Bell, 2016) limits the scope
of both caring and guarding strategies. In the model presented here, parameters β and
G are used to target variation in just the mate-guarding strategy. By doing so, the
high sensitivity of the model to guarding inefficiencies becomes evident. Even with re-
duced benefits, guarding still has overwhelming success at very male-biased sex ratios.
Previous exploration of the relative payoffs to the male strategies considered here
(Hawkes et al., 1995) paralleled the treatment of the social dilemma in Hirshleifer
(1991), and equilibrium allocations showed very little care. Even with reduced mar-
ginal gains for additional guarding effort, Hawkes et al. (1995) found high allocation
to guarding throughout a wide range of parameter values. The question then arises: if
mate guarding is so successful in such a general model, why is it so rare in mammals?
Here I show the fundamental importance of a variable Hawkes et al. (1995) did not con-
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sider: the ASR. I found that in contrast to their results, multiple mating does not only
dominate female-biased ASRs, but when guarding is even slightly inefficient, multiple
mating continues to dominate in some male-biased sex ratios. This was echoed in the
investigation in Chapter 2. This is a key discovery.
The results above are also different from those obtained by Gavrilets (2012), who
introduced heterogeneity in males, female choice for provisioning mates, and female
faithfulness to solve the male’s dilemma. In his constructions, guarding disappeared
early as a possible alternative. Gavrilets’ conclusion about what is required in order
for pair bonding to evolve differs from the results shown here of the overwhelming
persistence of multiple mating even in some male-biased populations, where the pa-
ternity of carers is less than perfectly certain, as well as the likely success of guarding
as a strategy at human-like mating sex ratios.
The ASR estimates used to represent humans show a substantial contrast between
the female-bias in great apes and male-bias in humans. Their life table calculations are
explained above (Section 3.3). Comparing those ASRs to other reports, Coxworth et al.
(2015, p. 11809) note that, "Figure 2 in Schacht et al. (2014, p.217) is the most serious
challenge to our characterisation of mating sex ratios as male-biased . . . [because] eight
of these [fifteen] societies — more than half — have female-biased ASRs, a pattern
that our model and arguments suggest is "not human."" Why do the ASRs reported by
Schacht et al. (2014) differ so much from those calculated by Coxworth et al. (2015) ?
Schacht et al. (2014, p.3-4) explain that they accumulated reports "from both pub-
lished sources and personal communication. . . determined from the ethnographers’
data on the number of individuals of mating age in their population. . . ". Coxworth
et al. (2015) addressed the difference by enumerating reasons that numbers of fer-
tile males could be underestimated by ethnographers, including frequent travelling
of young men that results in under-counting them, and classic cases where unmar-
ried men were not included. They emphasise another important problem that arises
in counting fertile men (or males in general) but not fertile women. This is a difficulty
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implied by Darwin (1871, p.258) when, in elaborating his theory of sexual selection, he
noted that "unarmed, unadorned, or unattractive males would succeed equally well in
the battle for life and in leaving a numerous progeny, if better endowed males were
not present."
If the measure of male fertility is realised paternities, then males that fail to win
them may not be counted as competitors, even when the competitive threat they pose
is an important driver of selection (e.g. the bachelor threat for equids Rubenstein (1986);
Rubenstein and Hack (2004), and primates Kirkpatrick and Grueter (2010)). When old
men get no more paternities because younger men out-compete them, and when un-
married men are not counted — including physiologically fertile sub adults because
local conventions deem them still ineligible to marry — dynamics that play major
roles in constructing and maintaining social institutions are obscured (see Rodseth
(2012) and references therein).
Coxworth et al. (2015) fell prey to this problem when they used age-specific fertil-
ities to exclude men under 20 from the fertile ages. So the high human sex ratios
used here are still underestimates. On the other hand, Coxworth et al. (2015) also note
that the hunter-gatherer populations investigated are all growing, which means that
the stationary population assumption they used to calculate sex ratios from life tables
overestimates older age classes.
Kramer et al. (2017) investigate a longitudinal data set for another population of
hunter-gatherers to show that the stochasticity of birth sex ratios has an enormous ef-
fect on ASRs in very small populations. Pume first births are relatively early compared
to other foragers. Kramer et al. (2017) use birth records to calculate both a beginning
and end to fertilities that are notably earlier than the estimates used by Coxworth et al.
(2015) for other foragers. The longitudinal Pume data and modelling of the year-to-year
shifts in age structure incorporate attention to individual heterogeneity and show ex-
treme annual variation. Of special interest here, it is evident that the annual ASRs range
from 0.43 to 0.67, which encompasses the entire range of ASRs in our Table 3.4 from
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calculations for both chimpanzees and human foragers in Coxworth et al. (2015). Not
only does this further underscore questions about how to appraise and compare ASRs,
it also raises questions about the time scale of ASR effects on behavioural strategies
that are beyond the scope of this investigation.
The model and its results given in this chapter follow that of Schacht and Bell (2016)
in showing that the payoffs for male strategies change with the sex ratio in the fertile
ages and, as expected, that male strategies would evolve in response to the changing
availability of females. Partner scarcity can make the payoff rise for protecting one’s
mate from competing males and, depending on its effectiveness, mate guarding can
become the winning strategy. Guarding effectiveness is an important addition to the
model, as it has a significant effect on the equilibrium winning strategy within the
range of documented hunter-gatherer ASRs. This is of special interest for the evolution
of our own lineage. Human populations everywhere include large fractions of women
who are past their fertile years (Blurton Jones et al., 2002; Blurton Jones, 2016; Hill and
Hurtado, 1996; Howell, 1979), resulting in notably male-biased human ASRs. Such a
male bias is rare among mammals and distinguishes us from our closest living rel-
atives, the great apes, where females become frail and usually die during their fertile
years (Hill et al., 2001). The modelling in this chapter aligns with other work that shows
pair bonds are unlikely to evolve due to the benefits of paternal care, while strength-
ening the hypothesis that the evolution of human grandmothering life history made
pairing advantageous in the evolution of the human lineage.
appendix b : further sensitivity analyses
Benefit of care and potential of theft from caring males
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Figure B.1: The effect of different parameters of the benefit of care on the equilibrium
strategies given different sex ratios, and given fully efficient guarding, G =
0, and low pair-bond breakup, β = 0.1. In the top right panel, care persists
in a small region of ASRs around an equal sex ratio. In all other parameter
sets, multiple mating persists at female-biased sex ratios (ASR< 0.5), and
guarding wins at all male-biased sex ratios (ASR > 0.5).
As highlighted in the main text, care only persists in populations at near equal sex
ratios, and where carers have certain paternity, stealing of paternities does not occur,
i.e. P = 0. This can be seen in the top right panel of Figure B.1, where P = 0 and care
persists around a near equal sex ratio. Once theft is introduced, P = 0.2 in the panel
below it, this region disappears.
If inefficient guarding is introduced, comparing Figure B.1 to Figure B.2, I note that
care can win at lower survival benefits than in the case of fully efficient guarding, and
also in very male-biased populations. This can be seen in comparing the top row of Fig-
ure B.1 with the top row of Figure B.2. Care wins for larger regions in Figure B.2 than
in the top row of Figure B.1. However, as was described in the main text, I note that
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Figure B.2: The effect of different parameters of the benefit of care on the equilibrium
strategies given different sex ratios, and given inefficient guarding, G =
0.1, and low pair-bond breakup, β = 0.1. Here, where theft from guarders
occurs, the benefit to guarding is smaller than in Figure B.1 and thus, care
persists in all cases where theft from carers does not occur (P = 0, in the
top row).
the first row represents an unrealistic case, where G > P, meaning that the mates of
guarding males are more available than that of caring males. In these cases, care wins
as it mimics the effects of guarding.
Theft by multiple-mating males
Further investigation demonstrates the influential effect of varying the availability of
paternities to theft by multiple-mating males. Qualitative behaviour is similar for both
low and high levels of care benefit, seen in Figure B.3 and B.4 respectively. The first
column of Figure B.3 shows that care persists only where G > P; the paternities of
guarded females are as available or more available to theft than that of caring males.
Again, this smuggles effects of guarding into care, as described in the main text and in
the definition of parameters given in the model description. The left column of Figure
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Figure B.3: The effect of the availability of the paternities of females to theft by
multiple-mating males. High, moderate and low availabilities, P and G,
are presented. Other parameters are that of c = 0.8 (or high survival benefit
to care) and low pair-bond breakup, β = 0.1. The left panels show persist-
ence of care, where theft from carers does not occur, P = 0. In the other
panels, multiple mating wins in female-biased populations, and guarding
wins at male-biased. The ASR at which the switch between these winning
strategies occurs is dependent on how available the paternities of offspring
of mates of guarding males are to theft by multiple maters, G.
B.4 also demonstrates this. If caring supplies higher paternity assurance than guarding,
i.e., G > P, then care can persist in a close to equal sex ratio.
Guarding inefficiencies
For parameter sets exploring the effect of guarding inefficiencies, β and G, multiple
mating is the persistent strategy at female-biased sex ratios, and guarding is the per-
sistent strategy at very male-biased sex ratios. This can be seen in Figures B.5 and
B.6, where I set P = 0.8. The panels on the right of Figure B.5 show care persisting
at very male-biased populations, but further exploration of these long-term equilibria
show that these populations are extinct. When the size of the total population is close
to 0, care is a winning strategy as it produces surviving juveniles, when levels of care
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Figure B.4: The effect of availability of paternities to theft by multiple maters. Differ-
ent combinations of high, moderate and low availabilities, P and G, are
presented. Other parameters are low care benefit, c = 0.1, and low pair-
bond breakup, β = 0.1. Where care here is low, the region within which
care persists in the left column, is smaller than that of Figure B.3. Again, in
the other panels, multiple mating wins in female-biased populations, and
guarding wins at male-biased. The ASR at which the switch between these
winning strategies occurs is dependent on how available the paternities of
offspring of mates of guarding males are to theft by multiple maters, G.
benefit are high, as is the case of Figure B.5, but not Figure B.6 (comparing the right
column of Figure B.5, where care is high, c = 0.8, with that of Figure B.6, where care
is low, c = 0.2).
Further, the higher the availability of the paternities of guarders’ mates’ offspring to
theft by multiple maters, the higher the ASR at which guarding takes over the popula-
tion. This is further explored in Figure 3.3 of the main text.
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Figure B.5: The effect of changes to parameters of guarding inefficiency, at high care
benefit, c = 0.8 and where P = 0.8. Different combinations of para-
meters quantifying pair-bond breakup, β, and theft of paternities from
guarders, G, are presented. The right column shows care persisting at
male-biased ASRs, but further investigation into the populations show ex-
tinction. For other combinations of parameter regions, multiple mating
wins when female-biased, and guarding persists when male-biased.
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Figure B.6: The effect of changes to parameters of guarding inefficiency, at low care
benefit, c = 0.2 and where P = 0.8. Different combinations of parameters
quantifying pair-bond breakup, β, and theft of paternities from guarders,
G, are presented. Where care is lower and theft of the paternities of carers’
mates’ offspring is high, multiple mating persists in female-biased popula-
tions, and guarding in most male-biased populations.
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4.1 introduction
Males and females demonstrate stark differences across a vast majority of animal spe-
cies. Differences in gamete size and number, or anisogamy, define the two sexes. Males
possess numerous but small gametes (sperm) relative to females’ few but large gam-
etes (eggs) (Lehtonen and Parker, 2014; Parker et al., 1972; Parker and Lehtonen, 2014).
This biological difference is established from initial fertilisation and this gametic di-
morphism plays a significant role in sex-role divergence (Lehtonen et al., 2016; Parker
and Lehtonen, 2014).
Offspring production through sexual reproduction requires the fertilisation of fe-
male eggs by male sperm. Maximising one’s reproductive success is then dependent on
choices in reproductive behaviours or sex roles. One such path is parental care, which
ensures the differential survivorship of current offspring. A separate path, mating, in-
vests in the production of additional offspring. Both males and females are then faced
with an allocation problem: does one invest reproductive effort into either parental
care or mating (Houston et al., 2005; Klug et al., 2012; McNamara et al., 2000; Parker
et al., 2002; Trivers, 1972)? Traits that guide this distinction in allocation of reproductive
effort are evident in many taxa. There are clear differences in reproductive behaviour
that go beyond anisogamy (Janicke et al., 2016; Parker and Pizzari, 2015; Schärer et al.,
2012); there are differences in traits that improve offspring survival (Clutton-Brock,
1991; Queller, 1997; Trivers, 1972) and traits that improve paternity chances and mat-
ing success (Andersson, 1994).
Darwin (1859, 1871) and other early commentators (Bateman, 1948; Fisher, 1915;
Trivers, 1972) noted that throughout many taxa, males tend more towards competing
for fertilisation opportunities than females (see Dewsbury, 2005, for historical review).
This contrasts with females who tend to allocate more effort to parental care (Balshine,
2012; Clutton-Brock, 1991; Cockburn, 2006; Kokko et al., 2012). Accounting for these
trends in post-copulatory behaviours in terms of pre-copulatory asymmetries like an-
isogamy remains an outstanding evolutionary problem. While both males and females
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are faced with the option to care for their offspring, why do males compete more read-
ily than care?
Trivers (1972) made the assumption that females’ larger, scarcer gametes meant that
they had more to lose from the start, which constrained them to continue investing
more in those offspring. While that was based on a fallacy (Dawkins and Carlisle,
1976), subsequent resolutions to this problem follow from closer examination of how
anisogamy, by definition, constrains the payoffs for both paternal care and mating com-
petition.
Lehtonen et al. (2016) links these payoffs with anisogamy through two decisive res-
ults. First of these is that females who invest in mating competition necessarily reduce
their number of eggs available for fertilisation. Thus, these females have fewer offspring
relative to their frugal counterparts. This removes scope for positive selection on mat-
ing competition amongst females. The second result follows from the sheer relative
number of gametes produced by males, such that not every sperm may be fertilised.
Thus, males stand to profit from sacrificing a fraction of their gametes by allocating re-
productive effort into mating competition if the result is increased probability of fertil-
isation with a comparatively rare female egg relative to other competing males. Those
males who are outcompeted will fertilise fewer eggs, while competitive males secure
more fertilisations. This implies positive selection for male mating strategies, echoing
the notion expressed in Darwin (1859, p.88) regarding the definition of "sexual selec-
tion. . . depend[ing] not on a struggle for existence, but on a struggle between the males
for possession of the females. . . the result [of which] is not death to the unsuccessful
competitor, but few or no offspring." It is one’s relative reproductive success that de-
termines strategic persistence.
Thus, it is evident that anisogamy, a pre-copulatory distinguisher, promotes mating
competition in males. The sex that invests less in parental care is necessarily more likely
to invest in competition (Kokko et al., 2012). This is because, due to the increase in mat-
ing success obtained from competing, those investing in competition are able to suffer
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the cost of maintaining the fitness-reducing trait that increases their competitiveness.
This tradeoff between parental care and mating indicates that males are incentivised to
reduce their effort into care (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1992; Parker and Pizzari, 2015).
Other modelling efforts along this vein have demonstrated that reduced male mortal-
ity and the ability of males to differentially impact brood survival may have evolved in
tandem to reduce the proportion of a male’s life that is spent mating (Kokko et al., 2012).
In these cases, selection on competition reduces while selection for more paternally
caring and better caring males increases (Fromhage and Jennions, 2016; Jennions and
Fromhage, 2017; Kokko et al., 2012; McNamara and Wolf, 2015). Each of the models
cited shows parental care trading off against mating competition. Male gains through
paternal care must necessarily come through differential offspring survivorship, taken
at an opportunity cost of accruing the reproductive advantages of mating.
However, I concede that assuming an a priori tradeoff between mating and parent-
ing effort is not always appropriate (Stiver and Alonzo, 2009). Effort allocated into
parenting and mating yield different immediate marginal payoffs. This differentiation
therefore informs our choice of ordinary differential equations to model these payoffs.
Within the differential equation model, I define distinct reproductive payoffs for alloc-
ation of effort into either parenting or mating and investigate the long-term behaviour
of the subsequent system of ODEs. Stability analysis of the model then describes con-
ditions under which natural selection will act more strongly on either the parenting or
mating advantages of a behaviour, that may initially profit both the survival of a male’s
offspring and a male’s competitive mating ability. If a trait produces advantages to off-
spring survival and competitive mating ability alike, which of these avenues offers the
payoffs upon which natural selection operates to maintain the trait in the population?
This chapter introduces an ODE model to compare the strategies of competition
and care in males, and demonstrates the persistence of competition over care in a
wide range of increasingly realistic scenarios. The model is easily generalised and I
present extensions to the model of increasing complexity. These extensions include the
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addition of paternity uncertainty and an extension of the two-strategy model to a multi-
mixed-strategy model where reproductive effort can be divided between competition
and paternal care. This mixed-strategy model also explores varying competition curves
and considers the interpretations of these curves and their results. Finally, the model
will show that in a range of situations, despite small competitive benefits relative to
potential survival benefits, competition can outweigh and overcome paternal care.
4.1.1 Hunter-gatherer large-game hunting
As a specific example pertinent to our species, I apply the model to an example of male
hunter-gatherer large-game hunting behaviours. Observations of hunting behaviours
in hunter-gatherer communities has led to the common perception that paternal in-
vestment is a unique human behaviour compared to other primates (Lancaster and
Lancaster, 1983). This has been a key aspect of human life history evolution with for-
agers and hunters investing their energy and resources into feeding themselves and
their families (Washburn and Lancaster, 1968).
However, as argued by Hawkes (1993), the acquisition of large-game by modern
hunter-gatherers fails to show correlation between hunter’s acquisition rates and the
consumption rates of their families. This evidence is contrary to claims that large-game
hunting evolved as a response to the need to care for one’s family. It is instead observed
that large-game is shared widely amongst others with no direct benefit or bias towards
spouses and offspring. Why would males invest in acquisition of large game, instead
of the more consistent supply of small game which can be directed to one’s family, if
they were aiming to produce greater provisions for their direct offspring?
Hawkes (1993) propose that this widely shared resource returns to the community
as a public good. Acquired meat can be supplied by any member and produces a
consumable good to all. There is no consumption advantage to the supplier. This no-
tion comes from economic theory where consumers include those who have not paid
the cost of acquisition. This falls into the problem of "the tragedy of the commons"
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(Hardin, 1998). The common good will not be supplied by agents unless the behaviour
is alternatively incentivised by a benefit other than direct consumption. Hawkes (1993,
p.341) hypothesised that "the incentive for providing widely shared goods is favour-
able attention from other group members." Hawkes and Bliege Bird (2002) connected
this hypothesis of the "show-off hypothesis" with Zahavi’s handicap principle (Zahavi,
1975, 1977, 1991, 1995).
Zahavi (1975) established the handicap principle by suggesting that handicaps es-
tablished due to the development and persistence of certain wasteful characteristics
may have developed through mate preferences and selection. These handicaps act as
signals of quality to a mate or rival and are necessarily honest (Zahavi, 1977). Further,
Zahavi (1991) emphasised the importance of signalling systems and the evolution of
extravagance. In his later comment Zahavi (1995) applies concepts of handicaps to al-
truism to show that previous models of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal
altruism (Trivers, 1971) are insufficient explanations of altruistic behaviours in observa-
tions where those behaviours are not reciprocated. Alternatively, as similarly described
in the observations of Hadza hunter-gatherers (Hawkes, 1993), those ‘helping’ by en-
gaging in altruistic behaviours were increasing their paternity chances. These were
indeed selfish behaviours.
The show-off hypothesis outlines that investment in the acquisition of large-game
acts as a costly signal where large-game hunting is too costly to fake and is necessarily
honest. Therefore, the audience receives information about qualities that make the sig-
naller a desirable ally and formidable competitor. This arena of signalling is of special
interest to the audience because they receive consumption benefits in addition to this
information. Hawkes and Bliege Bird (2002, p.59) explain that "men’s contribution to
subsistence may have evolved and may persist because men establish and maintain
their relative social standing by showing off their hunting prowess."
Observational evidence from the Ache people in Paraguay further supports this ar-
gument. Ache hunters have better reproductive success and resource sharing, without
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any bias to the hunter’s family, is well documented (Hill and Hurtado, 1996). Simil-
arly, in the Hadza community in northern Tanzania, hunters specialise in large-game
where acquired meat is again shared widely. In this case better hunters are more often
married to harder-working wives and are therefore able to obtain more surviving pa-
ternities in this way (Hawkes, 1991; Hawkes et al., 1991, 2001; O’Connell et al., 1988).
Blurton Jones (2016) also shows that better hunters have higher reproductive success
not because their offspring have higher survival, but because they have more of them.
However, despite this evidence, large-game hunting as subsistence provisioning by
paternal carers is still widely accepted. I would instead argue that these hypotheses on
the persistence of large-game hunting as familial subsistence provisioning are insuffi-
cient explanations of wasteful behaviour where acquired large-game meat is shared.
4.2 model of paternal care and mating competition
4.2.1 Populations
I first formulate a simple ODE model, starting with a population comprising of males
and females. To investigate the tradeoff between paternal care and mating competition,
I compare two pure strategies: males who invest all of their time and effort in paternal
care, and those who invest in mating competition. Mating competition can be manifest
in a variety of forms, such as contests, mate choice, or scrambles. For the sake of sim-
plicity and generalisation this compartment is defined as males with any competitive
trait leading to increased likelihood of paternity. These strategies are defined by the
variables C for paternal carers and M for competing males. The female population is
denoted by the variable F. All populations are considered to be adult, fertile popula-
tions.
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4.2.2 Ordinary differential equation system
To determine the equilibrium behaviours of each strategy and the winning strategy
given different parameters, a system of ODEs is formulated for the three populations,
C, M and F. This system is given by
Carers
dC
dt
=
b
2
Offspring survival
fraction for carers︷ ︸︸ ︷
exp (−τ(1− c)µ) F
Paternities won
by carers︷ ︸︸ ︷
C
C+αM︸ ︷︷ ︸
Birth term
−
Density-dependent
death rate︷ ︸︸ ︷
(µ+ T)C , (4.1)
Competers
dM
dt
=
b
2
Offspring survival
fraction for competers︷ ︸︸ ︷
exp (−τµ) F
Paternities won
by competers︷ ︸︸ ︷
αM
C+αM︸ ︷︷ ︸
Birth term
−
Density-dependent
death rate︷ ︸︸ ︷
(µ+ T)M , (4.2)
Females
dF
dt
=
b
2
C exp (−τ(1− c)µ) +αM exp (−τµ)
C+αM
F︸ ︷︷ ︸
Birth term
−
Density-dependent
death rate︷ ︸︸ ︷
(µ+ T)F. (4.3)
These equations represent the birth and death of each population and implicitly
model the transition from childhood to maturity. Within the birth terms, b is the in-
trinsic birth rate per female taking into account birth and weaning time, τ is the age
of maturity to fertile adulthood, and µ is the baseline mortality rate. The constant c
represents the offspring survival benefit to carers, and α is the advantage of increased
likelihood of paternities given to competing males. This balance between competition
(investment in α) and care (investment in survival benefit c) represents how males may
partition their reproductive effort. The marginal advantages of each of these potential
reproductive strategies are modelled and sensitivity analysis on these parameters is
given to highlight regions where natural selection acts most strongly on either strategy.
The survival benefit provided to the offspring of carers is parametrised by c, repres-
enting a decrease in baseline mortality, µ. The mortality rate of the offspring of carers is
(1− c)µ. This models the payoff of paternal care by increasing the fraction of surviving
offspring. Upon reaching sexual maturity, adult mortality becomes equivalent to that
of females and competing males. The juvenile population is implicitly modelled by as-
4.2 model of paternal care and mating competition 91
suming that the offspring of carers survive to age τ at probability exp(−τ(1− c)µ). This
models the surviving fraction of children that reach adulthood, given a defined mor-
tality rate. The proportion of paternities obtained by the caring population is CC+αM ,
where the denominator is the sum of males weighted by their competitive standing.
The birth term for the mating competition population follows a similar form. Here,
offspring mortality is given by the baseline mortality, µ, without any benefit from
care. This corresponds to an offspring survival fraction of exp(−τµ). The parameter α
defines the paternity benefit of competition such that the proportion of paternities ob-
tained by competing males is given by αMC+αM . In this way, the competitive benefit can
be controlled and the sensitivity of the model to this parameter can be analysed. Since
mating competition increases paternity chances, the strategic benefit of competition is
quantified and restricted to α > 1. For example, if α = 2, each competing male is twice
as likely to obtain a paternity than one of his caring counterparts. The weighting para-
meter α can theoretically be any value greater than 1; however, to consider realistic
values I investigate 1 6 α 6 3, so that the weighting advantage does not exceed 3-to-1.
The difference between the offspring survival fractions of each strategy determines
the reproductive advantage to caring fathers. This pays off through a greater propor-
tion of offspring surviving to adulthood. Increased offspring survivorship is an imme-
diate reproductive advantage of caring. In contrast to this, given that α > 1, competing
males obtain an immediate marginal advantage in offspring production by winning a
greater relative number of paternities. Defining benefits in this way remains consistent
with Darwin’s definition of sexual selection by capturing the notion that advantages of
mating accrue through immediate marginal gains in current offspring production. This
distinction is crucial for males; the relative offspring production advantage α would be
an inappropriate formalisation of the payoff to mating effort in females.
Density-dependent adult mortality for each population is given by µ + T , where
T = F+C+M is the total population size, and  is small. This density-dependent term
causes the population to settle at a finite equilibrium.
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Furthermore, it is assumed that half of the offspring are male and half are female, so
all birth terms are multiplied by a factor of 1/2.
Given initial conditions such that the population has equal sex ratio, i.e., F0 = C0 +
M0, the sex ratio remains equal for any given time, i.e., F = C+M, for all t. Under this
assumption, the differential equation for the rate of change of the female population,
Equation (4.3), can be disregarded and Equations (4.1) and (4.2) can be rewritten as
expressions of C and M only. The simplified two-dimensional model is given by
dC
dt
=
b
2
exp (−τ(1− c)µ) (C+M)
C
C+αM
− (µ+ T)C,
dM
dt
=
b
2
exp (−τµ) (C+M)
αM
C+αM
− (µ+ T)M,
(4.4)
with parameters defined as above, and where T = F+C+M = 2(C+M).
In this ODE model, mortality for the offspring of carers is adjusted by a constant
adjustment factor c. When c = 1, mortality of the offspring of carers is 0, meaning that
all offspring survive to maturity, and when c = 0, mortality is equivalent to that of
the offspring of competing males, µ. With this constant offspring mortality adjustment,
analytic steady states can be calculated and sensitivity analysis of these steady states
performed. This analysis highlights the parameter regions within which each strategy
outperforms the other, giving regions where natural selection will act more strongly
on traits that increase payoffs to either mating competition or parental care.
The simplified two-dimensional model of male populations given by Equations (4.4)
has steady-state solutions given by
SS Care (C1,M1) =
(
b exp(−τ(1− c)µ) − 2µ
4
, 0
)
,
SS Competition (C2,M2) =
(
0,
b exp(−τµ) − 2µ
4
)
.
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These steady states correspond to equilibria where either the strategy of caring wins
(SS Care) or where mating competition wins (SS Competition). There is an additional
non-realistic steady state of coexistence occurring atM = −C. However, the population
is non-viable here and dies out, and as such I ignore this equilibrium. There is no
realistic coexistence at equilibrium. Performing stability analysis gives that the steady
state where care persists (SS Care) is stable only when the following two conditions
hold
exp(−τ(1− c)µ) >
2µ
b
, (4.5)
α < exp(−τµ)−c. (4.6)
Conversely, the steady state where male competitive behaviours persist (SS Competi-
tion) is stable when the following conditions hold
exp(−τµ) >
2µ
b
, (4.7)
α > exp(−τµ)−c. (4.8)
Note that the stability conditions given by inequalities (4.6) and (4.8) are the converse
of each other and therefore, as life history parameters change, the equilibrium solution
of the ODE system will jump from one steady state to the other. Thus, it is evident that
stability is dependent on life history parameters, µ, τ, and b.
Considering human life history, and the evolution of competition and care in our
human lineage, I investigate the bifurcation and regions of stability for baseline hunter-
gatherer life history parameters, b = 0.3, τ = 18 and µ = 1/40. This female birth rate,
b = 0.3, corresponds to birth intervals of approximately 1/0.3 ∼ 3 years. This includes
an approximate 1 year for female conception and delivery, with an additional 2 years
for weaning (Kim et al., 2012, 2014; Sear and Mace, 2008). Further, my approximations
for the age of maturity, τ, and mortality rate, µ, are informed by Kim et al. (2014), who
scale their life history parameters by life expectancy and who are themselves informed
4.2 model of paternal care and mating competition 94
by demographic data from great apes and humans (Gurven and Kaplan, 2007; Knott,
2001; Robbins et al., 2006; Robson et al., 2006; Sellen, 2007). This scaling originally es-
tablished in Kim et al. (2012) corresponds to µ = 1/L and τ = L/2.5+ τ0, where L is life
expectancy and τ0 is a constant age of weaning. For these values, stability conditions
given by Equations (4.5) and (4.7) hold true. Thus, stability is determined by the val-
ues of α and c as given by Equations (4.6) and (4.8). For this human hunter-gatherer
example, the bifurcation in the α-c plane is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Bifurcation obtained from the analytic solution and steady state, in para-
meters of competition, α, and care, c. On the right of the line, mating com-
petition outperforms the caring strategy, and on the left of the line, care
persists over mating competition.
To the left of the bifurcation in Figure 4.1 the caring strategy wins, while to the
right hand side of the bifurcation mating competition wins, overcoming the caring
population. When males have increased relative paternity benefits from competition
investment, i.e., α is slightly greater than 1, mating competition will outperform pa-
ternal care even at low levels of care. For these low values of c the benefit of mating
competition need only result in marginally greater reproductive benefits (just greater
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than 1) in order to outperform caring. For example, when c = 0.25, mating competition
outperforms care when α > 1.12. In the extreme and unrealistic case where the benefit
of paternal care is maximised, c = 1, and all the offspring of carers reach maturity, the
relative reproductive benefit need only be α > 1.6 in order for mating competition to
outperform care. That is, if mating competition causes competitors to be 1.6 times as
likely to obtain paternities as paternal carers, despite care resulting in the survival of
all offspring to adulthood, competition still outperforms care.
Additionally, I simulate the model numerically without population mitigation, i.e.,
 = 0, and plot the α and c at which the equilibrium winning strategy switches from
care to competition. This numerical simulation is shown in Figure 4.1 in blue. Thus,
restricting population growth has no effect on the overall dynamics of the system.
Parameter Interpretation Value
b Birth rate 0.3 year−1
c Benefit to offspring of caring males 0 < c < 1
µ Baseline mortality rate 1/40
τ Age of independence and transition to fertility 18
α Marginal reproductive benefit of mating competition α > 1
Table 4.1: Summary of baseline parameter estimates used in analysing and simulating
the ODE system. Simulations and analysis use these baseline parameters,
based on human hunter-gatherers (Gurven and Kaplan, 2007; Kim et al., 2012,
2014; Robson et al., 2006; Sear and Mace, 2008; Sellen, 2007), unless otherwise
stated.
4.3 uncertainty of paternity
Paternity certainty and its effect on the evolution of male strategies is highly influen-
tial, particularly as is relevant to reproduction and competition (Loo et al., 2017a,b).
However, the model described above assumes full paternity certainty. Paternal carers
are certain that their caring effort is directly benefiting their progeny. However, this
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ignores the possibility of paternity uncertainty and theft. To investigate the effect of pa-
ternity uncertainty on the payoffs to care and competition, an uncertainty parameter λ
is introduced to describe the proportion of offspring who are born to competing males
and inherit the strategy of competition, but who remain in the care of paternal carers
and thus gain the survival benefit from paternal care. I assume that λ is a constant
proportion and investigate the effect of this uncertainty on the equilibrium winning
strategy.
Assuming all other mechanisms and interactions remain the same as in Section 4.2,
the ODE system is given by
dC
dt
=
b
2
(1− λ) exp (−τ(1− c)µ) (C+M)
C
C+αM
− (µ+ T)C,
dM
dt
=
b
2
exp (−τµ) (C+H)
αM
C+αM
+
b
2
λ exp (−τ(1− c)µ) (C+M)
C
C+αM
− (µ+ T)M.
(4.9)
I again investigate the effect of the parameters of care, c, and competition, α, and
additionally explore the effect of paternity uncertainty, λ, on the equilibrium winning
strategy of the system. When uncertainty is introduced, that is, λ > 0, the region within
which paternal care overcomes mating competition shrinks. The benefit of care must
render offspring close to immortal, with a high paternity certainty in order for paternal
care to persist in the population, i.e., high c and low λ. As uncertainty increases, mating
competition fully overcomes paternal care. This can be seen in Figure 4.2. Even under
the unrealistic circumstance that c = 1 and the offspring of carers are immortal, λ need
only be slightly larger than 0.2 in order for mating competition to completely over-
whelm the population. This can be seen in Figure 4.2, where in panel (b) for λ = 0.2
which corresponds to 20% of paternities being stolen by competing males, the strategy
of paternal care is almost entirely eliminated. While this may be interpreted as a re-
latively large proportion of theft, I highlight that even for the case where λ = 0.1 in
Figure 4.2(a), the region of care is significantly reduced compared to the case of certain
paternity.
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium strategies for model with paternity uncertainty, λ, at two values
of λ. Behaviour is investigated for varying values of paternal care survival
benefit, c, and competition, α. Blue corresponds to the persistence of pa-
ternal care, and yellow to mating competition. Note that there is a region
at low α where coexistence may occur.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of paternity uncertainty, λ, on the frequencies of care and competition.
Other parameters used are c = 0.8, and α = 1.1.
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For a given payoff structure, i.e., c and α are constant, I further investigate the stra-
tegic frequency of the strategies as the proportion of paternities stolen by competing
males, λ, varies. Where offspring survival benefit of care is high, c = 0.8, and compet-
itive benefit is reasonably low, α = 1.1, I plot the equilibrium male strategy frequency
of competing males, M, and carers, C, as λ varies between 0 and 1 in Figure 4.3. For
these values of competition and care benefit where, previously, care outperformed com-
petition in Section 4.2, increased proportions of theft and paternity uncertainty drive
the removal of paternal care from the population. That is, as λ increases, competition
overtakes care as the equilibrium winning strategy. Mating competition overcomes the
population when λ > 0.14. Between 0 < λ < 0.14, the populations may coexist. At
λ = 0.07, the proportion of competing males in the population becomes larger than
that of paternal carers, before full takeover at λ = 0.14, and care is eliminated.
4.4 mixed strategy ode system
The previous model considers pure strategies of paternal care and mating competition.
Individuals either invest fully into the survival of their offspring or their likelihood
of obtaining paternities through competition. This section introduces mixed strategies
and investigates the mechanisms that drive individuals of different mixed strategies to
outcompete others at equilibrium.
To set up the model, let n be the number of strategies modelled such that for
i = [0 : n− 1], the proportion of mating effort invested in competitive mating is given
by hi = i/(n− 1). Male strategies are defined by Mhi , where hi ∈ [0, 1] is the com-
petitive mating effort and a corresponding pi = 1 − hi is invested in paternal care.
This follows the simplifying assumption that time or effort not assigned to mating is
alternatively assigned to paternal care and therefore diverted to the increased survival
of offspring. Strategic populations are defined such that the case where n = 2 is equi-
valent to the model in Section 4.2, i.e., M0 and M1 correspond to populations C and M
4.4 mixed strategy ode system 99
from Section 4.2 respectively. Further, mating competition effort is defined such that if
hi = 0.2, a male in strategy Mhi invests 20% of his time into a behaviour that increases
his competitive standing amongst his peers and a corresponding 80% into the care of
his offspring.
The system of ordinary differential equations is given by
dMhi
dt
=
b
2
exp (−τµ(hi)) F
α(hi)Mhi
N
− µ˜Mhi , for i = 0, 1 . . . ,n− 1, (4.10)
dF
dt
=
b
2
(
n−1∑
i=0
exp (−τµ(hi))α(hi)Mhi
)
F
1
N
− µ˜F. (4.11)
The term µ˜ = µ+ T is the population density-dependent death rate as before where
T = F+
∑
iMhi is the total population. The constant b is the intrinsic female birth rate;
α(hi) is the competitive benefit of a given strategy Mhi ; µ(hi) is the mortality rate
of offspring fathered by a male of strategy hi; and N is defined as the weighted sum
given by
N =
n−1∑
i=0
α(hi)Mhi .
Investment into paternal care adjusts offspring mortality. I assume that this benefit
increases linearly with effort into care, taking the interpretation that, for example, re-
source provision provides proportional benefits to offspring; resource provision does
not increase exponentially with increasing effort. For the spectrum of mixed strategies,
hi, offspring mortality is given by
µ(hi) = (1− hic)µ,
where c is the constant benefit of care and µ is baseline offspring mortality as before. In
the case of two pure strategies, n = 2, this expression simplifies to offspring mortality
as given in Section 4.2.
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Figure 4.4: Different competition curves defining the advantage of mating competition,
given different values of γ. These are investigated in the mixed strategy
ODE system, using Equation (4.12). Functions considered take γ = 1 (lin-
ear), γ = 2 (concave up), and γ = 1/2 (concave down), and αmax = 2.
Investment in mating competition pays off by way of increased relative likelihood
of obtaining paternities. This is defined by α(hi), which is dependent on the given
strategy, hi. I define competition to be an increasing function in hi, such that the
competitive standing for paternities increases with mating effort hi. For example, if
α(a) = 2, then strategy Ma is twice as likely to obtain a paternity than a strategy Mb
where α(b) = 1. I consider a competition curve given by
α(hi) = (αmax −αmin)h
γ
i +αmin, (4.12)
where hi defines the given strategy, γ defines the shape of the competition curve, and
parameters αmin and αmax are the minimum and maximum reproductive benefit given
to males respectively. I set αmin = 1, without loss of generality. When γ = 1 the curve
corresponds to a linear competition curve, when γ > 1 it is concave up, and when
γ < 1 the curve is concave down. Examples of these curves are compared in Figure 4.4.
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Regions of strategy stability are dependent on the shape of this competition curve. For
the sensitivity analysis performed as follows, I ignore the implementation detail of the
number of strategies, n, and rename hi as the mating effort h ∈ [0, 1]. By choosing n
sufficiently large, I approximate a continuous form of h.
4.4.1 Linear competition curve
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Figure 4.5: Scatter plot showing the mating effort, h, of the winning equilibrium
strategy given various combinations of αmax and c, and a linear competi-
tion curve as given by Equation (4.12) and γ = 1. Yellow here corresponds
to maximum mating effort, h = 1, and dark blue corresponds to full pa-
ternal care investment, h = 0.
Using Equation (4.12), and setting γ = 1, the competition curve becomes linear. In
this case, mixed strategies can overcome others. I investigate the equilibrium winning
strategy given changes to parameters αmax and c. With the linear competition curve
the mating effort of the equilibrium winning strategies are given in Figure 4.5 with
the colour bar representing the mating effort, h, of the winning strategy. Thus, yellow
corresponds to the strategy of pure mating effort overcoming all others at equilibrium,
and dark blue to the strategy of pure paternal care overcoming all others. For higher
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values of care benefit, c, a region where mixed strategies overcome all others emerges,
shown by the spectrum of colours in Figure 4.5. However, for much higher competition
advantage, i.e., αmax closer to 2, pure mating competition still overcomes care. For low
αmax and higher c, pure care can outcompete other strategies. This behaves in a sim-
ilar way to that of the pure strategy case, but with an additional region where mixed
strategies can persist.
4.4.2 Concave up competition curve (increasing paternity benefits)
I then consider the effect of a concave up competition curve, such that higher invest-
ment in competitive mating effort corresponds to a quadratically increasing paternity
benefit. This follows from Equation (4.12) with γ = 2, which is visualised in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.6: Scatter plot showing the mating effort, h, of the winning equilibrium
strategy given various combinations of αmax and c, and a quadratic, con-
cave up competition curve as given by Equation (4.12) and γ = 2. Yellow
here corresponds to maximum mating effort, h = 1, and dark blue corres-
ponds to full paternal care investment, h = 0.
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For the case where strategies with higher mating effort have a quadratically higher
chance of obtaining paternities, using the concave up competition curve, the equilib-
rium winning strategies are given as in Figure 4.6. Equilibrium behaviour here is qual-
itatively similar to those of the simple pure strategy case in Section 4.2. Only pure
strategies outcompete others, with a bifurcation showing that as parameters change,
winning strategies will jump from a strategy of care (blue regions) to that of mating
competition (yellow regions).
4.4.3 Concave down competition curve (diminishing returns)
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Figure 4.7: Scatter plot showing the mating effort, h, of the winning equilibrium
strategy given various combinations of αmax and c, and a concave down,
diminishing returns competition curve as given by Equation (4.12) and
γ = 1/2. Yellow here corresponds to maximum mating effort, h = 1, and
dark blue corresponds to full paternal care investment, h = 0.
A concave down competition curve corresponds to diminishing returns on mating
competition investment. I assume a curve following Equation (4.12), with γ = 1/2.
There is a steep increase in paternity opportunities when more effort is invested in
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competition at low proportions of mating effort, but as investment approaches a pure
competitive strategy, i.e., h = 1, there is less incentive for further mating competition
investment as the relative paternity benefits decrease. This is shown in Figure 4.4, with
αmax = 2.
There is a greater chance of a mixed strategy outcompeting others when there are
diminishing returns on mating competition investment, as can be seen in Figure 4.7.
Here, for low care benefit and high αmax, the pure competitive strategy still prevails as
shown in yellow in Figure 4.7. Similarly, for low αmax and high care, the pure strategy
of care outperforms all other strategies. However, between these regions is a gradient
of mixed strategy persistence.
4.5 large-game hunting as a shared public good
The generality of the ODE system allows for its use in a number of applications. One
such application is the question of hunter-gatherer hunting behaviours, as outlined in
the introduction.
The simple ODE model given by Equations (4.4) in Section 4.2 assumed that benefits
to offspring survival came directly and solely from a caring male and offspring mortal-
ity was adjusted by a constant proportion, c. However, as was noted in the introduction
of this chapter, the question of why men hunt large game instead of providing a more
consistent resource via small game is emblematic of the larger question of competition
versus care. This follows from observations of hunter-gatherer groups that show a lack
of correlation between an individual’s large-game hunting success and the shares of
meat the successful hunter is able to retain and thus provide to his offspring. Large-
game hunting does not appear to be a provisioning or paternal care strategy, though
some continue to argue otherwise. Instead, bonanzas of acquired meat return to com-
munities as a public good, with no bias to successful hunters or their families (Hawkes,
1993). The show-off hypothesis instead proposes that the payoff to large-game hunters
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is in increased paternities or competitive advantages. Further, a hunter’s investment
and hunting success provides a benefit of meat to all members of the community
regardless of the receivers’ strategy, success, or individual acquisition and sharing his-
tory.
Ignoring potential differences in nutritional value between large- and small-game,
I investigate the effect of adjusting offspring mortality by the population of hunters
multiplied by a constant ch. This assumes that hunters will be successful at catching
large game and that this acquired game will provide a certain survival benefit to all,
quantified by ch. I assume this is also inversely proportional to the total number of
males in the population, representing the share of acquired game provided to each
male and his family.
Thus, I define the mortality of the offspring of carers by
µc =
(
1− ch
M
M+C
)
(1− cc)µ, (4.13)
where ch is the benefit of large-game, cc is the survival benefit provided by carers, and
µ is baseline mortality, with male populations of large-game hunters M and carers C.
Here, cc is equivalent to the parameter c in the model from Section 4.2 and defines the
direct offspring survival benefit from care.
The mortality of the offspring of competing males is
µh =
(
1− ch
M
M+C
)
µ, (4.14)
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with parameters as above. Using the two-compartment ODE model, large-game hunt-
ing versus paternal care can be represented by the following ODE model:
dC
dt
=
b
2
Offspring survival
fraction for carers︷ ︸︸ ︷
exp
(
−τ
(
1− ch
M
M+C
)
(1− cc)µ
)
(C+M)
Paternities won
by carers︷ ︸︸ ︷
C
C+αM︸ ︷︷ ︸
Birth rate
−
Density-dependent
death rate︷ ︸︸ ︷
(µ+ T)C ,
dM
dt
=
b
2
Offspring survival
fraction for competers︷ ︸︸ ︷
exp
(
−τ
(
1− ch
M
M+C
)
µ
)
(C+M)
Paternities won
by competers︷ ︸︸ ︷
αM
C+αM︸ ︷︷ ︸
Birth rate
−
Density-dependent
death rate︷ ︸︸ ︷
(µ+ T)M .
(4.15)
Sensitivity analysis can then be performed to investigate the effect of parameters relat-
ing to survival benefits, ch and cc, as well as the competitive advantage, α.
Investigation of the winning strategy as ch and cc vary, given two different compet-
itive benefits α, is given in Figure 4.8. As the survival benefit from large-game hunting
increases, i.e., ch increases, the direct care benefit cc required for paternal care to
overcome large-game hunting increases. In Figure 4.8(a), where α = 1.05, large-game
hunting persists for low values of survival benefit to carers. This is shown in the yel-
low region. As α increases, comparing Figure 4.8(b) to (a), this region of large-game
hunting persistence pushes further into the region of paternal care. As the competitive
benefit of large-game hunting increases, the region within which large-game hunting
outcompetes paternal care grows. Hunting can outcompete care when care yields a
greater survival benefit, even when hunting provides a survival benefit to all.
I then consider the behaviour of the bifurcation in α and cc given a low and high
value of hunting survival benefit, ch. This is given in Figure 4.9, where panel (a) shows
the numerical bifurcation with low survival benefit from large-game hunting, ch = 0.1,
and panel (b) shows the bifurcation with high benefit, ch = 0.9. These simulations
are qualitatively similar to that of the analytic bifurcation for the constant offspring
mortality case (Figure 4.1). As ch increases, the region where paternal care persists
reduces in size (the blue region). The slope of the boundary increases, thus shrinking
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(a) α  = 1.05 (b) α = 1.15
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Figure 4.8: Equilibrium strategies at varying cc and ch for different values of compet-
itive benefit, α. Blue corresponds to care overcoming large-game hunting,
and yellow to large-game hunting outcompeting care. For very low compet-
itive benefit, α = 1.05, the region where large-game hunting is successful is
where the survival benefit of paternal care is low, but as the survival benefit
of large-game hunting, ch, increases, large-game hunting pushes into this
region of care.
the region within which paternal care overcomes the strategy of competition through
large-game hunting. The greater the benefit provided to all, the larger the region within
which hunting can outcompete care.
c
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Figure 4.9: Bifurcation in cc and α for different values of benefit from large-game ac-
quisition; (a) low ch = 0.1, and (b) high ch = 0.9. Yellow corresponds to
large-game hunting persistence, and blue to paternal care persistence.
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4.6 discussion
The question of sex-role divergence and reproductive effort has sparked much invest-
igation. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, this differentiation of post-mating
roles has its foundations in anisogamy. In this attempt to better understand the selec-
tion pressures on strategies of care and competition, a simple model was developed
to capture the fundamental question of the payoffs to competition and care as two
alternative reproductive pathways. I provide a formal model that accommodates the
evolutionary dynamics of both parental care and mating competition without assum-
ing that they necessarily trade off. Using this model, regions dependent on life history
parameters where care and competition outperformed each other were found. Where
care provides improved offspring survivorship, only a relatively small competitive be-
nefit is necessary for the strategy of mating competition to perform better than the
strategy of care. By adding increasingly realistic parameters and interpretations, it
became evident that the region of care persistence is highly sensitive to uncertainty,
where increased uncertainty leads to a decrease in the prevalence of care. The fact that
the stability results for the different variants of the pure strategy model in Section 4.2
conform to what one would intuitively expect if mating and parenting trade off is a
result of the model rather than an assumption.
The dependence of the equilibrium stability on life history parameters is important
in comparing species both within our lineage and elsewhere. From the analytic solu-
tion and stability analysis in Section 4.2, it can be seen that the system is sensitive to the
birth rate b, age of independence τ and death rate µ. Making comparisons to other spe-
cies, I highlight the example of callitrichids. Callitrichids are a small, short-life monkey
and are a rare example of primate care (Bales et al., 2000; Dunbar, 1995; Ziegler, 2000).
The results given here demonstrate possible links between this differentiation in prim-
ate strategies and life span. It is possible that the short life span of these callitrichids
creates a selection pressure for care, while the much longer life span of chimpanzees
and humans results in a greater selection pressure for competition.
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The interbirth interval is another important life history determinant between species.
I note that the birth rate b modelled here is not strictly a female rate of conception
as it absorbs weaning time. This convolutes potential mechanisms and may result in
a decrease in the benefit of competition as, due to the way in which this birth rate
is defined, unpaired males are also subject to this weaning time. Males are unable to
produce new offspring during this time when females are otherwise occupied as well.
This may be better interpreted as the interbirth interval for females. However, this
also curtails the rate at which potential multiple maters can have offspring. Males who
would otherwise be able to mate with multiple females are required to wait for another
conception. This is an important distinction as b has a strong effect on the system. The
lower the value of b, the larger the region of care. However, if males were able to invest
in additional competitive mating effort where they might otherwise be occupied by
care for unweaned offspring, the payoff to mating competition would likely outweigh
that of care.
Further, the effect of sex ratios and subsequent availability of females is highly in-
fluential when considering the evolution of male reproductive strategies (Loo et al.,
2017b,a), but these effects are not considered here. The model presented here assumes
that males are competing against each other when females are readily available. How-
ever, when females are scarce the selective pressure of competition will only increase.
Consideration of female availability would be instrumental in further exploring the per-
sistence of competition, particularly in male-biased hunter-gatherer populations where
large-game hunting (as described in Section 4.5) and the provision of public goods is
observed.
Investigation of the strength of natural selection on maintaining traits that improve
reproductive success through mating competition over those that are driven by care
shows that increasing one’s number of paternity opportunities outweighs the potential
survival benefits of care for increasingly realistic situations. This points to a selection
pressure for traits that increase one’s status or standing as an attractive mate or intimid-
ating rival. Pathways that lead to deferential treatment and increased reproductive suc-
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cess have selective benefits even if, as in the case of large-game hunting, they provide
an additional benefit to all in the population. In the specific case of large-game hunting
explored in this chapter, it can be seen that when the competitive strategy provides a
public good to all, there is an even stronger selective pressure for that trait or behaviour.
The simple model developed and built upon in this chapter sheds light on the im-
portance of competition as a male reproductive strategy by characterising the marginal
advantages of both paternal care and mating competition and investigating their in-
teraction. When males are faced with the choice of investment in these alternative
pathways, the model has shown that mating competition more often wins out in in-
creasingly realistic situations.
5
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5.1 introduction
As socio-cultural and economic structures have changed, defined by the shift from pre-
to post-industrial society, so too has fertility. This global transition of fertility from
high to low has been widely investigated by cultural evolutionists and human beha-
vioural evolutionists (e.g. Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Bryant,
2007; Kaplan, 1996; Livi-Bacci, 1986; Mace, 1996). This shift has resulted in over half of
the global population now living in countries with below-replacement fertility (Wilson,
2004). Life history theory would predict that individuals would invest in strategies to
maximise lifetime reproductive success, which implies that greater wealth would res-
ult in more surviving offspring. However, improvements in socio-economic status are
instead observed to be negatively correlated with fertility (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998;
Bryant, 2007; Livi-Bacci, 1986).
This fertility shift can be understood on two levels. Longitudinally, demographic
transition is the shift in average population fertility from high to low as populations
move from pre-industrial to industrialised economic systems. The other transversal
dimension distinguishes individuals within populations, where individuals of higher
socio-economic status in a given population have lower fertility than those of lower
socio-economic status. The mechanisms of the shift in fertility in both of these direc-
tions are distinct and require separate investigation.
Demographic transition researchers argue that cultural, sociological, and economic
factors are too intrinsically defined to be analysed separately (review in Colleran, 2016,
and references therein) and that these factors are keenly dependent on different social
interactions and networks. Models based in evolutionary anthropology have explored
these different aspects of fertility decline from a number of perspectives, including in-
vestigations of socio-economic and socio-cultural factors, resource-allocation strategies,
fitness optimisation and human behavioural ecology (e.g. Alvergne et al., 2011; Barkow
and Burley, 1980; Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; Brown et al., 2011; Kaplan, 1996; Mace, 1996;
Nettle et al., 2013; Shenk et al., 2013; Shenk, 2009). The underlying assumption of many
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of these models is that with fewer children, a parent can invest more time and effort
into the survival, well-being, or performance of each individual child. This may be
interpreted as a question of quality versus quantity. Individual fitness is increased by
producing so-called ‘higher quality’ offspring. There is a strong focus in the literat-
ure on the tradeoff between quantity and quality of surviving offspring (Kaplan, 1996;
Lack, 1968; Turke, 1989), with ‘higher quality’ offspring often taking varying definitions
— be it economic quality, survival quality, or an alternative definition. This assumes
that individuals with high relative fitness will produce offspring with a similarly high
relative fitness. However, this does not strictly follow the pattern displayed in modern
societies.
Cultural evolutionists have pointed to fertility decline as a key example of cultural
transmission resulting in behaviours that do not maximise fitness, where fitness is cal-
culated as surviving offspring (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman,
1981). Investigations into the mechanisms underlying this cultural evolution need to
not only consider tradeoffs between the quantity and quality of offspring, but also the
effects of status seeking and social learning on the fertility decisions of parents. Separ-
ating trait transmission into genetic and cultural components can be difficult (Laland
and Brown, 2011) but studies in the literature highlight the utility of exploring cultural
evolution through the lens of natural selection (e.g. Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Dawkins and Carlisle, 1976; Mesoudi et al., 2007; Richerson
and Boyd, 1984). These studies consider non-genetic Darwinian mechanisms of inher-
itance to demonstrate the selection of traits of high-status individuals.
Maladaptive effects of competition can result from this selective imitation. This is
the notion that strategies or traits that increase an individual’s chance of outcompeting
its competitors are selected despite the decrease in overall population fitnesss. Boyd
and Richerson (1985) hypothesise that decreases in fertility are due to these such inher-
itance mechanisms that dictate the preferential imitation of traits associated with high
socio-economic status individuals. This echoes the investigation in Chapter 4, where
competition is shown to outcompete care in a wide range of cases.
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This chapter focuses on the mechanisms that drive high socio-economic status indi-
viduals to low fertilities by considering this relationship from a transversal perspective
rather than directly addressing demographic transition. An integro-difference equa-
tion model is developed to compare individuals of varying socio-economic status
within a given population and investigate the coevolution of fertility with changes
in socio-economic status. This is constructed within the framework of cultural evolu-
tion, wherein an individual’s target offspring endowment or provision is a transmitted
cultural trait. Thus, transmission is not restricted to biological inheritance of behaviour
through parents. As culture is passed from one individual to another by nurture —
through observation, imitation, teaching, etc. (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981) —
behaviours can be transmitted through any member of a population, including those
other than one’s biological parents. Using this model, I seek to explore the mechanisms
that drive the sacrifice of fertility for socio-economic status.
5.2 model
An integro-difference equation model is developed and analysed to investigate the ef-
fect of (i) the disposable wealth of parents as dependent on their own socio-economic
status, (ii) parents basing their fertility decisions on the decisions of other parents
with similar socio-economic status, and (iii) role models being chosen probabilistically
across the whole range of socio-economic status with a gradual preference for imitat-
ing high-socio economic status individuals from the parent generation.
The coevolution of two traits are explored: socio-economic status, s ∈ [0, 1], and en-
dowment target, e ∈ [emin, 1]. Socio-economic status is a dynamic trait describing an
individual’s position in a given generation relative to one’s peers. This relative status
can be thought of in terms of possession of income, education or occupation. Endow-
ment target is an inherited, evolving trait. Endowment target e is bounded below by
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emin, following the assumption that there is a minimum endowment requirement ne-
cessary for the survival of children or that there exists a baseline level of provision
given to children by way of welfare assistance.
Endowment target represents the investment strategy of a parent, which defines
the proportion of an individual’s disposable wealth that is endowed, or provided, to
each of their children. This can be interpreted as provision of monetary or material
inheritance, or investment in the development of certain skills, education or values.
The mechanisms by which either high or low endowment targets are selected for is
dependent on the coevolution of, and competition embedded within, socio-economic
status. With a foundation in cultural evolution, I assume that endowment target trans-
mission can occur through learning from one’s parent or through an alternative role
model chosen from the parent generation via mechanisms of social learning.
The population distribution is defined as a bivariate probability density f(s, e), which
is updated with each subsequent generation of parents. The sex of populations is un-
defined. Thus, I assume that individuals in parent generations represent reproducing
pairs. The coevolution of average endowment target, and subsequently average fertility,
with socio-economic status is investigated. I establish three sub-steps within the model
defining events that occur in each generation, as shown below:
1. Children born via fertility decision,
2. Socio-economic status acquisition,
3. Endowment target transmission.
This is summarised by
ft(sP, eP)→ fc(sP, eP)→ fs(s, eP)→ fe(s, e) = ft+1(s, e),
where fi, i ∈ {t, c, s, e} are probability densities in the trait space, with ft giving the
population distribution at a given time t.
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5.2.1 Fertility decision
The first sub-step is the production of children. The number of children born to each
parent of socio-economic status sP and endowment target eP is given by
n(sP, eP) =
W(sP, eˆP)
eP
, (5.1)
where eˆP is the average endowment target of the population; and W(sP, eˆP) is the total
disposable wealth of a parent who has socio-economic status sP. This is defined such
that the number of children born to a parent with socio-economic status sP and en-
dowment target eP is a choice dependent on how to divide one’s wealth. This is driven
by the investment strategy, or endowment target, eP. If endowment target is large a
parent chooses to invest a larger proportion of its wealth into fewer children, whereas
if endowment target is small a parent divides its wealth between more numerous off-
spring, thus providing smaller proportions to each child.
Disposable wealth is dependent on the parent’s socio-economic status and may also
depend on the average endowment target of the population, eˆP. I assume that wealth
increases as socio-economic status increases, such that ∂W/∂sP > 0, and W ∈ [0, 1].
The maximum disposable wealth is scaled to 1, without loss of generality. The mag-
nitude of ∂W/∂sP quantifies the extent of competition and inequality within a society.
For example, if ∂W/∂sP is much larger than 0, high socio-economic status individuals
hold much larger proportions of wealth relative to those with lower socio-economic
status; there are high levels of inequality.
The dependence of disposable wealth on the population average endowment tar-
get, eˆP, is important for investigating the longitudinal change in fertility, also known
as demographic transition. However, for simplicity, I consider a wealth distribution
that is solely dependent on socio-economic status, W(s). This assumes only latitud-
inal, within-population variation without taking into account the transition that occurs
longitudinally over decades. Thus, I focus on the competitive mechanisms that drive
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the coevolution of endowment target and socio-economic status between individuals
within a given population.
This wealth function is given by
W(sP) = ((1− rW)sP + rW)Wmax, (5.2)
where rW is a measure describing the disposable wealth available to an individual with
minimum socio-economic status relative to that of an individual with maximum socio-
economic status, i.e., rW =Wmin/Wmax. Thus, the parameter rW can be interpreted as
a measure of inequality; if rW is high, inequality is low and if rW is low, inequality
is high. The wealth function given by Equation (5.2) is a linear interpolating function
that defines the extent of competition.
The result of this sub-step is the frequency distribution of children, fc(sP, eP), prior
to the determination of socio-economic status within that peer group and the adoption
of their own endowment target investment strategy. Thus, the distribution of offspring
fc(sP, eP) gives the proportion of offspring born to parents with traits (sP, eP) and the
state distribution is given by
fc(sP, eP) =
1
Zc
n(sP, eP)ft(sP, eP), (5.3)
where Zc =
∫1
0
∫1
emin
n(s, e)ft(s, e)deds normalises the distribution of children.
5.2.2 Acquisition of socio-economic status
In the next sub-step, the distribution of socio-economic status in the child generation
is determined. This involves ranking children based on the endowment received from
their parents and using this rank to determine the child’s socio-economic status, as-
suming a certain degree of accuracy in parental endowment of wealth. I assume that
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parents who invest more in their children, i.e., the larger the endowment provided to
their children, have a higher chance of producing children of higher socio-economic
status. The dynamics of this socio-economic status determination is given by
S (s|sP, eP, fc) =
1
Zs (sP, eP, fc)
N(s|r(eP, fc),D(sP)), (5.4)
which gives the distribution of socio-economic status s. The term Zs(sP, eP, fc) nor-
malises socio-economic status such that
∫1
0 S(s|sP, eP, fc)ds = 1, to maintain a stable
population. The term N(s|r(eP, fc),D(sP)) is the probability density of offspring socio-
economic status s, taken from a truncated normal distribution with mean r(eP, fc) and
standard deviationD(sP). This is truncated so as to obtain an offspring socio-economic
status distribution that is also bounded by 0 and 1. Note that fc here is the distribution
of children found in the previous sub-step.
The standard deviation D(sP) is a decreasing function of parental socio-economic
status, i.e., D ′(sP) < 0. I assume variance decreases exponentially. This implies that the
higher the parent socio-economic status, the smaller the variance from the child’s rank
and therefore, the greater the influence the parent has on their child’s socio-economic
status. This is defined as
D(sP) = exp (−dsP) , (5.5)
where d is a constant. Section 5.3.3 considers the effect of a constant form of D(sP)
and also the effect of d in this exponentially decreasing form of standard deviation for
socio-economic status transmission.
The ranking term, r(eP, fc), orders offspring from the distribution of children fc
by the endowment provided by the parent generation, eP. Thus, if a child receives a
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large relative endowment from their parent, they will have a higher rank in their own
generation. The endowment rank is defined as
r(eP, fc) =
1
Zr(fc)
∫
eP
emin
∫
1
0
fc(s2, e2)ds2 de2
=
1
Zr(fc)
∫
eP
emin
∫
1
0
n(s2, e2)ft(s2, e2)ds2 de2
where Zr(fc) normalizes the rank such that r(1, fc) = 1, that is, the highest ranking
individual holds the highest rank of 1. Implementation details of this ranking function
are given in Appendix D.
The state distribution following socio-economic status transmission, describing the
transition from fc(sP, eP) to fs(s, eP) is given by
fs(s, eP) =
∫1
0
S(s|sP, eP, fc)fc(sP, eP)dsP. (5.6)
5.2.3 Social learning of fertility strategy
Within the framework of cultural evolution, the endowment target investment strategy
of an individual can be learned from one’s parent or from a role model chosen from
the parent population. This process of cultural evolution describes the extent of social
learning. The probability that a child learns its strategy from a role model is defined
by a constant ν, and the probability it learns from its own parents by (1− ν). The dis-
tribution of role models imitated is given by the imitation kernel, K(s, sM, ft), where
sM is the status distribution of role models from the parent population, ft(sP, eP), and
s is the status of the offspring generation.
Overall endowment target transmission occurs with the transmission kernel
E(e|s, eP, sM, eM, ft) = νK(s, sM, ft)δ(e− eM) + (1− ν)δ(e− eP), (5.7)
5.2 model 120
where δ is the Dirac delta function. The first term represents imitation from role mod-
els and the second term represents imitation from parents. This transmission function,
E(e|s, eP, sM, eM, ft), describes the transmission of endowment target e using the prob-
ability density that a child adopts endowment target e when it has socio-economic
status s, its parents have endowment target eP, and it imitates a role model charac-
terised by traits (sM, eM). This probability is given by an imitation kernel described
below.
Role models are chosen from the parent population and characterised by socio-
economic status sM and endowment target eM. The parent population ft(sP, eP) corres-
ponds to the equivalent role model population ft(sM, eM).
I define an imitation kernel that gives the probability that a child of socio-economic
status s successfully imitates a role model of socio-economic status sM from the parent
population ft. This is given by
K(s, sM, ft) =
1
Zi(s, ft)
N(sM|s, 1/a)
1+ exp(−w(sM − s))
, (5.8)
where Zi(s, ft) normalizes the kernel such that the whole parent population, ft(sP, eP),
is available for imitation and, given that imitation occurs, Zi(s, ft) ensures that a role
model is indeed chosen, i.e., the probability that a role model of any socio-economic
status is chosen from the parent population is 1. This corresponds to the mathematical
condition that
∫1
0
∫1
emin
K(s, sM, ft)ft(sM, eM)deMdsM = 1. When the normal distribu-
tion in the numerator of Equation (5.8) is divided by the Fermi update rule in the
denominator, the kernel gives preference for role models with socio-economic status
greater than that of the imitator.
The imitation kernel assumes that a role model is assortatively chosen from the par-
ent population. The numerator of Equation (5.8) gives the probability that a role model
of socio-economic status sM is chosen by a child of socio-economic status s based
on assortative imitation. This assumes that preference is given to role models whose
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socio-economic status is close to that of the imitating offspring. This choice is normally
distributed around the socio-economic status of the offspring, with standard deviation
1/a, where a > 0 is a constant. If a is small, a child will be able to imitate any role
model and if a is large, a child can only imitate those whose socio-economic status is
close to their own. This follows from the interpretation that a child will be less likely to
imitate the investment strategy of a role model whose socio-economic status is vastly
different from their own. This takes into account the probable lack of mixing between
individuals of very different socio-economic status and can also be interpreted as a
child’s assessment that imitating a role model of much higher socio-economic status is
unachievable.
The denominator of Equation (5.8) represents a sigmoidal Fermi function which
accounts for perception — or implementation — error and sets preference for role
models with higher socio-economic status. If a role model has socio-economic status
much larger than the offspring there is likely to be error in imitating this strategy, and
therefore, the accuracy of imitation diminishes. The degree of imitation error is mod-
elled by a constant w > 0.
Special cases of this imitation kernel can be obtained by taking different values of a
and w. For example, small values of a correspond to a large variance and therefore all
role models with larger socio-economic status than that of the child are available for
imitation. A further example can be seen where w→∞, corresponding to a step func-
tion that mimics wholly accurate imitation of role models of higher socio-economic
status.
Thus, the distribution of the child population following endowment target transmis-
sion is given by
fe(s, e) =
∫1
emin
∫1
0
∫1
emin
E(e|s, eP, sM, eM, ft)fs(s, eP) dePdsMdeM. (5.9)
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Parameter Interpretation Value
emin Minimum endowment target 0.2
en Maximum endowment target 1
s1 Minimum socio-economic status 0
sn Maximum socio-economic status 1
ν Probability of imitation 0.4
d Uncertainty in socio-economic status transmission 2
a Extent of assortative role model choice 10
w Effect of perception or imitation error 10
rW Ratio of minimum disposable wealth over
maximum disposable wealth
0.8
Wmax Maximum disposable wealth available 1
Table 5.1: Summary of baseline parameters used for population simulations of stabil-
ity and equilibrium. Baseline parameters are chosen such that the baseline
demonstrates a negative correlation between socio-economic status and fer-
tility. Parameters are as given, unless otherwise stated.
The total intergenerational dynamics are obtained by combining the transmission
functions given in Equations (5.4) and (5.7), and the population densities given by
Equations (5.3), (5.6) and (5.9):
ft+1(s, e) =
∫1
emin
∫1
0
∫1
emin
E(e|s, eP, sM, eM, ft)∫1
0
S(s|sP, eP, fc)
1
Zc
n(sP, eP)ft(sP, eP) dsPdePdsMdeM.
(5.10)
Details of the implementation of the model are given in Appendix D at the end of
this chapter.
5.3 results
I consider the effect of parameters in the model and investigate the mechanisms that
drive those of higher socio-economic status to invest in better endowed children. I first
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explore the effect of the distribution of wealth, parametrised by varying the ratio of
wealth. Then, I consider the effects of other parameters including the extent of social
learning, ν; the influence a parent has on their child’s socio-economic status, D(sP)
with particular focus on the parameter d; and parameters that define the assortative
nature and success of imitation, a and w. Baseline parameters are defined as in Table
5.1 and sensitivity analysis is performed by perturbing parameters from the baseline.
For baseline parameters given in Table 5.1, the distribution of the population in trait
space is given as in Figure 5.1. High socio-economic status individuals move towards
high endowment targets and low socio-economic status to low endowment targets, cor-
responding to low and high fertilities respectively.
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Figure 5.1: Population distribution over the trait space of endowment targets and socio-
economic status at an early time, showing initial imitation behaviours. Para-
meters are baseline parameters given in Table 5.1.
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5.3.1 Wealth distribution
The effect of population wealth distributions on the correlation between socio-economic
status and fertility is explored. Using the wealth distribution defined in Equation (5.2),
I assume Wmax = 1, and consider the effect of varying the ratio parameter rW . Results
for this sensitivity analysis are given in Figure 5.2 for a baseline moderate level of so-
cial learning, ν = 0.4. Figure 5.2(a) presents the equilibrium average fertility at each
socio-economic status for a range of ratio values rW , where the blue curve corresponds
to the lowest ratio and green to the highest ratio where wealth is distributed equally
across socio-economic status.
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Figure 5.2: The effect of wealth distribution or inequality, rW , on (a) the relationship
between average fertility at a given socio-economic status; and (b) the Pear-
son’s correlation coefficient of this relationship between fertility and socio-
economic status (red, solid line), and the average population fertility (blue,
dashed line). The wealth function is defined as in Equation (5.2), and other
parameters used are given in Table 5.1.
When rW is high, the difference in wealth between the highest and lowest socio-
economic status individual is small, i.e., the population is more equal. For these relat-
ively equal situations, the benefit of higher endowment targets is greater. Individuals
start from a more level playing field and therefore the relative benefit of higher en-
dowment targets and better placed children is greater in comparison to having more
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children. Therefore, endowment targets increase and fertility decreases with socio-
economic status when the ratio rW is high. Maladaptive effects of competition can
be seen in these cases where competition is strong.
When rW is lower, that is, when there is a large difference in wealth between indi-
viduals in a population, the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility
is monotonically positive, as represented by the blue and red curves in Figure 5.2(a).
Low socio-economic status individuals have much lower relative wealth and they are
unable to produce offspring who are relatively well placed in their subsequent genera-
tions, even if these offspring receive large proportions of parental wealth.
The correlation between fertility and socio-economic status is summarised in Figure
5.2(b), where the Pearson’s correlation coefficient is calculated and plotted along the
red axis (the solid line). There is a distinct transition from positive to negative correl-
ation as wealth ratio decreases. Further, since Wmax is set as constant, as the ratio rW
increases the total wealth of the population increases. This leads to an increase in pop-
ulation average fertility, represented by the blue, dashed line in Figure 5.2(b).
The transition from positive to negative correlation as rW increases occurs as the
benefit of having more children is outweighed by the benefit of producing offspring
who are more likely to be of higher socio-economic status in their own generation.
This demonstrates the maladaptive effect of competition, but this effect can be over-
shadowed. At very high socio-economic status, the relative benefit of high endowment
targets decreases as these children are already likely to receive greater relative wealth
from their much wealthier parents. When higher socio-economic status corresponds
to high relative wealth in this way, those of high socio-economic status are still able
to bear the costs of having more children. They have sufficient means to have more
children who are still relatively well endowed in the succeeding generation.
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5.3.2 Effect of social learning
The greater the extent of social learning, or the stronger the effect of cultural evol-
ution through imitation of role models, the lower the population average fertility at
equilibrium, corresponding to a higher average endowment target. This can be seen in
the blue, dashed line in Figure 5.3(b). Maladaptive competition drives the imitation of
the traits of higher socio-economic status individuals despite the overall fitness deficit,
leading to the evolution of higher endowment targets and lower fertilities.
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Figure 5.3: The effect of the extent of social learning, ν, on (a) the relationship between
average fertility at a given socio-economic status; and (b) the Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient of this relationship between fertility and socio-economic
status (red, solid line), and the average population fertility (blue, dashed
line). Other parameters used are given in Table 5.1.
Again, the correlation between fertility and socio-economic status is shown in Fig-
ure 5.3(a), and on the red axis in (b) showing the correlation coefficient. When social
learning is low and limited imitation occurs, the correlation between socio-economic
status and fertility is positive. As the extent of social learning increases, the correlation
becomes negative before becoming positive again.
However, as ν continues to increase, despite the decrease in average fertility, the
within-population heterogeneity between socio-economic status and fertility maintains
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a positive correlation at high levels of social learning. When there is a high level
of social learning individuals will, almost with certainty, imitate an individual with
higher socio-economic status. There is less incentive to outperform competitors by en-
suring a high endowment and relative socio-economic status for offspring, as others of
low socio-economic status will follow suit by similarly imitating this high endowment.
Thus, offspring end up equally well endowed.
5.3.3 Likelihood of influencing child’s socio-economic status
I explore the effect of a constant standard deviation, which relates to the normal dis-
tribution of child acquisition of socio-economic status, independent of parental socio-
economic status and then consider different values of the parameter of influence, d
within D(sP) in Equation (5.5). The larger the standard deviation, the less likely a par-
ent is able to influence their child’s socio-economic status. If D(sP) = 0, the parent
ensures the child’s socio-economic status is directly proportional to their endowment
received.
5.3.3.1 Constant standard deviation
In Figure 5.4, constantD(sP) = d is investigated, with varying values of d ∈ [0, 1]. Thus
the likelihood of influencing the socio-economic status of offspring is independent of
parental socio-economic status. In Figure 5.4(a) the relationship between fertility and
socio-economic status is presented. Low standard deviation means that parents are
more able to ensure their offspring are similarly well positioned in their subsequent
generation. For these low values of standard deviation maladaptive competition is
strong and high socio-economic status individuals have a much lower fertility in com-
parison to low socio-economic status. This is seen in blue in Figure 5.4(a).
As standard deviation increases, this relationship transitions to being positively cor-
related. Large standard deviation corresponds to a large transmission error in trans-
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ferring endowment of wealth to ensure offspring socio-economic status. This is sum-
marised in Figure 5.4(b) on the red axis, where the Pearson’s correlation coefficient
transitions from negative to positive as constant standard deviation D increases.
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Figure 5.4: The effect of constant standard deviation, D, on the equilibrium (a) relation-
ship between average fertility at a given socio-economic status; and (b) the
Pearson’s correlation coefficient of this relationship between fertility and
socio-economic status (red, solid line), and the average population fertility
(blue, dashed line). Other parameters used are given in Table 5.1.
5.3.3.2 Standard deviation dependent on parental socio-economic status
The effect of a more realistic exponential form of this standard deviation that is de-
pendent on parental socio-economic status as given by Equation (5.5) is presented in
Figure 5.5. I investigate the effect of changing the parameter d in this equation, where
d > 0. For low values of the constant d, seen in blue in Figure 5.5(a), the relation-
ship between fertility and socio-economic status is slightly positive. As d increases,
high socio-economic status individuals are increasingly able to ensure a similarly high
socio-economic status for their children. With this increase the correlation becomes
negative, as is evident when d = 5, the red curve in Figure 5.5(a). Continually increas-
ing d leads to a stronger negative correlation. However, the effect of this is limiting,
as in the cases where d = 10, 15, 20 are seen to overlap. This is further emphasised by
the correlation coefficient plotted in Figure 5.5(b) in red where the curve approaches a
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limiting correlation. As d increases, the standard deviation is very close to 0 and the
offspring’s socio-economic status is directly determined by their parent. Thus, the ap-
parent stochasticity in the average fertilities at high d seen in Figure 5.5(a) correspond
to very small proportions of the adult population being at that given socio-economic
status.
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Figure 5.5: The effect of varying values of parameter d in the exponential form of the
standard deviation given by Equation (5.5) on (a) the relationship between
average fertility at a given socio-economic status; and (b) the Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient of this relationship between fertility and socio-economic
status (red, solid line), and the average population fertility (blue, dashed
line). Other parameters are as defined in Table 5.1.
The average fertility of the population also declines, as can be seen in Figure 5.5(b).
As a parent’s influence on the subsequent socio-economic status of offspring becomes
more precise, high socio-economic status individuals will coevolve with high endow-
ment targets, and subsequently fertility will decrease.
5.3.4 Imitation parameters
Embedded within the imitation kernel, given by Equation (5.8), are the effects of as-
sortment of imitation and imitation error. These are modelled by the parameters a and
w respectively. To investigate the effect of these parameters, I increase the baseline im-
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itation parameter ν to 0.7. With this value, the effect of parameters relating to imitation
can be more easily visualised and investigated.
5.3.4.1 Assortative choice
Small values of assortative choice, a, correspond to being able to imitate those of much
higher socio-economic status than oneself. Conversely, larger values of a correspond
to a narrow window of imitation such that only those of nearby socio-economic status
can be imitated. The effect of this assortion in imitation is investigated and presented
in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: The effect of varying strengths of assortative choice, a, on (a) the relation-
ship between average fertility at a given socio-economic status; and (b) the
Pearson’s correlation coefficient of this relationship between fertility and
socio-economic status (red, solid line), and the average population fertility
(blue, dashed line). Other parameters used are given in Table 5.1.
As assortative choice increases, average fertility of the total population increases.
This corresponds to a decrease in the average endowment target strategy and can be
seen in Figure 5.6(a) and (b). In panel (a) the relationship between fertility and socio-
economic status shifts up while retaining a similar curvature for increased values of
a. This increase in a decreases the ability of individuals to imitate those of much
higher status than themselves. Thus, the high endowment target strategy of high socio-
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economic status individuals cannot be easily imitated, and therefore the average pop-
ulation fertility increases. The effect of maladaptive competition is weakened.
Figure 5.6(b) shows the effect of a on the correlation coefficient relating socio-economic
status and fertility. This correlation increases as a approaches 5 before again decreas-
ing. The correlation plateaus as the assortative constant continues to increase past 20
as the corresponding variance in the normal distribution of Equation (5.8) approaches
zero and the parameter has a diminishing effect. The correlation coefficient is positive
for all values of a presented as the curvature of the relationship seen in Figure 5.6(a)
remains the same.
5.3.4.2 Imperfect imitation
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Figure 5.7: The effect of changes to imitation error, w, on (a) the relationship between
average fertility at a given socio-economic status; and (b) the Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient of this relationship between fertility and socio-economic
status (red), and the average population fertility (blue). Higher values of w
correspond to higher accuracy in imitation. As described in Section 5.2.3,
as w→∞, imitation approaches a Dirac delta step function corresponding
to wholly accurate imitation of the role model. Other parameters used are
given in Table 5.1.
Conversely, as imitation error w increases, the average fertility decreases. When imit-
ation error is modelled and is large, there is a small likelihood that a larger endowment
strategy is imitated than was intended. Thus, the average population endowment tar-
5.4 discussion 132
get at equilibrium increases, corresponding to lower average fertility. This can be seen
in Figure 5.7(a) where the distribution shifts downwards as w increases, and in the
blue curve in (b). However, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient increases as imitation
error increases, seen in Figure 5.7(b) in red. This demonstrates the decreased effect of
maladaptive competition within a population.
5.4 discussion
Taking the concepts explored in previous qualitative and quantitative studies, I de-
veloped a quantitative, dynamic model and explored the use of cultural evolution in
explaining the fertility choices observed in modern societies. Using this framework,
it is evident that increased sociality or social learning through cultural imitation of
either parents or role models and the wealth distribution of the population may help
to explain the paradox of the negative correlation between fertility and socio-economic
status.
The greater the degree of cultural evolution, i.e., increased sociality and interaction
between individuals of different socio-economic status, the higher the average endow-
ment target strategy and correspondingly, the lower the population average fertility.
This increase in the extent of cultural evolution could be a result of globalisation or, on
a smaller scale, increased networking due to changes in technology. Increased network-
ing and mixing of individuals from different socio-economic status allows for higher
likelihood of imitation from a role model whose strategy seems attractive. From the
sensitivity analysis of the parameter of social learning in Section 5.3.2 it is evident
that the increase in cultural evolution is sufficient to drive a decrease in total average
fertility. This supports the hypothesis in Boyd and Richerson (1985), which states that
decreases in fertility are due to inheritance mechanisms that dictate the preferential
imitation of traits associated with high socio-economic status individuals.
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However, the question remains as to why these high socio-economic status individu-
als are those associated with low fertility in the first place. Investigating this question
requires further exploration of the mechanisms driving the relationship between high
socio-economic status and low fertility.
Additional answers to this question may be found in alternative investigations. As
outlined in the introduction of this chapter, diverting resources away from offspring
production towards other pathways may result in an overall decrease in fertility. For
example, the change in women’s labour choices informs the investment of individual
effort into areas outside of the production of offspring, which may divert resources into
pathways that improve mating success or individual maintenance. The introduction
of individual consumption of disposable wealth and differences of this consumption
based on sex could be an interesting further avenue of exploration.
By instead focusing on the mechanisms above that drive high socio-economic status
individuals to low fertilities, I have shown that the evolution of low fertilities at high
socio-economic status is particularly sensitive to population wealth distributions. Within
the model, wealth is a direct determinant of the number of children produced; thus it
follows that the distribution of wealth between individuals of varying socio-economic
status is important in considering the average total fertility of the population. Wealth
distribution outlines societal inequalities, and this distribution has a strong influence
on the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility. It is perhaps the dif-
ferences in inequality of different societies that drives the differences in fertility rates
both between populations and within populations.
The sensitivity of the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility to the
relative distribution of wealth in a population informs future work in the direction
of corroboration of the model with measures of inequality in contemporary societies.
This may be achieved by using metrics of inequality such as the Gini coefficient of
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education or income distribution. This has potential to illuminate differences between
countries where fertility has remained stable, such as Sweden, and comparing these to
countries where fertility has dropped drastically, such as South Korea.
A quantitative analysis of the link between low fertility and high socio-economic
status was achieved, and results emphasised the overwhelming effect of the malad-
aptive competition that drives parental attempts to maximise their offspring’s socio-
economic status. While this demonstrates the link between high socio-economic status
and low fertilities, I have shown that the overall negative correlation between socio-
economic status and fertility is strongly dependent on disposable wealth and levels of
social learning. In populations with high levels of inequality, the exorbitant wealth of
those of high socio-economic status may allow for the correspondingly high fertility of
those on top of the socio-economic ladder. Where wealth is more equally distributed,
the coevolution of socio-economic status with endowment investment targets results
in low fertilities at higher socio-economic status.
appendix c : numerical scheme for model
To implement this model, I discretise the bivariate trait space in socio-economic status,
s, and endowment target, e. Thus, I define n possible states, equally spaced within
each set, such that
s ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , sn−1, sn} = S, (5.11)
e ∈ {e1, e2, . . . , en−1, en} = E, (5.12)
where s1 = 0 and sn = 1 are the minimum and maximum possible values of socio-
economic status, and e1 = emin and en = 1 are the minimum and maximum possible
values of endowment target. Taking large values of n possible states approximates the
continuous formulation.
Sub-step population distributions are defined by
ft → fc → fs → fe = ft+1, (5.13)
where population distributions fy(i, j) ∈ [0, 1]n×n represent the proportion of indi-
viduals in the population with socio-economic status si and endowment target ej, and
where the subscript y ∈ {c, s, e, t} describes the distribution at a given sub-step or gen-
eration t. The mechanisms within the sub-steps in this discrete trait system, and details
of their implementation are described below.
Child population
The number of children born to each state is dependent on parental disposable wealth,
itself a function of parental endowment target, socio-economic status, and the average
endowment target of the population. This is given by
fc(i, j) =
1
Zc
W(si, eˆ)
ej
ft(i, j), (5.14)
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where the wealth function W(si, eˆ) is given by Equation (5.2), eˆ is the average popula-
tion endowment target, and Zc normalizes fc such that
Zc =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
fc(i, j). (5.15)
Status transmission
Socio-economic status is then transmitted by ranking children based on the endow-
ment target of their parents. Ranks are equally spaced and of equal size. The set of
possible ranks is given by
r ∈ {r1, r2, . . . , rm−1, rm} = R. (5.16)
A ranking mechanism is established that maps parental endowment target to a child’s
rank relative to its peers, i.e., from eP ∈ [emin, 1] to r ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, we require the
ranking function r(e) that divides the set of endowment targets, [emin, 1], intom equally
spaced intervals, [gα,gα+1], to be defined by
r(e) =

r1, e ∈ [emin,g1]
r2, e ∈ [g3,g4]
...
rm e ∈ [gm−1,gm]
(5.17)
where intervals are such that there are an equal proportion of individuals in each rank,
independent of socio-economic status, i.e.,
∫gα+1
gα
∫1
0 fc(e, s)dsde = 1/m, for all α.
To apply this ranking function to the distribution of children, fc, in a discrete trait
space I first consider the proportion of individuals at each rank, given their parental
endowment target. I define a matrix ak×j where a(k, j) is the proportion of individuals
with rank k who receive parental endowment j. To calculate these proportions, I use
the cumulative distribution of the endowment target distribution.
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Let pj be the proportion of children with parental endowment target ej,
pj =
n∑
i=1
fc(i, j). (5.18)
Thus, the cumulative sum of children with endowment target up to ek is given by
Sk =

0, i = 0,
k∑
j=1
pj, 1 6 k < n.
(5.19)
I then use this cumulative sum to determine the proportion of individuals in each rank,
given the endowment target of their parent. Straightforwardly, pk = Sk − Sk−1.
Given Sk, I define xk ∈ Z as the smallest integer greater than or equal to the cumulative
sum Sk. Here, each xk is so defined such that each xk/m ∈ R, where R is the set of
all possible ranks, given in Equation (5.16). This determines the rank within which a
given proportion of endowment targets lies. This definition implies xk−1 6 xk, and
xk+1 − 1
m
6 Sk 6
xk+1
m
. (5.20)
To determine ak,j the proportion in rank rk given endowment target ej, I determine
the proportion of that rank present in the given endowment target, and then calculate
this as a proportion of the given proportion of that endowment target, ej. An example
of this matrix is represented by
ak×j =

1 . . . . . . . . . 0
0 0.8 0.2 . . . 0
0 0 1
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 . . . . . . 0.1 0.9

m×n
Therefore, the following properties hold. If xk−1 = xk, then all of that endowment
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target has rank r = xk, and the proportion of endowment target k with rank xk is
axk,k = 1. Otherwise, where xk−1 < xk
axk,k =
Sk−R(xk−1)/m
pk
and (5.21)
axk−1,k =
R(xk−1)/m−Sk−1
pk
, (5.22)
and if there exists an integer α such that xk−1 < xk−1+α < xk− 1, then it follows that
axk−1+α =
1
mpk
. (5.23)
Given the distribution of the proportion matrix a, I then assume that transmission
is imperfectly accurate. Error in transmission from a child’s rank to its eventual socio-
economic status is modelled by a moving average. This moving average is the convo-
lution of the proportions present in each rank rk given an endowment target ej with
a truncated normal distribution N(si|rk,D(sl)) of the child’s resulting socio-economic
status after transmission, si. This truncated normal distribution has mean rk and stand-
ard deviation dependent on parental socio-economic status, itself given by D(sl), and
is truncated at 0 and 1, so as to ensure the resulting socio-economic status si remains
bounded. This is achieved using a discrete convolution method, described in Appendix
D.
Thus, the transmission of socio-economic status can be expressed as the change in
proportion of the population with endowment target ej and socio-economic status si,
and mathematically given by
fs(i, j) =
n∑
l=1
m∑
k=1
ak,jN(si|rk,D(sl))fc(l, j). (5.24)
Endowment target transmission
After socio-economic status transmission, individuals in the child population make a
choice regarding their own endowment target. To establish the cultural evolution mech-
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anism acting on the endowment target trait, I assume that a child adopts the strategy
of a role model with probability ν ∈ [0, 1] and from its parent with the converse probab-
ility (1−ν). I assume that role models are chosen from the given population of parents
according to an imitation kernel K(s, sM, fs), given in Equation (5.8) and described in
Section 5.2.3.
The transmission of endowment target from the parent generation to the next gener-
ation can be summarised by,
fs(i, j) = νK(i, j)
n∑
k=1
fs(M,k) + (1− ν)fs(i, j), (5.25)
where the imitation kernel is discretised by
K(i,M) =
1∑
i
∑
j ft(i, j)
N(sM|si, 1/a)
1+ exp(−w(sM − si))
, (5.26)
where i here is the socio-economic status of the child, and M is the socio-economic
status of the role model.
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appendix d : moving average
A moving average is a convolution that acts to reduce noise in an output response. In
a continuous form, convolutions take the form
(f ∗ g) =
∫∞
−∞f(t− τ)g(τ)dτ, (5.27)
using the dummy variable τ. If thought of in terms of a function of time, this can be
interpreted as a weighted average of the function f(τ) at a given moment t, with the
weighting determined by the function g(−τ) shifted by t.
For implementation, discrete convolution of two functions, or vectors, f and g, is
defined as
(f ∗ g)[i] =
∞∑
m=−∞f[i]g(i−m). (5.28)
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In this thesis, I investigated the mechanisms that drive the evolution of uniquely
human behaviours such as pair bonding in Chapters 2 and 3, and large-game hunting
in Chapter 4, Section 4.5. I also explored the payoffs to competing strategies of mating
competition and paternal care by comparing the strength of natural selection on each
pathway in Chapter 4. These dynamic models of competing male strategies enabled me
to compare the evolutionary stable strategies at great ape-like life history parameters
with those at human-like parameters to investigate the mechanisms that drive these
divergent evolutionary trajectories.
In Chapter 2, I developed an ordinary differential equation of male reproductive
strategies. This model provided a framework within which I performed sensitivity
analysis on parameters of interest. In this case, I investigated the effect of the sex ratio
as it shifted from female-biased to male-biased. As the sex ratio becomes increasingly
male-biased, the effects of mate scarcity increase, seen in Figures 2.7–2.8. This leads
to a change in the payoffs to competing strategies, as it becomes harder to obtain
available mates. In hunter-gatherer-like male-biased sex ratios where there are fewer
females readily available for mating opportunities, male-male competition between
peers is strong. Thus, guarding outperforms other strategies as the likelihood of ob-
taining the paternity of guarded partners is greater than that of finding a new partner.
This provides insight into the selection pressures that drive the evolution of pair bond-
ing in humans.
In my model, the guarding strategy trades off with paternal care and multiple mat-
ing strategies. Despite the greater differential offspring survivorship that can be ob-
tained through investment in care, I have shown that the strategy of paternal care is
an insufficient explanation for the evolution of pair bonding, though some continue
to stress its significance (Kaplan, 1996; Wood and Marlowe, 2013). Paternal care fails
to outcompete other strategies at most realistic male-biased sex ratios. Instead, my
model agrees with the work of Hawkes et al. (1995), who demonstrated the promise
of mate guarding as a pathway to human pair bonding over caring and multiple mat-
ing strategies but ignored the effects of sex ratio. These results align with the work
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of Schacht and Bell (2016), who outlined the effect of the sex ratio on strategies that
increase individual fitness. By developing an ODE model of these three competing
strategies I used analytic and numerical analysis to show the stability of strategies at
varying sex ratios, and showed that multiple mating outcompetes other strategies at
a chimpanzee-like sex ratio while guarding outperforms others at hunter-gatherer-like
parameters. This shows mate guarding to be a probable non-caring pathway to pair
bonding in humans.
The results from the difference equation model in Chapter 3, Sections 3.3–3.5 further
support this notion. In this model I included an explicitly modelled female population,
introduced female mortality, dependence of offspring survival on maternal survival,
and further emphasised the effect of guarding inefficiencies. With these additional
assumptions, I showed that guarding still outperforms multiple mating and care in
human-like male-biased populations where the male’s dilemma is fully realised. Where
the likelihood of theft of paternities by multiple maters is greater for caring males than
for guarders, the guarding strategy outperforms other competing strategies.
By including theft of paternities from guarded pairs, I demonstrated the sensitivity
of the guarding strategy to these imperfections in guarding (Chapter 3, Section 3.4).
I highlighted the importance of modelling these inefficiencies, as male paternities are
necessarily uncertain. Accurately modelling the male’s dilemma requires the inclusion
of the possibility of theft from all males regardless of strategy. Though it is more likely
that the paternities of the offspring of guarded females is that of the guarding male
rather than a multiple mater, there must be at least the possibility of theft. Thus, I
showed that a small proportion of multiple mating can survive in the population.
Additionally, the mates of carers must be more available for theft than guarded fe-
males. This is the fundamental definition of mate guarding — that guarding increases
one’s chance of paternities. Assuming otherwise can implicitly include guarding ef-
fects into the caring strategy by assuming paternity certainty or protection from theft.
Thus, since caring only outperforms guarding where the availability of paternities of
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the mates of guarders is greater than or equal to that of carers (G > P) or the fe-
males of both guarding and caring males are relatively unavailable (both G and P
very small), the persistence of caring in these situations further supports the proposal
that it is through pathways of guarding that pair bonding evolved. Differential off-
spring survival benefits obtained through care do not lead to the evolution of human
pair bonding.
The models I developed in Chapters 2 and 3 show examples where the benefits of
competition and the increased relative likelihood of obtaining paternities through mate
guarding outweigh that of multiple mating and differential offspring survival obtained
through care. In Chapter 4 I investigated the reproductive payoffs of competition and
care using an ODE model, to show the tendency of males to invest in competition. This
follows from the clear distinction between male and female reproductive behaviour;
males tend towards competition while females tend towards care. This was influenced
by the work of Lehtonen et al. (2016) who framed these pathways using anisogamy and
the effect of gametic differences on reproductive investment. The ODE model presen-
ted in Chapter 4 elegantly describes the payoffs to each strategy; increased relative
likelihood of paternities through investment in competition, and differential offspring
survivorship through investment in care. By parametrising these benefits, I explored
these separate pathways of reproductive success and performed sensitivity analysis on
these parameters. In this way, the model showed regions where the payoffs of com-
petition outweighed that of care and vice versa, thus showing regions where natural
selection acts more strongly on traits that increase the payoffs to either strategy.
The general construction of the ODE in Chapter 4 allows for modification and applic-
ation to more specific pathways. I presented several extensions to the model, includ-
ing paternity uncertainty. The importance of paternity uncertainty was emphasised in
Chapters 2 and 3 and follows from anisogamy. Again, introducing paternity uncer-
tainty that allows competitive males the opportunity to steal paternities reduces the
payoff to caring. Selection for competitive traits increases.
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I then applied the model to the problem of large-game hunting in Section 4.5, and
showed that selection favours the wide sharing of large-game through payoffs in in-
creased paternity opportunities, despite the simultaneous provision of a public good
that is provided by one and consumed by all. This agrees with observations of many
hunter-gatherer populations (Hawkes, 1993; Hawkes and Bliege Bird, 2002; O’Connell
et al., 1988) where bonanzas are shared widely with no resource bias to the hunter’s
family. Rather than large-game acquisition providing resources to nuclear families as
suggested by some (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1983; Washburn and Lancaster, 1968),
I showed that the benefits of large-game hunting through increased paternity oppor-
tunities, despite the benefit provided to all, are large enough to drive its evolutionary
stability. When acquired meat is provided to all without bias to the hunter himself, and
when this meat is highly valued, the caring strategy is unable to outcompete mating
competition through large-game hunting.
This outstanding problem of competition versus care can be easily confused with the
tradeoff of quantity versus quality. However, as noted in Chapter 4, the misconception
that males invest in quantity while females invest in quality is a misunderstanding of
these reproductive pathways. The model in Chapter 4 is able to avoid these issues by
modelling the payoffs to each strategy without necessarily assuming that they trade off.
The quality-quantity tradeoff in females would necessarily take a different form and,
as such, making the generalisation that males invest in quantity and females in quality
is an incorrect corollary. The model presented in Chapter 4 outlines a simple version
of this payoff structure in males that does not automatically assume this tradeoff.
These findings from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 show the importance of correctly interpret-
ing anthropological literature. For example, I noted the importance of defining guard-
ing and paternity certainty in modelling male reproductive strategies (Chapters 2 and
3), and in defining the payoffs to competition and care (Chapter 4). In these three
chapters, male reproductive strategies were modelled to show regions within which
unique human behaviours emerge and to investigate the possible evolutionary traject-
ories of behavioural strategies. What life history parameters result in a human-like
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behaviour, compared to a chimpanzee-like behaviour? What does this tell us about
ancestral human behaviour? Ensuring increased relative likelihood of obtaining pa-
ternities is shown to outcompete other strategies of care for a wide range of hunter-
gatherer-like life history parameters in all of these models.
In Chapter 5 mechanisms of competition were analysed in a contemporary example
by considering the coevolution of low fertility at high socio-economic status, modelled
within the framework of cultural evolution. Using concepts of trait inheritance from
Darwinian evolution, studies in cultural evolution have explored selection gradients
and strategic choice of behaviour by including non-parental ‘inheritance’, or imitation.
The integro-difference equation model developed in this chapter addressed the tradeoff
between parental provision of greater wealth to offspring and investment in producing
more numerous offspring who receive smaller proportions of parental wealth. This can
be interpreted as a quality versus quantity tradeoff, which is similar to that discussed
in Chapter 4.
However, since individuals in the model reproduce asexually, I note that anisogamy
driven differences in payoffs to parental and mating effort in males and females are
ignored. Payoffs to parental care, or greater provisioning investments, take the form
of improved offspring quality by assuming offspring are subsequently similarly well
placed in their generation. Alternative payoffs to producing more offspring are received
immediately in number of direct offspring. Interestingly, although mechanisms of mal-
adaptive competition drive the coevolution of low fertilities at high socio-economic
status, individuals in the model invest in the provisioning or quality of their offspring,
which may be interpreted as care, rather than quantity or increased likelihood of ob-
taining paternities, which may be interpreted as mating competition. While the metric
of socio-economic status quantifies competition for wealth within a generation, com-
petition for mates is not modelled in this one-sex model. As such, I propose that intro-
ducing two-sex dynamics would be an interesting further step of exploration.
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Including sex-specific dynamics would further demonstrate the effect of competition
for mates and mate scarcity, which was shown to have a strong effect on male repro-
ductive strategies in Chapters 2 and 3. Additionally, developing a two-sex model would
allow for the inclusion of additional mechanisms such as female labour choice, which
have changed drastically as societies have moved from the pre- to post-industrial era
(Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000; Schultz, 1990).
This model of the cultural evolution of low fertility at high socio-economic status
provides a basis for understanding the mechanisms that drive the decrease in fertil-
ity in many countries. As wealth distribution has a strong effect on the relationship
between socio-economic status and fertility, exploring this effect further by including
empirical demographic research and comparing the fertility levels and inequality of
contemporary societies would be an interesting avenue of further research. This cor-
roboration with data could be used by demographers to highlight mechanisms that
cause fertility shifts. Understanding these drivers could influence policy makers to im-
plement policies that attempt to curtail drastically declining fertilities or ageing popu-
lations.
Overall, my thesis sheds light on some of the mechanisms that drive selection for
counter-intuitive behaviours. Dynamic mathematical modelling of human interactions
has demonstrated the utility of these techniques in investigating human behavioural
evolution. As evident in the studies presented in this thesis, the competitive benefits of
increased relative paternities can select for uniquely human traits such as pair bonding
in humans and mating competition in general. Though paternal care is often cited as
the main driver of these behaviours, I have shown that it is an insufficient evolutionary
pathway for the behaviours analysed here given hunter-gatherer-like life history para-
meters.
Addressing the male side of the story through creative modelling, I attempted to
uncover some of the mechanisms of human behavioural evolution. I investigated the
evolution of male reproductive strategies, and captured some of the mechanisms of
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certain tradeoffs in reproductive effort in males. This contribution emphasised the sig-
nificant effect of the sex ratio on male behaviour, and noted the possibility of caring
and multiple mating strategic persistence at some hunter-gatherer-like life history para-
meters, given that guarding is significantly imperfect. This may point to the differences
in behaviour that can be observed between societies. The ODE model of the payoffs to
competition and care further demonstrates the significance of male-male competition,
even at hunter-gatherer-like life history parameters where paternal care is often touted
as the main evolutionary driver.
Addressing some of these tradeoffs with two-sex models would be an important
avenue for further investigation. This would require careful quantification of repro-
ductive tradeoffs where payoffs to each sex come in drastically different forms, as is
informed by anisogamy. Pre-mating investments and post-mating investments for each
sex are important distinctions to make, and attempts to combine these will continue to
provide significant contributions to the field of mathematical modelling in evolutionary
anthropology.
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